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Florida Expressways and the Public Works Career of Congressman William C. Cramer 
 
Justin C. Whitney 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
   
  Since the introduction of automobiles to Florida in the 1900s, highways have been 
integral to the state’s economy.  In the 1950s, statewide limited-access highway projects 
were introduced in the form of a state-operated turnpike and the national Interstate 
highway system.  This paper traces the simultaneous development of both expressway 
systems, outlining the previous condition of Florida’s highways, the initiatives taken by 
Florida’s governors, and especially the role of William C. Cramer of St. Petersburg, 
Florida’s first Republican United States Congressman since Reconstruction.   
  In the House of Representatives, as a ranking member of the Roads Subcommittee 
of the Public Works Committee, Cramer played a prominent role in shaping federal 
highway policies, addressing corruption in highway politics, keeping Interstates toll-free, 
and preventing highway funds from being diverted to other programs. He battled 
proponents of the Sunshine State Parkway, which ran parallel to designated Interstate 
routes and threatened to make them unfeasible.  As the capstone to his public works 
career, Cramer secured additional mileage to provide for the ‘missing link’ between 
Tampa Bay and Miami, which had not been authorized in the original federal outlays.  
The designation extended a route through St. Petersburg. 
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Introduction 
 
Three hundred feet below the earth's surface, beneath the border of France and 
Switzerland, a miniature Big Bang is taking place.  Scientists have created a device with 
which they can observe subatomic particles slamming into each other at nearly the speed 
of light, in hopes of discovering the nature of these particles, the formations of solar 
systems and galaxies, and the creation of the universe.  I envy these scientists.  Their task 
is relatively simple.  Across the Atlantic in St. Petersburg, Florida, as a student of the 
Florida Studies Program, I observe much more complex phenomena, involving what 
happens when people of diverse backgrounds and expansive technological capabilities 
come together in a state with a unique environmental makeup, asking, what is Florida's 
place in relation to its neighboring regions, the country, the world?  
The familiar lament among scholars of Florida is that the state’s culture is too 
diverse to be understood.  Composed of numerous regions, each culturally distinct and 
some in themselves as diverse as a small state, Florida bewilders and amuses scholars 
trying to find a common thread.  While journalist Michael Paterniti has described Florida 
as “the truest melting pot we have,” novelist Carl Hiaasen describes the state as “almost 
Toffleresque in its chaos.”  Events occur in disjointed, episodic sequences, “as a 
television drama unto itself,” wrote Paterniti, “a place where dots do not connect.”1  
Meanwhile, Florida has come to be regarded as a bellwether state for the rest of the 
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nation.  During the 2008 presidential election, political analysts observed with keen 
interest the behavior of voters along the I-4 corridor running from Tampa Bay through 
Orlando to Daytona Beach.  While voters of this corridor figure out where they stand on 
the issues, this booming population may provide indicators of what direction the nation 
will take. 
What does this mean for the future of Florida and the nation? “To visit a people 
who have no history,” wrote historian Richard Hofstadter, “is like going into a wilderness 
where there are no roads to direct a traveler.  The people have nothing to which they can 
look back; the wisdom of their forefathers are forgotten; the experience of one generation 
is lost to the succeeding one; and the consequence is, that people have little attachment to 
their state, their policy has no system, and their legislature no decided character.”2 My 
aim has been to pinpoint some aspect of history that penetrates the complex, nuanced 
history of modern Florida and the United States.  Throughout the nation, and especially in 
Florida, mobility is perhaps the most common American trait. According to Hofstadter, 
“the American habit of movement has continued in full force even after the 
disappearance of the frontier.”  Helpful in understanding American history, declared 
Hofstadter, would be a “great imaginative book on American movement.”3  
 On reading Hofstadter, I found affirmation for my nearly two years of research on 
Florida’s highways. When people refuse to stand still long enough to allow for a 
thorough study, it seems logical to bring attention to the technology that enables that 
movement.  In fact, my fascination with American mobility dates back to my childhood.  
Some of my earliest memories are of traveling with my family along Interstate 80 from 
my hometown of Evanston, on the Southeast border of Wyoming, to the nearby city of 
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Salt Lake City, Utah, counting train engines on the nearby Union Pacific railroad.  I also 
remember my father waking up early for his drive to nearby mountains, where he labored 
as a technician for a petroleum company, while my mother worked as a front desk clerk 
in hotels built to accommodate passing travelers from distant places.  Next to my grade 
school playground was Interstate 80.  As I slept, the wail of speeding semis pierced the 
silent Wyoming night. In short, I grew up with a pronounced awareness of the prevalence 
of motor transportation in American life.  In fact, I do not recall ever living more than a 
mile or two from an Interstate highway.  
 By focusing on expressways, I hope to bring attention to an aspect of Florida that 
represents a shared experience. Everyone in this state, regardless of background, is 
affected in countless ways by car culture.  Most able adults have experienced driving a 
vehicle, many of them on a daily basis.  With roadways, parking spaces, and garages, the 
built landscape is dominated by motor vehicles, such that areas designated for 
pedestrians, cyclists, and mass transportation are in the margins.  As for the cars 
themselves, drivers often put a great deal of thought into the kinds of vehicles they drive, 
including power, suspension, transmissions, steering, brakes, along with interior comfort, 
such as seats, headrests, and air conditioning.  Take a glance at any newspaper, and motor 
transportation stories are bound to fill a few columns.  The stories deal with road rage, 
hit-and-runs, changes in driving laws and road conditions, suggestions on how and how 
not to drive, car insurance, fuel economy, and the progress of major car companies, to say 
nothing of pages upon pages of new and used car sales advertisements.   
More specifically, I have brought attention to what I consider to be the most 
explosive, defining event in the state’s motor transportation history: the creation of the 
  
4 
Interstate and turnpike systems, starting in the latter half of the twentieth century. This 
study ties together many major elements of the overall Florida story: interregional 
interaction, political transformation, and environmental degradation.  My hope is that this 
study will be useful in discussing Florida’s impressive transportation systems, how they 
came to be, how they shaped the state, and what their future holds in store.  
The year 2006 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the National Interstate and 
Defense Highways Act of 1956.  While President Dwight D. Eisenhower has been 
recognized for his leadership, less has been said about the roles of successive Presidents 
and members of Congress who saw the Interstate system to its completion.  This thesis 
focuses on the endeavors of Congressman William C. Cramer of St. Petersburg, Florida, 
who in the 1960s was the senior Republican on the Roads Subcommittee of the Public 
Works Committee of the House of Representatives.  
On the Roads Subcommittee, Cramer championed the Interstate system during the 
administrations of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. Throughout his career, 
Cramer fought the incorporation of toll highways into Interstate routes.  He stood out 
early in his career in the creation of tougher laws to fight corruption in Interstate 
construction; eventually, the Kennedy administration adopted some of his proposals. 
While President Johnson promoted Great Society programs and escalated the Vietnam 
conflict, Cramer rallied fellow Subcommittee members to prevent Interstate funding from 
being diverted to other programs, a struggle that continued into the Nixon presidency. 
While helping the Subcommittee broker additional Interstate mileage for the nation, 
Cramer secured extra mileage for his home state and district. Thanks largely to Cramer, 
  
5 
Florida gained an Interstate route linking Tampa to Miami, including a loop through St. 
Petersburg with two connectors to the downtown area.  
This thesis situates Cramer within the broader context of Florida highway 
development, from the conception of the Dixie Highway to the present, with emphasis on 
the simultaneous construction of the Florida Turnpike and the Interstate.  Besides 
highlighting Cramer’s efforts to shape Eisenhower’s national vision into the system we 
know today, attention is given to the battles Cramer fought against state officials to 
prevent Florida’s Interstate routes from being altered, delayed, and littered with tolls.   
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The First Wave 
 
In Dirt Roads to Dixie, Howard Lawrence Preston remarked that since the end of 
the Civil War, Florida had been developing a reputation as a “recreational haven.”  
However, nothing Florida’s early admirers said, wrote, drew, or painted “directly” 
changed Florida.  In order for actual change to occur, northerners needed access to the 
state.  Nineteenth century railways spurred the early growth of numerous boomtowns, 
notably Miami and Tampa, but at the turn of the twentieth century, Florida remained the 
most sparsely populated state in the South.  Actual change, Preston remarked, arrived 
with the “throng of automobile tourists attracted by the region’s greater accessibility, 
which highway progressivism made possible.”4 What the Iron Horse did for the West, the 
highway would do for Florida.5 
Essentially inaccessible by car as late as 1910, much of Florida lay “beyond 
arduous and impassable sands, behind impenetrable morasses of red gumbo and just 
around the corner from Stygian cypress swamps and other road unpleasantries,” forcing 
tourists to ship their cars by steam or rail to one of Florida’s cities.6  Gradually, cities and 
counties built roads according to their needs, and a network developed. Initiated in 1914, 
the two major prongs of the Dixie Highway expedited the process of bringing northerners 
south.  Sending motorists down the Atlantic coast of Florida, the east leg of the Dixie 
Highway passed through Jacksonville, St. Augustine, Daytona, Fort Pierce, West Palm 
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Beach, and on to Miami. The western route entered Florida at the panhandle, passing 
through Tallahassee on the way to the interior into Gainesville, Ocala, Orlando, 
Kissimmee, Bartow, Arcadia, Fort Myers, and Marco, then across the Everglades to 
Miami.   
The above cities were blessed with a highway through a combination of 
geography, power, and luck.  To become part of the network, cities bypassed by the 
highway had to exercise some initiative of their own and build links.  This was especially 
true for Tampa and St. Petersburg.  Rather than complain that the Dixie Highway had 
bypassed them, Tampans worked with neighboring communities to create a link to the 
Dixie.  In November 1915, the Tampa Daily Times announced that the last part of the 
road surface between Tampa and Lakeland would soon be completed, providing thirty-
five miles of some of the best brick road in the country.  Although the main Dixie 
Highway would not come within forty miles of Tampa, motorists could be tempted to 
turn west on this finely-built leg, a road fifteen feet in width rather than the usual nine 
feet, with crowning steep enough to evacuate water but not too steep for cars, along with 
culverts and concrete bridges with protective rails for passing over waterways.  The path 
was straight and the grades were smooth.7  
Once on the road from Lakeland to Tampa, tourists might be further tempted by 
intersecting roads of slightly lesser quality, made of clay, shell, or stone, leading to farms, 
tourist sites, or the great unknown.8  From Tampa, motorists could drive to Indian Rocks 
beach in about an hour over a “popular auto drive,” passing through “pine forests, orange 
groves and several pretty country towns.”  A ferry provided access to the island until a 
toll-free bridge was completed in 1915, leading to a “shell drive.”  Indian Rocks 
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anticipated hundreds of visitors on the bridge’s opening day.9 Until they were brought 
into this growing network, many nearby communities remained isolated from incoming 
car traffic.     
By 1920, Florida had a functional motor transportation system, complete with 
main arteries to cities, although there were weaknesses in the system.  A 1921 account 
claimed that of all counties on the drive from Clearwater to Orlando, Pinellas had the 
worst roads.  Brick roads on the county line near Oldsmar were “narrow and rough.”  On 
the turnpike crossing Old Tampa Bay and through Safety Harbor, an unsafe bridge and 
bad road conditions caused traffic to be diverted to Sutherland and Dunnedin.  Unless the 
county made strides, news of bad roads during the upcoming tourist season was sure to 
mar the county’s reputation.10 
Superintendent of county roads C.E. Burleson helped improve the road system 
and modernize the county’s road-building equipment.  When Burleson began, the county 
presented him with 13 mules, “12 of which he said were half dead.”  After four years, he 
acquired a sixty horse power tractor that could accomplish as much as three hundred 
laborers, a clearing plow and a road grader, five Mack trucks, five army trucks, five 
International trucks, and carloads of equipment.  Equipped, Burleson’s team could build 
one mile of road per day.11  Nevertheless, an observer once complained of seeing only 
two men on a Burleson road crew doing any work. The rest were “doing the heavy 
looking on.”12 
Tampa Bay transportation development made great strides in the 1920s.  Daring 
projects paid for themselves in no time and extended prosperity to the surrounding areas. 
The promise applied to projects big and small.  When the bridge to Pass-a-Grille, 
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population twenty, was destroyed by the 1921 hurricane, the Pass-a-Grille Bridge 
Company had saved enough in a single year of operation to rebuild and resume traffic by 
the end of the year. Gearing up to build the Gandy Bridge from St. Petersburg to Tampa, 
promoters looked to the success of the St. Johns River Bridge recently finished in 
Jacksonville.  While an estimated 80,640 vehicles crossed the bridge in 1922, the St. 
John’s River Bridge’s tolls had already paid off twenty percent of its ten-year bonds in 
the first year of operation.13   
The 1920s thus served as a window of opportunity for George S. Gandy to 
construct a bridge linking the commercial city of Tampa to the resort city of St. 
Petersburg, a project twenty years in the making.  In 1913 the surveys began, followed by 
a lengthy application to the War Department to build over navigable waters and the 
passage of necessary state legislation.  The bridge received full authorization just in time 
for World War I and a period of deflation, “when capital ran to cover and refused to be 
coaxed.”  Local residents finally purchased most of the shares, and construction began in 
the fall of 1922.14  
“The rhetoric flowed,” noted journalist Leland Hawes, “as dignitaries from 
around the nation participated in the official opening” of the Gandy Bridge on November 
20, 1924.  St. Petersburg Chamber of Commerce president Bradford Lawrence 
proclaimed, “Two golden shores are now linked by a ribbon of silver.”15  St. Petersburg 
mayor Frank Fortune Pulver waxed similarly that the neighboring cities were diamonds 
joined by a ribbon of gold.16  Whatever kind of ribbon, the Gandy Bridge stood testament 
to the prosperity of the Tampa Bay region while adding to it, uniting a combined 
population exceeding one hundred thousand, the largest metropolitan area in the state.17   
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Tampa Bay residents, said the St. Petersburg Times, had a great opportunity to “join 
hands and work together for the future of southwest Florida.”18   
Previous to the Gandy Bridge’s construction, the shortest road from St. Petersburg 
to Tampa was 43 miles and the shortest steamboat route covered 22 miles, each route 
taking two to three hours. The Gandy Bridge reduced the trip to a mere forty to fifty 
minutes, making the linked cities “virtually one.”19 “One will find it hard to think of a 
more pleasant evening,” gushed the Times, “the long drive over the moonlit waters, the 
car parked out in the middle of the bay for a spell then across to the other shore and 
back.” While Tampans and other Floridians would have easier access to gulf coast 
fishing, bathing beaches, and “countless resort attractions,” St. Petersburg would have at 
its doorstep Tampa’s “quaint Latin colony in Ybor City with its Spanish, Cuban and 
Italian atmosphere of romance and the old world,” the “interesting cigar factories,” and 
the annual Gasparilla Celebration.  It was only a “magnificent pleasure drive” away.20  
Completed in the late 1920s, State Road (SR) 19, later US 19, made Pinellas Point 
the southern apex of a northern Florida trunk line. No longer would tourists have to drive 
through Florida’s interior to get to Tampa Bay.  SR 19 shortened the trip from St. 
Petersburg to Tallahassee to 250 miles, opening St. Petersburg to “immense traffic” from 
northwest Florida.  From Tallahassee, SR 19 headed to the gulf through Lamont and 
Sirmans, then ran parallel to the coast through Perry, Cross City, Oldtown, across the 
Suwannee River, into “the huge development of Homosassa,” and on to St. Petersburg.  
A precursor to mid-century expressways, SR 19 was notable for having “no sharp curves” 
and “long, easy tangents,” including a 10.2-mile straightaway.21  
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For all of Tampa Bay’s road improvements during the 1920s, the Great 
Depression dampened the economic promises.  Tolls failed to keep the Gandy Bridge 
enterprise solvent.  Following the initiative of Senator Claude Pepper and the Roosevelt 
Administration, the federal government bailed out the bridge for $2.38 million and lifted 
the tolls in 1944 as wartime measures.22  Despite hardships, communities maintained their 
road systems and sometimes added modest improvements.  Following a 1935 hurricane, 
the Works Progress Administration improved the drive between St. Petersburg to Tampa, 
rebuilding Tampa’s damaged seawall and adding concrete balconies, benches, and steps 
leading down to docks.23 
 With the rise of automobile usage in Florida came a decline in the use of rails.  In 
the early 1900s, F.A. Davis dreamed of the day when ten thousand passengers per day 
would ride St. Petersburg’s streetcars.  In 1917, the city’s rail system reached that 
benchmark and was ready for expansion.24  But within a few decades, streetcars were 
perceived more as nuisances than conveniences. More people owned cars, and 
motorbuses were going where the trolleys could not.  In the late 1930s, “Miami’s biggest 
traffic headache” stemmed from a traffic island designed for trolleys in the middle of one 
of the United States’ busiest intersections.  Traffic engineers looked forward to replacing 
the trolleys with buses so the island could be removed.25 In 1936, Jacksonville was the 
first major city to give up its trolleys, followed by Miami in 1940, Tampa in 1946, and St. 
Petersburg in 1949.26   
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The Gridlock City 
 
The end of World War II spelled the resumption of automobile manufacturing and 
the end of gas rationing.  Cars flooded downtown streets; parking spaces filled; horns 
blared, and pedestrians ran for cover.  In most cities transportation systems directed 
traffic to the city centers, and downtowns became clogged with more cars than they could 
handle.27  
Traffic jams soon threatened city centers, including St. Petersburg’s.  “Unless a 
solution is found,” predicted a postwar editorial, St. Petersburg’s “entire business district 
will […] inevitably be led into economic chaos as customers move to easier parking 
grounds.”28  During the 1945 tourist season, finding a parking space in St. Petersburg was 
not a problem until late November; by 1946, it was hard to find a space in October.  In 
1947, it was predicted, parking would be difficult in September, and “we will find the 
community strongly united behind a program to do something about traffic.”29  The 
efforts were to no avail. In 1949, the city had only nine thousand parking spaces in the 
business district to accommodate an estimated eighty thousand vehicles and failed to 
create any new spaces the following year.  St. Petersburg was becoming better known as 
the Gridlock City than the Sunshine City.30  
As the city groped for solutions, the problem grew, compelling the St. Petersburg 
Times to publish a three-part series on the city’s traffic problems.  Although Maas 
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Brothers built a million dollar department store in downtown, decentralization, a natural 
reaction to downtown congestion, was already taking place as businesses established 
themselves beyond the gridlock.  City officials told these maverick proprietors they were 
“too far out” to succeed, but the businesses proved them wrong as shopping centers took 
hold on the intersection of Lakeview Avenue and 9th Street South; along Central Avenue 
at 34th Street and between 68th and 72nd Street; at 34th Street and 9th Avenue North; at 16th 
Street and 17th Avenue North; and wherever suburban motels sprouted in place of 
traditional urban hotels.31   
Each new establishment chipped away at downtown’s drawing power, sales 
potential, property value, and tax revenue.  Critics suggested mitigating the problem by 
replacing Albert Whitted Airport with a parking lot, improving public transportation, and 
removing the Atlantic Coast Line railroad tracks along 1st Avenue South.  But city 
leaders, short on resources and initiative, could not act fast enough to keep up with the 
pace of development in other parts of the city.32  
Until the 1940s, residential areas were largely confined to the Central Avenue 
corridor out to 34th Street, the region beyond being “very thinly peopled.”  After the war, 
the corridor, and the city’s center of gravity, began to extend farther towards the Gulf of 
Mexico.  Every year from 1946 to 1949 brought the construction of more than a thousand 
homes in the city’s western reaches, and between two and three thousand homes every 
year from 1950 to 1952.33  At 34th Street and Central Avenue, entrepreneurs developed 
Central Plaza, a major shopping center. The site included two supermarkets, A&P and 
Publix; various chains, including Belk, Liggett’s, McCrory’s, Butler, Diana, Kinney, and 
Singer; and a few local businesses, including two laundromats and an optometrist.34 
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Holding its grand opening in 1952, an estimated fifty thousand customers visited Central 
Plaza on its first day of business.35   
 As development expanded inland, so did St. Petersburg’s transportation agenda, 
and asphalt spread like kudzu across the peninsula.  By the mid-1950s, finding solutions 
for downtown’s gridlock slid from the city’s agenda as planners began envisioning a 
comprehensive, countywide grid system in place of “the awkward system that now 
exists.”36  Fourth Street had only four lanes up to Thirtieth Avenue North, where traffic 
was then squeezed into two lanes up to Gandy Boulevard. Drivers, especially patrons of 
the Derby Lane dog track and Tampa’s Jai-Alai Fronton, would “pass at random,” 
“causing many collisions.”  This “traffic headache” and the addition of the Courtney 
Campbell Bridge prompted the six-laning of Fourth Street and four-laning of Gandy 
Boulevard.37  In 1957, the city put into effect a truck route “to relieve congestion from 
thoroughfares” and “speed truck traffic through the city.”38 Planners kicked around the 
idea of making the county’s roads more amenable to industry and envisioned a “multi-
million dollar bridge and causeway program linking the Gulf beaches.”39  As St. 
Petersburg four-laned Tyrone Boulevard and designated 66th Street as a main artery, 
plans went into motion for another crossroads shopping center where 66th Street 
intersected 18th Avenue North, this one larger than Central Plaza.40  In 1963, the county 
gave St. Petersburg another east-west artery, extending 22nd Avenue North from 34th 
Street to Tyrone Boulevard.41  Taking advantage of the freeze of 1962, the city contracted 
to remove ten thousand dead trees from needed rights-of-way.  Residents complained 
when some of the removed trees “didn’t appear dead.”42   
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On into the late 1950s, downtown still experienced record-breaking traffic jams, 
especially when major events coincided with spring training and when bad weather 
prohibited beach ventures.  Webb’s City continued to have huge sales days, bringing in 
$175,000 in one day in March of 1957, but by 1963 it was evident that the “old-
fashioned, rundown commercial establishments” that occupied downtown were 
increasingly “doomed by competition.”43  The gridlock subsided enough that City 
Manager Lynn Andrews proposed removing the city’s parking meters.44   
While city and county transportation systems grew, regional and statewide 
projects imposed major changes on St. Petersburg. At the end of the war, a network of 
highways and bridges connected the city to Tampa, Jacksonville, Tallahassee, and 
beyond, but the path to Miami still presented a glaring obstacle.  Along the east coast, 
travelers could follow US 1 all the way down to the Overseas Highway to Key West.  On 
the west coast, however, travelers following US 19 had to negotiate Tampa Bay by 
veering inland or by taking chances with the Beeline ferry from Pinellas Point to 
Manatee.   
On the morning the Beeline ferry resumed service at the close of World War II, 
forty cars waited in line to board a barge built to hold twenty-eight cars.  That day, a 
single ferry carried 217 cars.  The Beeline acquired two more ferries after they were 
decommissioned from wartime service, but the crossing remained an inconvenience, not 
to mention discontinuations in service due to labor strikes.45 One motorist complained of 
arriving at Pinellas Point an hour early for the last ferry to Manatee.  After buying his 
ticket, agents told him that the ferry was full and that he would have to drive around the 
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bay.  Angrily, the motorist remarked, “Good will created on the spot is surely worth as 
much as many colorful posters up north.”46  
Determined to devise a better way to cross the bay, the St. Petersburg Port 
Authority considered building a tunnel, but engineers decided that a lower bay bridge 
would be more realistic.47  Completed in 1954, the Sunshine Skyway Bridge made it easy 
to cross the southern portion of Tampa Bay.   
Subsequently, US 19 quickly rose in prominence. To the south of the Skyway, US 
19 joined with highways 41 and 301 in the city of Palmetto, leading to the construction of 
a new bridge across the Manatee River and the four-laning of US 41 to accommodate the 
increased traffic.48 At the northern end of the Skyway, US 19 replaced US 92 along 4th 
Street as St. Petersburg’s main north-south artery.  The sudden presence of traffic created 
demand for the Bayway Bridge across Boca Ciega Bay to sites along barrier islands to 
the west such as Pass-a-Grille, the Don Cesar Hotel, and Pine Key.49  In 1963, traffic at 
the crossing of US 19 and 54th Avenue South prompted the city council to consider 
installing traffic lights.”50  Meanwhile, the intersection of US 19 and US 98 was deemed 
“one of the most dangerous in Florida.”  A third of a mile before the intersection, one of 
the highways narrowed dangerously from four to two lanes.  The state planned to upgrade 
the routes into divided four-lane highways, with one-way drives separated by islands, a 
concept that roadside business proprietors were reluctant to accept.51  
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Terrific Amount of Rock 
 
With the reign of the automobile, St. Petersburg businesses touted their parking 
spaces as much as their actual services.  With a parking lot on Central Avenue and 19th 
Street that accommodated 110 cars for free, the Home Federal Savings and Loan 
Association encouraged its customers to “Save without fuss ...the parking’s on us!”52 
Central Plaza Bank and Trust Company claimed to be “Surrounded By Convenience.”  
Occupying an entire block on US 19 between 2nd and 3rd Street, the bank offered parking 
on every side of the building and a drive-through option, making Central Plaza Bank 
“The Symbol of Banking Convenience.”53  
“Cars, Cars, and More Cars ... a typical Suncoast scene,” read the caption to a St. 
Petersburg Times photograph in which Fords and Chevrolets were lined up bumper-to-
bumper on a four-lane city street with yet more cars occupying every parking space.54  
Throughout the postwar years, Tampa Bay’s population grew remarkably dependent on 
automobiles. In the Tampa-St. Petersburg Metropolitan area, the 1960 census reported 
that 77 percent of central city inhabitants either drove their own cars or car-pooled.  In 
suburban areas, that figure was 81 percent.55  That year, Pinellas guzzled 109 million 
gallons of gasoline, with the state burning 1¾ billion gallons.56 In the three counties 
adjoining Tampa Bay, registered cars reached a total of 353,359. Pinellas County’s 
numbers were striking. From 1950 to 1959, Pinellas experienced a 176 percent increase 
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in car registrations.57  Although Pinellas was Florida’s second-smallest county in total 
area, it had nearly 163,000 registered vehicles, 9,000 more vehicles than Hillsborough 
County.  Statewide, only Dade County had more registered vehicles.58    
The state as a whole also experienced an exponential rise in car usage.  In the 
1950s – the decade that Florida became the nation’s fastest growing state – Florida’s 
highways became among America’s most traveled.  This was largely due to the state’s 
massive number of tourist drivers.  By 1962, Florida was drawing an estimated 10.6 to 
11.5 million tourists every year and expecting “an ever-swelling tide of tourists” in the 
future.  Statistics confirm that the overwhelming majority of these tourists preferred to 
drive – and often not just to singular destinations, but all over the state.  In 1956, out of a 
sample of 4,932 visitors to the St. Petersburg Chamber of Commerce, 81.5 percent came 
by car.  Many visitors made a “circle tour” down one Florida coastline and looping back 
up the other.59  
Florida’s residents also preferred to drive. Car culture had so pervaded Florida 
that when the St. Petersburg Times discovered that a Circuit Court judge still actually 
commuted to and from Dade City “via Choo Choo,” reporters were incredulous.  Despite 
the judge’s commitment to the Atlantic Coast Line, the closest depot to his home was 
seven miles away in Trilby.  From there, he depended on a cab.60 By 1960, Florida’s 
resident drivers ranked ninth in the nation at three million.  With tourists and residents 
combined, Florida ranked third only behind California and New York in the number of 
highway-using vehicles, edging ahead of the higher-populated Texas.61  
Statewide, Florida struggled to keep up with the automobile invasion.  By and 
large, citizens had the will to build the necessary highways, the ideas were there, and so 
  
19 
were the money and materials, but the government experienced a great deal of difficulty 
getting organized and, after that, staying on track.  During Governor Fuller Warren’s 
administration some ambitious projects went into motion, particularly the Jacksonville 
expressway system.  However, it might also be said that Warren’s administration adhered 
to the spoils system of government.  Duval County, home of Warren and the Jacksonville 
expressway, received far more funds than any other county during Warren’s 
administration, in 1953 soaking up almost twice as much state primary road funds as any 
other county.  Despite the funds heaped on the expressway, the Tampa Tribune reported 
in 1954 that although bond issues had been raised and spent to speed the expressway’s 
completion, the state had thus far neglected to do its part. 62   
Meanwhile, several demographically small, undeserving counties received far 
more than their fair share as road agendas in developing parts of the state went hungry.63  
In December 1951, the Tampa Morning Tribune reported that Hernando had received 
more state road money than Hillsborough since Warren’s inauguration, even though, 
according to the last census, Hillsborough’s population was 249,894 while Hernando’s 
was 6,693.64  This spoke of the unchecked power of the road board and its chairmanship.  
Regardless of how much the counties gave the state in gasoline taxes, they were only 
guaranteed a twenty percent return; the other eighty percent was spent at the state’s 
discretion; while Hernando was the home of Warren’s appointed road board chairman, 
Alfred A. McKethan.65   
During McKethan’s chairmanship, Hernando turned its share of the gasoline tax 
over to the state along with $30,000 a year in county road funds.  What the state did with 
the sum of state and local funds raised a few eyebrows.  McKethan donated, at what he 
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deemed “considerable sacrifice,” seven-and-a-half acres on the gulf for county parkland 
at Pine Island; then the road department contracted to build a bridge and highway to the 
park passing directly through McKethan’s adjacent property, this one privately 
developed.  Meanwhile, the parkland was dredged and filled at the state’s expense.  
Whether it was even prudent to dredge the area was questionable.  E.A. Lopez, Jr. of the 
Laguna Corportation admitted that his company’s dredge, operating at $25.45 per hour, 
was working constantly and running into “a terrific amount of rock.”  In a few months, 
Laguna took in $13,000 from the Pine Island project.66   
In other parts of the state, McKethan was accused of putting politics before civic-
mindedness.  According to the Range Line Road Association, a group representing 
Sarasota and neighboring municipalities, a proposed bridge crossing the Manatee River 
ought to have directed traffic onto Fifteenth Street rather than First Street, thus avoiding 
the creation of a new bottleneck in the already congested Bradenton.  Only a “selfish” 
minority was “anxious for the bridge to be placed” at First Street. Local mayors and 
county commissioners agreed on this and convinced McKethan’s engineers of the ideal 
location.  Then, McKethan was reportedly “cornered” by a few individuals and changed 
the route to First Street, where the bridge landing was eventually built.67  McKethan was 
also accused of arranging a major highway from the northeastern United States to Tampa 
Bay (probably US 301) to “ben[d] at right-angles through Starke to pass [Senator] 
Charley Johns’ tourist cabins.”68 
Sources indicate that much of the damage inflicted during previous 
administrations was rectified during the brief administration of Governor Daniel T. 
McCarty and his road board.  Where previous road boards hired unnecessary staff and 
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initiated narrow-sighted road projects for the benefit of a privileged minority, McCarty’s 
board laid off four hundred employees, eliminated six million dollars worth of unworthy 
road projects, and started practical projects which would receive approval and funding 
from the federal government.69   
McCarty’s road board chairman, Richard Simpson, was well regarded among his 
colleagues and throughout the state.  As a former speaker of the state legislature, he was, 
according to the Tampa Morning Tribune, an “advocate of good government who was 
deliberate in action and fair-minded in argument.”70  Thomas B. Manuel of the fourth 
district expressed gratitude for Simpson’s “advice and counsel and for the consideration 
shown by you and the entire Board to the traffic needs of this district.”  During its first 
meeting, Simpson’s board agreed to allocate funds “regardless of location, based on 
engineering reports showing the greatest need.”  Manuel’s fourth district included Dade 
County, which contributed nearly eighteen percent of the state’s gasoline tax, while the 
district as a whole contributed nearly thirty percent.  Historically, the fourth district did 
not receive its fair share of funding and was in constant need of improvements.  By the 
end of 1953, the fourth district had forty-eight projects under construction and $55 
million in new projects slated for 1954.71   
Likewise, board member J. Saxton Lloyd of Daytona Beach brought to his home 
county of Volusia $900,000 for four-laning and improving parts of the heavily burdened 
US 1 along with another $496 million for a bypass truck route.  Not one to privilege his 
county unfairly, Lloyd also sought federal assistance for improvements to US 1 in other 
parts of his district.72   
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Governor McCarty suffered a heart attack and died in his first year in office. 
Senate President Charley Johns took over shortly thereafter; subsequently, the tenure of 
McCarty’s proactive road board was also cut short.  On December 11, 1953, Johns 
suspended the entire road board and turnpike authority and appointed new officials in 
their place. 73  As the new road board set to work, Johns campaigned for the 1954 
gubernatorial election.  Soon, the entire state began to notice that a flimsy style of politics 
dictating the administration’s road agenda.  By summer, people from all around the state 
were complaining about Johns’s ill-conceived road agenda.   
The Tampa Bay area was especially critical of Johns, particularly after he ordered 
road board chairman Cecil M. Webb to hold hearings for a toll reduction on the Sunshine 
Skyway – still under construction – to one dollar.  Webb took the matter to Coverdale 
and Colpitts, the consulting firm that set the toll-rate based on calculated earnings 
statements.  The firm responded that although the reduced toll would induce a hundred 
thousand more cars across the bridge every year, five hundred thousand annual crossings 
would be needed to make up for the lost revenue.  Johns’s move was interpreted as purely 
political, not practical.  Johns, it was suggested, ought to turn his attention to the 
completion of US 19, which to date forced “1.2 miles of east-west driving detours and 
about three miles of travel on ordinary city streets” through St. Petersburg, the 
inconvenience resulting in “a potential loss of $70,000 or more in [Skyway] revenues.”74   
Simpson also accused Johns’s road board of rushing “skeleton or incomplete 
plans,” giving contractors only two days to study the plans and make bids.  To cover their 
assets, contractors would bid high, so high that the Bureau of Public Roads would refuse 
to finance the project. Chairman Webb responded that Florida could still use the federal 
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money on other projects, but Simpson pointed out that federal money had to be matched 
by state money, which was in limited supply; in recent years the state lost nearly $12 
million in unmatched federal money. Examples of lost federal funding due to rushed 
contracts included the northern approach to the Skyway, the San Marco overpass on the 
Jacksonville Expressway, and a stretch of US 1 north of Jacksonville.75 
Johns’s reign was especially felt in Tampa.  Where McCarty’s administration set 
out to extend the Dale Mabry Highway northward – eventually connecting it to US 41 
and US 19 near Weeki Wachee Springs, “vastly improv[ing] access to Tampa from the 
two main tourist routes into the West Coast area” and “speed[ing] up local traffic by 
taking pressure off the approaches to U.S. 41” – Johns promised voters in Sulphur 
Springs that he would block the extension of the Dale Mabry Highway north of 
Hillsborough Avenue in order to force traffic to drive past Sulphur Springs’ motels and 
attractions.  “Consider what this means to the growth of Tampa,” pointed out the Tampa 
Morning Tribune.  Not only was Johns’s proposal poorly conceived, it was ill informed; 
his own road department had already begun construction on Dale Mabry north of 
Hillsborough Avenue.76 
Perhaps Johns’s biggest mistake in his bid for governor was “heaping unjustified 
abuse” on Simpson’s suspended road board.  Simpson, initially accepting his suspension 
gracefully, could “no longer sit still” as Johns publicly denounced him and his colleagues 
as a “do-nothing” board that would not “cooperate” with him.  Simpson, well versed in 
Johns’s record, unleashed some criticism of his own while helping gubernatorial 
candidate LeRoy Collins shape a road agenda that would win the voters’ confidence.  As 
for his lack of cooperation with “the Acting Governor,” Simpson recalled being 
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reprimanded by Johns three times: “for refusing to find some way to change a contract in 
favor of a senator’s friend at a loss (to the state) of approximately $100,000;” for not 
granting “special consideration” to a contractor; and for not inflating a property 
assessment for a friend of Johns.  As for the “do-nothing” board, Simpson explained: 
“When we took over […] we found the road department in the worst financial condition 
in its history. … The total deficit […] was close to $28,000,000. […] The McCarty road 
board met the deficit, carried on a creditable, if limited, building program and 
accumulated enough cash to make the 1954 program possible. […] History will show that 
1953 was the most constructive year of the Road Department since its creation.”77 
Johns also accused Simpson’s board of budgeting only a million dollars for the 
Jacksonville expressway merely “in order to keep it alive” for political reasons. In reality, 
said Simpson, the McCarty administration “told the people the full truth about the 
expressway. We pulled it down from a heaven of promises and made out of it a fine 
practical project, actually spending around two million dollars of State money on it.”  
Johns, Simpson recalled, was more severe than McCarty, openly refusing to spend any 
more than “what normally would be spent” in Duval so that more funds would be 
available for his own district.78   
Other criticisms of Johns included “openly and brazenly promising roads and 
bridges far beyond his ability to deliver;” hiring a Director of Wildlife Exhibits even 
though the Road Department did not have a wildlife exhibit; hiring three extra lawyers 
for the Jacksonville expressway though there was not enough work for one; and 
needlessly inflating the costs of a proposed turnpike. “In view of the present situation,” 
quipped Simpson, “non-cooperation may be regarded as a mark of distinction.”  The 
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chief engineer of the road department, Sam Turnbull, concurred.  After twenty-eight 
years of service and only twenty-two months before retirement, Turnbull resigned from 
his post, remarking that Johns’s road board needed “a political engineer instead of a 
professional one.”79 
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Interlopers 
 
 With Johns in power, proponents of progressive government began to take steps 
towards reforming Florida’s road department.  In the 1950s, the five members of the state 
road board represented the congressional districts as drawn in 1937.  With board 
members elected for four-year terms by the governor, Senator B.C. Pearce complained 
that the system provided “no continuity from administration to administration:” “A 
governor appoints a road board that develops a program that fits in with his ideas.  That 
program is just under way well when a new governor is elected.  He names his own road 
board and, more often than not, its ideas are directly opposite those of its predecessor 
board.  So it throws out the old program and starts one of its own.”80   
In 1954, the state Legislative Council organized a special committee to make “an 
exhaustive study of all phases of Florida road building with a view toward drafting 
recommendations for a highway code.”  Some suggested staggering road board 
appointments to create more continuity. Pearce, a committee member, wanted to see an 
elected board member from each of the eight congressional districts, with the state as a 
whole electing a chairman.  Others asked, “What’s the point?” The congressional district 
lines were no fairer than the road districts’.81  
While campaigning in 1954, Collins heard pleas to save Florida from outmoded 
transportation governance.  The Dade County Central Labor Union complained of 
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Florida’s “spoils system” of government, which with every new administration brought 
the firing of hundreds of road workers.  In response, Collins favored “career service” and 
promised to “take politics out of State employment.”82 Just as the Range Line Association 
turned to Collins with its bridge predicament, the citizens of Port St. Joe sought salvation 
from a highway from Apalachicola that, at the behest of Johns’s crony George Tapper, 
was going to transform Harrison Avenue, through the community’s “nicest residential 
section,” into a major thoroughfare.  Johns reportedly gave Port St. Joe an ultimatum: 
take the highway as planned, or be bypassed altogether: not a viable option for St. Joe 
Paper Company.83   
Near Lake Okeechobee, Tom Gaskins was fighting with all his might to save “a 
beautiful Cabbage and Oak Hammock that thousands of visitors have admired” in the 
middle of his Cypress Knee Museum site from being destroyed by a rerouting of US 27.  
“[I]t’s not just some small filling station they are going to ruin,” howled Gaskins, 
explaining that his attraction was listed on “pictorial road maps of Florida, recommended 
by the A.A.A. and other tour guides,” and “written up in many national magazines.”  
Convinced that a hostile government intended to destroy him, Gaskins turned to Collins 
as a last resort, vowing to “spend a great deal of thought in publicizing this dastardly act” 
if it came to fruition, as it sadly did.84 
In this atmosphere of frustration, Collins ran for governor with the promise of 
modernizing the government.  Progressives were hungry for a methodical system of 
government that ceased to allow small-county officials, ‘pork-choppers,’ to dictate where 
to build the state’s highways. Collins and his administrative assistant, Joe Grotegut, 
received tips on Johns’s misdeeds and valuable advice from a network of insiders, 
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including Simpson.  With this, Collins took a firm stand on road issues and organized 
solid support by seeking to eliminate politics from road planning; supporting staggered 
terms for road board members; rejecting the division of road money based on antiquated 
district lines; and promoting “a legal designation of a state arterial system” with provision 
for “ultimate, reasonable, limited access features.”  Although Collins knew where he 
thought new superhighways should be built, he emphasized that such decisions are “not 
for the Governor to decide.”85   
Although, as we shall see, the Collins administration can be credited with 
temporarily kicking the state’s turnpike program into high gear, the governor could not 
follow through with all of his promises.  In particular, he was unable to establish order in 
the state road department. In Florida, as in many other states, business as usual was 
frequently unethical; some acts, if not criminal in the legal sense, should have been. 
Collins, though himself an agent of change, would be a victim of unfortunate timing, his 
term coinciding with a surge of investigations into Florida’s highway construction 
outlays, with some of the blame resting with the governor and his appointees for not 
whipping the road department into shape.  
Scott Kelly, appointed chairman of the senate’s Public Roads and Highways 
Committee in June 1959, created the Legislative Interim Committee on Public Roads and 
Highways to develop legislation to address problems with the road department. From 
October 1959 to April 1961, the Kelly Committee ran hearings throughout the state, 
revealing evidence of “bribery, substandard work, conflicts of interest, profiteering, 
kickbacks, waste and corruption.”  The accused included “contractors, material suppliers, 
engineers, real estate investors,” as well as politicians. Numerous road department 
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employees were caught accepting gifts and paychecks from contractors.  Committee 
members included Senator Johns and Legislator E.C. Rowell, who were especially eager 
to find dirt on Collins’s road board.  In this, the committee was successful, as Collins’s 
road board members were caught in conflicts of interest involving building materials and 
real estate along the right of way, with one member’s parcel of land originally appraised 
for $3,200 reappraised for $41,107 before being sold to the state.86   
The investigation revealed what was already widely known about Florida’s 
Democratic establishment, which was entrenched, stuck in its ways, and without serious 
challenge for over a century.  Even Governor Collins was unable to act fast enough to 
make long overdue changes in government operations.  Metropolitan areas, especially the 
Tampa Bay region and Dade County, had had enough. As long as small county 
representatives dominated state politics, soaked metropolitan areas for taxes, and gave 
little back in return, metropolitan counties would blast the pork chop agenda.  In the 
1950s, Republicans created a small but meaningful dent in the Democratic hegemony, 
installing representatives not just into federal judgeships and postmaster general 
positions, but also into city councils, county commissions, the state legislature, and the 
United States Congress.   
St. Petersburg and Pinellas County led the Republican revolution. As with many 
of Florida’s cities, migrants flooded into St. Petersburg, and the city grew in just a few 
decades from a quaint resort town into a bustling city.  Most of St. Petersburg’s residents 
were not from Florida – fewer than 20 percent were Florida natives in 1950; and most 
residents were not even drawn from the South, but the Midwest.  The newcomers brought 
with them Republican politics.  The status quo was not deeply invested in the ‘Southern 
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way of life,’ especially when it came to politics.87  Instead, this maverick city acquired a 
fighting, can-do spirit, spanned impressive bridges across the bay, grew, and prospered.  
Fighting for fair representation from its inception, the relationship of Pinellas County to 
neighboring Hillsborough and the state as a whole was like David to Goliath. No longer 
satisfied with trying to reform the Democratic Party from within, a homegrown 
Republican populace transformed the county into a GOP stronghold and sent Florida’s 
first Republican congressman since Reconstruction to Washington.  
 The life of Congressman William Cato Cramer is illustrative of Tampa Bay’s 
transformation. Cramer was born in Colorado in 1922, and he migrated with his family to 
St. Petersburg when he was three years old. William’s mother worked as a laundress and 
his father peddled citrus.  A St. Petersburg Times reporter wrote of him: “If Cramer 
believes that in this nation any poor railsplitter can become President, it is not so much 
the life of Lincoln that tells him so, but his own life.  He is right out of Horatio Alger.”88  
Signs of Cramer’s political destiny were evident early in his youth. 
Foreshadowing his conservative law-and-order agenda, his classmates at Lealman Junior 
High elected him as the lieutenant colonel of the schoolboy patrol.  Cramer stayed 
engaged in student government at St. Petersburg High School and St. Petersburg Jr. 
College.  During World War II, he joined the Navy’s V-12 program, where he “turned the 
tragedy of war into a personal opportunity,” attending the University of North Carolina, 
rising to the rank of lieutenant, and serving his country in Southern France on D-Day.  
While completing his studies at UNC, he convinced Dean E. N. Griswold to admit him to 
Harvard law school.89 
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In 1948, his studies behind him, Cramer returned home to an American South 
undergoing a profound political shift. For years, Gallup polls showed a majority of 
southerners believing “the South would be better off, in general, if there were two 
political parties of about equal strength instead of one strong party.”  From 1939 to 1946, 
the percentage favoring two parties increased from 57 to 62 percent.  During a similar 
period, 1932 to 1944, the percentage of southerners voting Democrat decreased from 76 
to 69 percent, and in Florida the percentage fell from 75 to 70 percent.  “Competition” 
was widely considered “essential to a sound democracy” and necessary to “help build 
ideas” – “and the south could sure use some new ideas,” quipped an observer.  It was also 
argued that if democrats nationwide could no longer take the South for granted, the 
region might receive “more attention from Washington and have greater say in 
Democratic party councils.”90  
President Harry Truman expedited the South’s transformation.  At the request of 
“Black leaders,” Truman formed the President’s Commission on Civil Rights, which 
released a report in 1947 entitled To Secure These Rights.  The report was more than a 
bland statement of the nation’s race problems; it was a call to action that “sketched out 
the liberal agenda on civil rights for the next twenty years.”91 Truman’s Committee was 
repulsed by the perverse treatment of blacks, “a kind of moral dry rot which eats away at 
the emotional and rational basis of democratic beliefs.”  There was also a political 
motive.  Truman believed that the black vote would help reelect him in 1948.92  For 
segregationist southern Democrats, this affront, plus the approval of Hubert Humphrey’s 
civil rights plank, along with the nomination of Truman for a second term, prompted the 
formation of the Dixiecrats.93   
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With the Democratic Party in splinters, the time was ripe for change, and few 
counties were as ready as Pinellas.  “Give Pinellas County A Two Party System,” was the 
battle cry in 1948.  “If a two party system is good for the nation, it is good for Florida and 
Pinellas County,” announced Ohio Senator Robert Taft.  That year left a few chinks in 
the armor of Pinellas Democrats, with Dewey receiving 24,900 votes to Truman’s 15,724 
and Republicans capturing numerous positions, including two county commission seats, 
the supervisor of registration, justice of the peace, and tax assessor.  Now a young 
lawyer, Cramer took notice, betrayed his family’s party affiliation, and led the charge as 
Republicans geared up for the election of 1950.94   
Adeptly exploiting the political circumstances, Cramer’s Republican surge came 
as a complete surprise to “the slumbering Democrats who were not used to GOP 
challenges.”  “[O]ut-organized,” “out-hustled,” and “smeared,” Democrats hardly knew 
what hit them as fourteen of fifteen county offices went to Republicans and Cramer was 
elevated to the state legislature. Summing up the election, a St. Petersburg Times cartoon 
depicted a “herd of stampeding elephants running roughshod over a sole donkey.”  As St. 
Petersburg became Florida’s undisputed Capital of the Republican Party, the Times cried 
out, “Hey, We Said A Two Party System!” “Almost overnight,” concluded political 
scientist Darryl Paulson, “Cramer transformed Republicans from minor players in local 
politics to the party that would dominate Pinellas politics for the next half century.”95 
Two other Republicans accompanied Cramer to Tallahassee, and Cramer did 
everything in his power to make their presence known. “We used the U.S. House rules,” 
Cramer recalled, “insisted on our rights, held caucuses, nominated me as Speaker of the 
House.  I got three votes.”  When Democrats held a caucus to distribute pageboy jobs, 
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Cramer introduced his first resolution “lamenting” the exclusion of the minority party. 
With an air of “condescending tolerance,” Democrats granted the interlopers another 
page.  Cramer also proposed a resolution expressing “appreciation and gratitude” to 
General Douglas MacArthur, recently terminated by Truman. Democrats “mashed” the 
resolution, 14 to 62.  In general, there was little the trio could do to “ripple the placid 
Democratic pond,” so Cramer cosponsored favorable Democratic bills.96    
During Cramer’s first and only term in the state legislature, Eisenhower and the 
GOP made some inroads in the South.  In 1952, six southern Republicans were elected to 
the House of Representatives, five of them from contiguous Blue Ridge districts in 
Tennessee, Virginia, and North Carolina.  Cramer himself ran for Congress, but lost 
narrowly to Courtney Campbell, ostensibly “on the count of absentee ballots.” Cramer 
returned to Pinellas, where he again practiced law, was appointed county attorney, and 
“never stopped running” for Congress.97    
As county attorney, a part-time, $5,000-a-year position, Cramer “represented the 
county in legal matters involving rights-of-way, sewers, submerged land, and the control 
of dogs and hot-rodders.” For extra services, he charged the county extra, and for this he 
received criticism. As a minority party, Republicans had promised to eliminate or revise 
the post of county attorney, otherwise known as the “sixth commissioner,” deeming the 
position too powerful not to be accountable to voters; but once in power, republicans 
neglected to relinquish the office.  To his credit, Cramer drafted legislation that would 
create a “fulltime legal department” with a salary “worthy of an attorney’s time.” Long 
after Cramer’s departure the bill finally passed.98  
  
34 
 George Gallup remarked back in 1946 that “the more taste a southern state has of 
an effective two-party system, the more it likes that system.”99  Florida’s top Democrats 
were cognizant of this problem in 1954, as gubernatorial candidate LeRoy Collins and 
United States Senators Spessard Holland and George Smathers campaigned in St. 
Petersburg for the reelection of Florida’s seven United States Representatives – all 
Democrats.100  That year, Gallup’s observation still held, as southern Republicans lost 
one House seat but gained two more, both in metropolitan districts: Bruce Alger of 
Dallas, and Cramer, Florida’s first Republican Congressman “since the days of President 
Andrew Johnson.”  In addition, Republicans won seven seats in the Florida legislature.101    
That same year, the Supreme Court decision, Brown versus the Board of 
Education, outlawed segregation in public schools, and quickly alienated southerners 
from the Republican Party.  Drafted by Eisenhower appointee Chief Justice Earl Warren, 
the decision dismayed the president.  Nevertheless, in 1957, Eisenhower upheld the 
verdict with force in Little Rock, Arkansas, sealing the Republican fate in the South.  
After 1954, the South elected no new Republicans for the rest of the decade.  For the 
moment at least, Gallup was wrong; the South had its fill of Republicans, though Cramer 
was already in office.102   
 In Washington, Cramer placed friend and assistant Jack Insco on the 
congressional payroll as “district assistant.”  With Insco as his “eyes, ears and alter ego,” 
Cramer was able to “build a political party from one thousand miles away” as he “wooed 
his new constituency without mercy:”  “His weekly reports were carried that first term on 
13 radio and three television stations in his four-county district, more than 5,000 
newsletters were mailed from his office every two weeks, he toured the district whenever 
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possible in an office-trailer to hear complaints and requests, and he made 182 speeches, 
as many as 51 a month.”  Cramer was everywhere.  According to legend, “if two 
members of the GOP chanced to meet on a street corner, he showed up, too.”  Never 
missing a meeting, Cramer was appointed Republican National Committeeman.  
Eventually, Pinellas Republicans rivaled Democrats in numbers.103   
 Although an ardent organizer for the GOP, Cramer’s Republican loyalty was 
consistently trumped by two agendas.  First, he supported the “conservative coalition:” 
“that amalgamation of conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats that 
materializes when the issue involves the rights of the states – or the rights of the Negro 
minority.” As long as he served in the House his coalition support “never slipped below 
73 percent;” in 1959 he had a “perfect 100 score;” and in 1956 he insisted on signing the 
Southern Manifesto, though he later considered the decision a mistake.104  The only 
matter to rival his conservatism, ironically, was a bill that frequently challenged the rights 
of the states: the National Interstate and Defense Highways Act of 1956. 
 Cramer’s appointment to the Roads Subcommittee of the House Public Works 
Committee during the development of the interstate highway system was a case of being, 
to borrow one of the politician’s most commonly used phrases, “in the right place at the 
right time.”  Florida had an exceptional number of vehicles on its roads, and so did the 
nation as a whole. Transport for a new America required a new kind of highway.  In the 
age of the high-speed automobile, the same highway could not satisfy both the need for 
local access and for high-speed motion.  Traditional highways had been “encroached 
upon by commercial . . . uses,” resulting in “disorderly strips of commercial 
development” which contributed to the “progressive deterioration of adjacent residential 
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communities,” and it forced traffic to merge from a standstill onto high-speed lanes, 
increasing the chances of a collision.105  
During World War II, the United States found the highway it wanted in a nonstop, 
limited access, divided highway called the German Autobahn.  On such a highway, 
Americans would be able to travel hundreds of miles without ever having to wait at an 
intersection, without worrying whether around the next bend or over the next hill a 
motorist was going to merge onto the highway from a dead stop, creating the potential for 
a deadly accident; without having to stare into the headlights of a oncoming truck only to 
discover a moment too late that the truck had drifted into oncoming traffic.   
The 1950s proved a monumental decade in federal road funding.  Since 1939, 
when the United States began gearing up for World War II, each successive presidential 
administration “argued in favor of relatively low road outlays.” At last, in 1954, President 
Dwight Eisenhower “endorsed a big jump in road spending,” issuing reports that 
America’s highways “had deteriorated to a point where drastic action was necessary.”106  
Cramer was at the end of his first term when Eisenhower pushed through his giant public 
works bill.  As a junior member of the roads subcommittee, Cramer played a minor role 
in the initial shaping of the bill and immersed himself in all aspects of the monumental 
legislation while learning the ropes in Washington.   
By the end of the decade, Cramer was coming into his own as a public works 
legislator.  Working closely with interstate program experts and officials, Cramer relished 
the complexities of Washington and soon was reshaping and drafting amendments to the 
interstate program.  On the one hand, Cramer was very collaborative and eager to work 
with individuals on either side of the aisle who wanted to see the project to its fruition.  
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On the other hand, he was extremely combative and quick to find errors, especially under 
Democratic rule.  He could be irritating, but colleagues soon recognized that debates with 
Cramer generally yielded strong, well-considered resolutions.  Couple his lawmaking 
ability with his rising influence, first as senior Republican on the roads subcommittee and 
then on the public works committee, and by 1963 Cramer was assuming a fairly 
influential role in Washington.  By extension, he effectively insinuated himself into 
Florida highway politics, using every bit of knowledge, every connection, and every tool 
at his disposal to shape the state’s highway systems to the ends he saw fit. 
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Bobtail 
 
 Before the advent of interstate and other limited-access highways, Florida faced 
dire challenges in providing safe and convenient routes for tourists and citizens.  When 
LeRoy Collins ran for governor in 1954, letters flowed into his office on what to do about 
the state’s most important north-south thoroughfare, overburdened US 1. “If U.S. 1 had 
been intelligently handled from the beginning,” said one observer, “Florida would have 
no great problem now; however towns were permitted to grow up on the highway, local 
jurisdiction was allowed, schools were permitted to be built, quite unnecessarily right on 
the highway, with the result that from Jacksonville to Miami there are hundreds, maybe 
thousands of ‘School Slow’ signs.  . . . Today a driver is fortunate and able indeed who 
can drive from Jacksonville to Miami in less than fourteen hours whereas he should be 
able to do it in seven.”107 
Collins responded that US 1 could be four-laned, as it should have been from the 
start, but “current road funds” would not permit a major overhaul transforming US 1 into 
the north-south artery that Florida needed.108  That need would have to be fulfilled by the 
construction of a project that had been on the minds of highway advocates for years.   
As early as 1941, the state of Florida had considered proposals for a statewide 
thru-highway providing easy access to Miami from the Georgia border. Florida highway 
promoters proclaimed that with the five-day week, the desire of Americans to “see more 
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of their native land,” retirement plans, and vacations, people were “taking to the 
highways of this country by the millions.”  The war effort undercut the possibility of such 
projects, but by the early 1950s, the “spectacular growth of Florida” and the “desire of 
tourists to visit all sections of Florida” made it imperative for the state to build a north-
south limited access highway.109  
For $62 million, the Warren administration found the state could build the first 
segment of a limited access turnpike. Exploring the possibilities, a delegation from 
Simpson’s road board visited the Pennsylvania Turnpike and the New Jersey Turnpike, 
seeking assurance that an expressway would not make “Ghost Towns” along the previous 
routes. They returned “feeling that the turnpikes were practical, that they did not tend to 
harm by-passed communities, and that they had good public acceptance.” Nevertheless, 
the question was still a toss-up.  Florida lacked the “large centers of population” and 
“industry found in the states visited,” as well as the “vast number of vehicles” needed to 
justify a turnpike. Then again, the “experience of other states” had shown that traffic 
could be “induced” and make for a “successful venture.”110  
Simpson’s Road Board recommended the construction of this expressway by a 
turnpike authority and that the agency should be authorized by the Florida legislature.  
That way, the authority would have better legal standing and would be established in a 
more democratic manner, as opposed to authorization from a handful of officials on the 
Internal Improvement Commission or the Road Board.111  Simpson’s board also 
expanded the Warren administration’s plans, but through the Johns administration, the 
turnpike had still not been set into motion.  According to Simpson, Johns needlessly 
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managed to inflate the cost by forty percent, at a profit to the consulting firm, Parsons, 
Brinkerhoff, Hall and McDonald.112   
While the state talked about building a turnpike, the Sunshine Skyway Bridge 
linked the lower Pinellas peninsula to the mainland.  Completed in September of 1954, 
the bridge marked a new level of commitment to road construction, demonstrating the 
revolutionary progress that a major transportation project could bring to the state. It was 
widely recognized, in Florida, and throughout the nation, that the completion of the 
Skyway marked a new era in Florida’s development. The New York Times dubbed the 
Skyway “the most important single factor in the entire area it is to serve,” accelerating 
fruit traffic, closing the gap to Miami, and generating an anticipated million dollars 
annually in toll revenue.113 In 1954, the Florida Power Company predicted that 
population increases on the west coast of Florida would nearly double, up from 17.5 
percent over the usual five-year period to 31.79 percent, while in five years increases in 
retail sales would jump from 14.5 percent to 31.7 percent.114   
Indeed, a new era in the region’s history had begun.  “St. Petersburg at 
midcentury,” writes historian Raymond Arsenault, “was closer to its past than to its 
future.”115 In the decades following construction of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge, “the 
entire Tampa Bay region would be transformed into a spiraling metropolis.”116 The west 
coast of Florida at the end of the war, said another observer, consisted of “a string of 
isolated communities with long stretches of undeveloped land separating them.”117  With 
the Skyway closing the last major gap on the gulf coast, cities such as St. Petersburg, 
Sarasota, Clearwater, Bradenton, Tarpon Springs, Venice, and Naples became prominent 
features of the once desolate west coast landscape.   
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Amidst celebration of the new bridge, Collins pronounced himself the governor 
who would build the turnpike. His election closely coinciding with the bridge’s 
completion, Collins deemed the achievement “of tremendous importance to the future of 
a great area of Florida.”  In it, he saw the “vision of the sort we in Florida must have if 
we are to meet the challenges facing us and realize our boundless opportunities.”118  
Collins saw “no limit to Florida’s tourist and other possibilities” and was “determined 
that we shall have the kind of roads and the kind of government in other ways that will 
enable us to realize our boundless opportunities.”119 The Skyway, a symbolic milestone, 
exemplified the forward-thinking approach to engineering and financing that would guide 
the creation of a state turnpike. Months before his inauguration, Collins took up the reins 
and rushed the turnpike into motion. 
 Before Collins was elected, the state had some general ideas of where a turnpike 
might be built.  In the early 1950s, state officials contemplated an east coast route, from 
Jacksonville to Miami, or an inland route, serving “the great agricultural areas of the 
Everglades and Central Florida.”  Either route would provide a link to Tampa Bay. 120  
The central route would be less expensive to build, passing through “low priced farm-
grove and pasture land” while still being within range of major cities.121   
Rather than build the entire highway at once, successive road departments 
endeavored first to construct a limited-access highway along the southeast coast from 
Stuart to Miami, an area in need of “traffic relief at the earliest possible moment,” and to 
build the extension to Georgia later.  The first segment became known as the ‘bobtail,’ a 
somewhat denigrating term referring to the 108-mile-long highway’s shortness and 
inadequacy to the state’s overall needs.122   
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The Collins administration inherited plans for the bobtail, but they needed much 
revision.  Sam Turnbull reported to Thomas Manuel that out of eighty planned structures, 
only fourteen were salvageable, mainly because they were the only ones to adhere to a 
standard road width of twenty-eight feet.123  New plans were quickly drawn.   
The decisiveness of the Collins administration rested on the time-tested expertise 
of a number of consultants from around the country.  On the twenty-third floor of 120 
Wall Street, reinstated road department officials Sam Turnbull and Thomas Manuel met 
with Sam P. Brown of Coverdale and Colpitts, the firm producing the turnpike’s traffic 
and earnings report.  Also present was R.N. Bergendoff of Howard, Needles, Tammen 
and Bergendoff, whose firm was drafting the engineering report miles away in Kansas 
City, in close concurrence with Coverdale and Colpitts’s earnings report.  As of 
November of 1954, a few kinks still had to be worked out.  The routing was not quite 
settled; Coverdale and Colpitts needed assurance that the Florida legislature would 
rescind a decision to convert Route 9 north of Hollywood Boulevard into a limited 
access, and therefore competitive, highway; and the consulting firm also needed to know 
before completing a revenue estimate that the turnpike’s restaurant facilities would be up 
to par, their quality to be regulated by the state.124  
As the year came to an end, Collins’s team made a last ditch effort to make slight 
alterations to the route, but Brown waved them off in lieu of the timeline drawn up by 
Manuel.125 By January 4, the route was to be fixed and construction costs estimated; then 
a feasibility report and validation; on February 14, the advertising of bonds and 
construction contracts; March 1, bonds sold and construction bids opened; and March 15, 
groundbreaking.126 
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As plans went into motion, the public became interested in the specifications of 
the bobtail. “Isn’t that to be a parkway as superhighways are in the north,” not unlike “the 
beautiful one on Long Island,” a Yankee asked of Collins.  “You will remember that 
there are only occasional gasoline stations.”127  Presumably, most travelers would be 
pleased with the limited access aspects of the bobtail.   
On the other hand, a local industry of restaurants, filling stations, and tourist 
attractions had grown up around the traditional highway.  With a little ingenuity, a 
determined entrepreneur of modest means could stake a claim on the roadside and have a 
decent chance of making a living, if not striking it rich.  What would become of the 
concession industry when the fastest, most convenient route to Miami consisted of a 
minimum of exits, with real estate and contracts going to the highest bidders?  Noting 
that 9,938 gasoline retailers had established themselves in the state, a representative of 
the Allied Gasoline Retailers Association of Florida wrote Collins with a novel idea: 
Don’t create any service stations along the thoroughfare, but rather provide access to the 
towns where these establishments already existed.  He added: “[T]here are ample 
facilities for all needs in the cities and towns along the state’s thoroughfares; . . . if a 
motorist should need gasoline, the same as he might need repairs to his car or a place for 
his night’s lodging, he should obtain these necessary accommodations where they are 
already provided – off the turnpike.”128 
 Consultants of national standing rejected the notion that traditional, small-scale 
establishments would have any part in creating the modern facilities.  One went so far as 
to say that “the most successful operation of service facilities is where one operating 
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company is charged with the responsibility of selling gasoline and oil, food, repairs, 
communications, medical service and even policing.”129  
Ultimately, the quality of Florida’s turnpike facilities was outlined in New York, 
Chicago, and Kansas City. In November 1954, the state informed prospective bidders that 
concessions along the bobtail would consist of three service stations. It was “a terrible 
blow to small operators,” lamented the oilman.  As for food, there would initially be 
perhaps only one restaurant on the entire bobtail, perhaps more if the cost could be kept 
under a million dollars.130  Hot Shoppes eventually won the contract.  
 Engineers and financiers of the nation’s highway industry took note of Collins’s 
ability to coordinate operations.  Letters with attached brochures flowed in, informing the 
governor of what industry experts had done in the past, and what they could do for 
Florida.  Wallace G. Rouse, the same consultant who recommended one operation to 
manage all facilities, aggressively entreated the governor to relinquish authority to him 
on future programs. The problem with Florida, said Rouse, was that there were “too 
many unqualified persons involved in a situation that requires a highly-specialized 
knowledge.” “In the field of turnpike operations,” said Rouse, “we are not obliged under 
any circumstances to bow to any authority.” As an adviser to the National Association of 
State Turnpike Authorities, Rouse played a role in establishing “the standards by which 
any well-informed turnpike authority should operate,” and he was ready to share his 
already drawn plans for Florida.  Convinced that the bobtail was not “practical or feasible 
from a banking point of view,” Rouse pushed Collins to gear the legislature for a full-
length turnpike and coordinate with a Georgia pike while he took care of the rest.131   
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 Apparently, Collins preferred dealing with experts with a softer, gentler approach 
than Rouse. Paul D. Speer of H.C. Speer and Sons Company of Chicago claimed to have 
an excellent grasp on the coordination of the financial, engineering, and legal aspects of a 
major project.  Speer assisted with finances on the Skyway as well as the bobtail.  
Whereas Rouse wanted to dictate, Speer offered to provide expertise where it was 
needed. “The members of our councils, commissions and other governing bodies,” said 
his brochure, “have the duty of seeing that governmental policies reflect the desires and 
best interest of the public in general, and they are not expected to be experts in municipal 
finance.” The responsibility of a municipal finance consultant, said Speer, was “not only 
to save all the cost of his services for his clients, but should save those costs many, many 
times over.” Speaking logically, rather than forcefully, Speer explained:  “With bond 
issues running for periods of twenty, thirty or forty years, a mistake causing only a slight 
difference in interest rate can result in a tremendous difference in total cost over the life 
of the bonds.  On a twenty year issue of $1,000,000, one-quarter of one percent per year 
comes to a total of $50,000.”132 
N.C. Hamilton of Smith, Barney & Company also pursued business in a friendlier 
manner, meeting Collins’s assistant Joseph Grotegut face-to-face and expressing interest 
in the shaping of the governor’s road board and turnpike authority.  Spun off from a 
banking concern dating back to the Civil War, Smith & Barney offered “a background of 
long experience and high traditions in the financial world with extensive modern facilities 
and national scope,” claiming to be “one of the few firms that offers all-embracing 
financial services as underwriters, brokers, and dealers in investment securities.” Smith & 
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Barney also had a history with Florida, assisting with revenue on the Jacksonville 
Expressway.133  
Turnpikes were sprouting up all throughout the east, and the outlines of a 
countrywide network were beginning to emerge.  Promoters envisioned express links 
from New York to Chicago and from Chicago to Florida, and adjacent states began 
coordinating links.  On the path to Florida, Alabama was as strong a contender as 
Georgia.134     
Despite their growth, however, turnpikes were not as financially sound as was 
hoped.  Initially, it was assumed that once the states paid off their construction debts, the 
tolls would be lifted, but this proved financially unsound.  In Pennsylvania, the nation’s 
most prosperous turnpike owed its success to three factors: no competing routes had yet 
pierced the Alleghany Mountains; it was built on a railroad bed; and it received federal 
assistance.  As a result, in 1955 the Pennsylvania pike had the “lowest debt per mile of 
any modern toll road.”  Other toll roads without these advantages had only a “marginal” 
chance for success, although the possibility of federal aid could assure survival.135   
As Eisenhower broached the idea of federal aid for superhighways, initially 
proposing $50 or $100 million, the committee designated to direct financing, headed by 
Lucius D. Clay, toyed with the idea of providing financial assistance to toll roads – great 
news for the turnpike industry.136   
With the bobtail under construction, the Collins administration developed plans 
for Florida’s turnpike extension to the Georgia border.  In 1956, bonds for a full-length 
turnpike were already validated and the state was ready to build.  Fatefully, passage of 
Eisenhower’s 1956 Interstate Act did not bode well for turnpikes.  Instead of 
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compensating turnpikes, it promised a toll-free nationwide network.  The announcement 
rocked the turnpike industry to the core.  Turnpike Authority Chairman Thomas Manuel 
saw the writing on the wall, stating bluntly, “Any competing free road built to Interstate 
standards is better than a toll because it is FREE – it is just that simple.”137   
The federal program dwarfed the state’s wildest highway dreams: 1,100 miles of 
interstate highway crisscrossing the state at a projected cost of $500 million.  First on the 
agenda was I-4, which by 1965 was to extend a total of 154 miles from St. Petersburg to 
Daytona Beach, passing through Tampa and Orlando.  I-10 would run across northern 
Florida, from Jacksonville to the Alabama border and on to California.  I-95 would enter 
Florida from Georgia, pass through Jacksonville and terminate in Miami.  I-75 was to 
cover the 210 miles from Georgia to Tampa.138 With such an ambitious program, what 
would be the fate of Florida’s turnpike?  
Although Floridians generally favored free federal expressways, up until 1954 it 
was widely assumed that turnpikes were the only feasible way a state such as Florida 
could construct a superhighway – that is, through the issuance of bonds redeemed with 
toll revenue.  When in 1953 the Miami Chamber of Commerce resolved to “use every 
available means to urge the people and government of the State of Florida” to construct a 
superhighway to South Florida, it was the Chamber’s assumption that this would be 
constructed as a “Toll Turnpike.”139 With funds from such sources as gasoline taxes 
spreading thin, it appeared that the ‘pay-as-you-go’ method of funding alone could not 
handle Florida’s transportation development. Imperative road projects such as the 
Jacksonville expressway were soaking up available funds, such that the state did not have 
anywhere near the amount of money it needed to keep up its existing road program and 
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develop a new statewide project.  It therefore seemed logical that any superhighway 
would be “paid for by those who use it.”140 Although the toll philosophy had many 
opponents, it quickly emerged among Florida’s political elite as the sole plausible means 
of constructing a superhighway.  Many other states were already embracing the toll 
philosophy, and Florida’s boosters did not care to be left behind.141  
Even with the inducement of 90 percent federal funding, Collins proclaimed that 
the turnpike authority was ready to go ahead with the extension “just as soon as our 
additional bonds could be properly marketed.”142  In January 1957, Collins dedicated the 
first 108-mile bobtail section of the Sunshine State Parkway.143 Safe and convenient just 
like the projected Interstate, the bobtail boasted a minimum of 725 feet of visibility 
around curves, a 950-foot minimum of merging length, wide shoulders and a median.144 
Collins was proud of the accomplishment, and admonished the state for merely “toying 
with the idea of a turnpike for the past 17 years at least,” as well as the 1953 legislature 
for only authorizing a highway of bobtail size, rather than a “full-length turnpike.”  
Fortunately, the 1955 legislature “saw the mistake” and called for lengthening the 
turnpike from “north of Jacksonville” to the Gold Coast “with spurs to the Tampa Bay 
area and West Florida,” but in the two years that the legislature wasted, the projected cost 
of construction increased by $20 million.145  Now, with a federal program in the works, 
Collins believed that the state should take advantage of both federal funding and tolls. 
This was the time to build by any available means, not to yield the state’s highway future 
to the interstate. 
The bubble burst in the spring of 1957, when turnpike engineers confirmed that an 
east coast interstate highway to Fort Pierce would jeopardize turnpike income, making 
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the extension unfeasible.  Collins conceded that the competing federal route created a 
“tough hurdle,” but insisted that the engineers were wrong.  The state’s needs demanded 
going full steam ahead with both methods of funding.  In the end, he believed the 
turnpike and interstate would complement each other, giving the state “a more complete 
network of limited access highways.”146 Nevertheless, consultants warned that even the 
bobtail, not to mention the extension, would experience trouble upon the opening of 
southeast Florida’s federal superhighway. Coverdale & Colpitts warned that upon 
completion, roughly in 1976, the competing federal highway would produce a 
“substantial and gravely adverse effect on . . . traffic and toll revenues,” with estimated 
revenue dropping as much as fifty percent.147   
To protect bobtail revenue, Manuel struck an agreement with road department 
chairman Wilbur E. Jones, making the section of expressway paralleling the bobtail the 
last of the federal system to be built.  Jones agreed, but with the stipulation that when 
advertising the bonds for the extension, any prospectus should inform buyers of the east 
coast interstate route.148  
Towards the end of Collins’s term, Coverdale & Colpitts at last felt that with the 
financial success of the bobtail, the state could cautiously move forward with the 
extension.  The bobtail had not generated quite as much money as consultants hoped – 
with the exception of toll roads in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, no turnpike ever did – 
but high construction estimates “set the scales right.”149  Besides, the state had a plan. As 
I-95 and I-4 entered the planning and construction stages, the turnpike authority 
coordinated with the state road department in the planning of interstate construction.  If 
the road department sped the construction of I-95 from Georgia to Daytona, along with I-
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4 from Daytona to Orlando, then motorists could be induced to take the extended 
turnpike from Orlando to Miami – at least until 1975.  With this in mind, it was argued as 
late as June of 1960 that Collins could initiate construction on the extension.  This was 
preferable to seeing “the new administration immediately do what we know we can 
accomplish now, thus bringing criticism on the present Turnpike Board for its 
inaction.”150  
As time went by, it became evident that the extension would be constructed by 
Collins’s successor, not him. However, there was still hope that the bonds could be 
validated and sold during Collins’s term, such that the next governor could “let contracts 
left and right” as soon as he took office.151  As Farris Bryant emerged as the frontrunner, 
Collins entreated him to “make a careful analysis of everything our Turnpike Authority 
has done in seeking to develop an extension from Fort Pierce to Orlando,” and to see if he 
would like to follow the same course.  Collins was anxious to know Bryant’s position, 
because a “group of antagonists” was organizing legal opposition to the extension, and to 
move forward, Collins faced a “legal battle” and a “public relations battle” along with an 
“all-out effort to get the bonds validated.”  Collins was ready for the fight, but he and his 
financial advisers needed to be assured that his efforts would “not prove futile” due to 
Bryant changing course.152 
Talks with Bryant proved disappointing.  A number of disagreements stemmed 
from a central matter of financing.  The bobtail had been financed by $74 million in bond 
sales sold at an annual interest rate of 3¼ percent.  After completing the bobtail, the 
fiscally responsible turnpike authority managed to buy back nearly $8 million worth of 
bonds, reducing the debt to $66 million.  Financial advisers approached Collins with the 
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idea of refinancing the existing bonds to generate capital for the extension; but while 
Collins saw a few advantages to refinancing, he ultimately rejected the plan.  With 
competing interstate routes, the best Florida hope for was a 4¾ percent interest rate on a 
new bond issue.  The added 1½ percent interest on refinanced bobtail bonds would cost 
the state extra, nearly $9 million.  Terms cited in the trust agreement would cost the state 
another $10.2 million, for a total additional cost of nearly $19 million.153   
Bryant nevertheless favored refinancing.  In refinancing, Bryant sought to free 
interstate construction from restrictions under the existing contract.  Collins also 
considered this, but pointed out that any refinancing plan would doubtless include the 
same restrictions – for good reason.  Ironically, although Collins generally favored urban 
expressways over rural, and although Bryant’s record indicated the opposite, the bobtail 
compelled Collins to put the brakes on federal urban expressway construction where it 
was most needed, in southeast Florida, while Bryant apparently was ready to go forward.  
Bryant also thought that refinancing might help speed the turnpike’s current litigation; 
however, according to Collins, the litigation had nothing to do with financing, but with 
routing, and therefore the litigants would not likely be “assuaged” by refinancing.154   
Having outlined his case against refinancing, Collins sensed that Bryant had made 
up his mind and therefore decided to “leave the matter now for you to . . . work out in 
accordance with your own evaluations.”  Collins, who touted his turnpike administration 
as “one of the best in the country and one that has a fiscal soundness that is the envy of 
toll facility administrators throughout the land,” offered to assist but would proceed no 
further “with the plan . . . which you find you cannot approve.”155    
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As to what advantages financial advisers saw in refinancing, and why Bryant 
adopted the plan, I have not been able to ascertain.  Bryant’s campaign assistant, John 
Hammer, whom Bryant later appointed turnpike chairman, was apparently willing to 
accept Collins’s judgment, but was not of the same character as his predecessor, Thomas 
Manuel; on matters big and small, Hammer relinquished authority to Bryant, who was 
more authoritative than his predecessor on turnpike matters.156   
Through 1961, while construction surveys commenced on the extension route, 
Bryant conferred with financial advisers.  In June of 1961, Jerome Tripp, president of the 
turnpike’s financial consultant, Tripp & Co., assuaged Bryant’s fears in reference to a 
bond estimate: “Please do not be concerned if some of the preliminary figures […] are 
not altogether pleasing.”157  Later that month, more bad news: President Kennedy 
successfully pushed Congress to get the interstate program back on track.  Where 
turnpike consultants based their estimates upon the system being completed no sooner 
than 1975, Kennedy brought the target date back to 1972.  Predicting trouble, Manuel 
tried to convince Hammer to cut his losses. “God knows that I’d like to see it built to the 
Georgia line,” said Manuel; but: “The larger the bond issue – the harder to sell.  The 
longer the road – the more it will cost.”  Orlando was a safe bet, but if the turnpike was 
too ambitious, it might reach “the point of no return.”158  
The conflict came to the attention of Bryant’s staff in December of 1960 during 
meetings with Collins’ officials. W.R. Kidd, Bryant’s administrative assistant, noticed “a 
very serious planning problem:” plans for Interstate 75 had been “prepared 
independently” from the turnpike, “with no thought as to its possible effect.”  “You will 
note that in the vicinity of Ocala the Turnpike and the Interstate system parallel each 
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other for a considerable distance.  This is a situation that indicates either a total lack of 
planning or absolutely no coordination between the two projects.  It would not be 
economically feasible.” 159 
Aware of the potentially vexing interactions of federal and state governments, 
Kidd warned Bryant, “it is sometimes extremely difficult to get the Federal Bureau of 
Roads to make any changes to approved alignments.”  This problem could “delay the 
construction of the Orlando extension.”  Kidd continued, “You can see the situation that 
is rapidly developing.  The Interstate system from the Georgia line to Alachua is under 
contract.  The Authority is now considering the extension of the Turnpike to Orlando, and 
possibly Leesburg.  Yet, at the same time, no provision has been made for a connection 
between the two systems and, as I pointed out before, we simply cannot afford parallel 
expressways this close together.”160 
Cognizant of the problem, Kidd offered a solution:  “I do respectfully suggest that 
you direct that the Interstate, Sunshine State Parkway, and the primary system be 
coordinated at the State and Primary level.  This will have to be done by someone who 
has considerable authority to make decisions and I would suggest that possibly Mr. 
Monohan might be the proper selection.”161   
As Bryant and his administration responded to the situation, interstate advocates 
watched with keen interest. 
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Clash 
 
C. Farris Bryant was born on July 26, 1914 in Ocala.  His father was a farmer and 
bookkeeper.  Although “of modest means,” the Bryants had close connections to 
Florida’s political elite, with Bryant’s uncle Ion Farris having served as Florida’s Speaker 
of the House and in the Senate.  After receiving his degree in Business Administration 
from the University of Florida, and a law degree from Harvard in 1938, Bryant served as 
an auditor in the State Comptroller’s office and then established a law practice in Ocala.  
In 1942, Marion County elected him as State Representative, but his term was cut short 
by World War II.162  In the Atlantic, Bryant commanded artillery aboard an oil tanker 
sailing from Galveston, Texas, to Bristol, England, watching helplessly as U-boats sank 
allies off the coast of Iceland.  Later, Bryant staged mock training battles from Guam 
Naval Station.  After the war, Bryant returned home to resume his career in politics.163  
As a state legislator representing Marion County, Bryant eventually favored the 
turnpike through central Florida, although Floridians in general remained sharply divided 
on whether they wanted the limited access highway.  Understandably, roadside 
enterprises such as gas stations, motels, and restaurants protested that they would lose 
trade.  Furthermore, some argued that a highway without traditional roadside businesses 
could not be profitable.164  Amidst heated debates over highway financing, Bryant also 
established himself as a believer in toll roads.  “Toll roads are unpalatable,” Bryant 
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conceded, amidst a flurry of pleas not to promote them, “but we’ll have them tomorrow, 
not because we like them but because there is no other way to finance needed road 
construction.”165   
There are many plausible reasons why Bryant sided with the turnpike.  He was 
well connected with the turnpike promoters and knew how to work with them. 
Meanwhile, although he was no stranger to the allure of federal highway funding, his 
correspondence suggests impatience with the federal application process.  In 1955, he 
inquired to Chairman Wilbur E. Jones of the Florida Road Department as to why the state 
would have to renegotiate a highway contract order to procure federal aid.  Jones 
patiently explained that federal engineers needed to approve the entire process, “the 
specifications, the bids and the contracts,” before providing aid.  Likewise, Bryant hoped 
to procure federal aid for work already completed.  However, federal statutes precluded 
that option, as Regional District Engineer B.P. McWhorter informed the state: “where 
contracts had already been executed,” the state “could do nothing to help get Federal 
Aid” unless the state could “cancel out the contract and readvertise.”  (Florida’s sole 
exception to this rule was the Gandy Bridge.)166  Technicalities such as these discouraged 
many politicians from relying heavily on the federal government for highway funding, 
and Bryant was no exception.  Instead, Bryant preferred dealing with the state turnpike 
authority, where he was better connected and exercised more direct control of routing, 
engineering, contracting, and financing decisions.   
As previously discussed, even with the availability of federal funding, toll 
financing proved impossible to shake.  The bobtail was already under construction while 
Congress debated Eisenhower’s initiative, and Collins was raring to see the realization of 
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the full-length turnpike. As Collins was putting the pieces in place for the extension of 
the Sunshine State Parkway, warning signs arose that the merging of the Parkway and the 
Interstate, backed by diametrically opposed philosophies and interests, was not going to 
be a simple matter.  
The first sign of problems to come, with the simultaneous development of the 
turnpike and interstate systems, arose as the turnpike authority built the first stretch of 
highway from Stuart to Miami.  Built within miles of a proposed federal route, interstate 
interests fumed over the lost federal funding.  The debacle churned up a plethora of 
concerns for interstate interests both in Florida and around the nation.  If state or private 
organizations could build over proposed interstate routes, would they be compelled to 
meet federal standards?  Would their highways be adequate for national defense as well 
as for everyday travel?  Was the toll-free interstate system going to be peppered with 
tolls?  In the event of a national emergency, would these turnpikes exact tolls on the 
United States armed forces, as would occur during the Cuban missile crisis?167   
Needless to say, the federal government already had its work cut out in making 
sure the interstate system was completed in a logical, uniform manner.  Toll roads 
presented formidable challenges to the system’s integrity.  With prominent Floridians, 
including Bryant, revving for turnpike construction, it was no foregone conclusion that 
the state’s interstate system would be built according to the guidelines of the 1956 Act. 
Were it realistic for Collins to believe that state and federal programs would be 
seamlessly woven together without a hitch, that assumption would be shattered during the 
Bryant administration.   
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As Bryant emerged as the frontrunner in the 1960 election and Collins began 
ceding authority to him, the new governor introduced an insular style of government that 
some, especially Cramer, found off-putting. A relentless booster of highway matters and 
now a powerful member of the public works committee, it did not take long for Cramer 
to argue that Bryant was purposefully or mindlessly undermining Florida’s interstate 
system.  Portraying Bryant as a servant to selfish turnpike interests who wanted nothing 
more than to rake profits off of tolls, the benevolent Cramer would leverage his authority 
to create as many toll-free routes as possible while mitigating their disruption by toll-
ways.  
Regardless of how much substance there was to Cramer’s accusations, the toll 
issue offered prime opportunities to garner support in his district and throughout the state 
of Florida.  After all, someone had to protect the interests of northern visitors, who could 
never be sure what kind of highways they would be subjected to on the way to their 
vacation destination.  If anyone was going to soak Florida’s tourists, it was going to be 
the South Florida tourist establishment, which did not want visitors complaining of 
gouging by toll roads, gyp joints, and speed traps in North Florida, Georgia, and other 
states to the north.   
Rather than meekly submit to the Democratic establishment’s promotion of 
turnpikes, Cramer urged the public to become aware of the dichotomy of toll roads verses 
free roads, skeptical of the former, and optimistic that they had an ally strong enough to 
protect them from being exploited by turnpike bondholders, some of whom did not have 
in mind the best interests of the state.  This simple agenda offered Cramer ample 
opportunity to cast himself as the just minority squaring off against the entrenched 
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squirarchy of his own state. He had an excellent grasp of the tools at his disposal, 
effectively searching out his enemies, pinpointing their weaknesses, manipulating 
evidence, organizing a formidable army of supporters, and bringing the opposition to its 
knees.  
In the toll versus Interstate highway question, Cramer insisted on taking 
advantage of federal funding while making Florida’s roads user-friendly. Key to 
Cramer’s efforts was an intimate knowledge of the 1956 Interstate Highway and Defense 
Act and the Federal-Aid Highway Act.  His congressional career literally grew up with 
the legislation, and even as Congress and the presidency passed on to the Democratic 
Party, Democrats with opposing road development philosophies would find a powerful 
foe in Cramer and his allies. Knowing his limitations, Cramer also made valuable friends 
among knowledgeable road officials.  One of these was Clifton W. Enfield, Republican 
Counsel for the Bureau of Public Roads, whose knowledge and expertise came in handy 
as Cramer endeavored to protect Florida’s interstate system from being compromised by 
toll roads. 
Quick to remind Floridians of the mileage lost from Stuart to Miami, Cramer 
sounded the alarm as the state extended the Sunshine State Parkway from the bobtail up 
through central Florida.  Problems with this development were numerous.  First, the 
Parkway might render Interstate 95 along the entire southeast coast of Florida 
unnecessary.  As Clifton Enfield pointed out, in 1956 the Secretary of Commerce had 
issued a statement regarding toll roads along interstate routes that had become a maxim:  
“There is no intention whatever of building any Interstate routes paralleling a toll road 
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which until 1975 will adequately serve the traffic needs of the area through which it 
runs.”168   
Based on this mandate, Enfield also presumed that “Interstate route 4 from 
Daytona Beach to Orlando and that section of the Sunshine State Parkway . . . from 
Orlando to Fort Pierce can adequately serve the traffic needs until 1975 between 
Jacksonville to Miami.” Therefore, “a free section of Interstate route between Daytona 
Beach and Fort Pierce would not be justified.”  Interstate 95 south of Daytona could be 
justified only if the Bureau of Public Roads conceded that Interstate 4 and the Parkway 
could not serve South Florida’s industrial, commercial, residential, and defense 
requirements.  In other words, there had to be enough traffic to justify both routes, a tall 
order.  Enfield suggested that Florida “secure . . . a commitment from Public Roads that 
construction of the proposed extension of the Sunshine State Parkway will not be a basis 
for Public Roads withholding approval of construction projects on IS 95.”169  
During the summer of 1961, Cramer launched a two-pronged highway campaign: 
one to shape federal law and policy according to a more prudent design, and another to 
make sure that those laws were enforced in his own state. To the congressman’s credit, it 
took a great measure of finagling, pitting Cramer’s legal and political talents to those of 
the opposition in its many forms.  Due in large part to these coordinated efforts, he 
carefully aligned himself on the side of law and common sense.  
 Cramer’s campaign depended largely on the support of concerned Floridians who 
were directly affected by the expressway developments. One of Cramer’s local 
informants in Central Florida was N.G. Sherouse, from Reddick.  When it looked as 
though the state government wanted to inordinately manipulate the interstate system, 
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Sherouse paid close attention to the media, put notice on public officials that they were 
under his close scrutiny, and brought relevant developments to the attention of Cramer. 
According to Sherouse, the state desired “a shift” of I-75 to the east of Ocala to enable a 
shorter link with the Sunshine State Parkway, and perhaps even to extend tolls on I-75 as 
far north as Gainesville.170  In a vitriolic press release, Cramer interpreted the I-75 
situation:  “The Bryant Administration’s original proposal for the Toll Parkway 
extension, according to the Bureau of Public Roads, was to insert a 77-mile toll road on 
Interstate 75 between Alachua and Wildwood.  This highway, serving the West Coast of 
Florida, is a proposed freeway paid for […] by the public out of road user taxes including 
a 4 cent per gallon gasoline tax.  Had this initial plan been approved, a $30 million loss in 
Federal matching funds to the State of Florida would have resulted – and a toll facility 
would have been injected on a freeway according to the Bureau of Public Roads in 
testimony before the Highway Investigating Committee.”171 
Sherouse considered it a victory when Bryant seemed to have “thrown in the 
sponge” on rerouting I-75, sighing stoically when “stuck with a diversion” of US 441 
“away from the original route south from Orange Lake to Ocala.”172  In return for 
Sherouse’s cooperation, Cramer thanked him, urged him to attend the upcoming Road 
Bureau meetings, and emphasized their purpose to “not sacrifice our free system in an 
effort to build the toll facility.” At this hearing, Cramer hoped to smoke out Bryant’s 
intentions for I-75 out into the open and force him to publicly seek advisement from the 
Bureau as to whether the construction of I-95 would be affected by the Sunshine 
Parkway.173  Cramer argued that the turnpike would have a devastating effect on I-95, 
“the result of which is a loss of 135 miles of Interstate allocations from the Federal 
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Government.”  “This ridiculous scheme,” said Cramer, “will result in Florida’s losing 
between $60 and $75 million in Federal apportionments, substitute a toll road in place of 
a programmed free road from Daytona Beach to Fort Pierce and make indirect, a 
previously scheduled direct route along the East Coast from Jacksonville to Miami.”174 
For the Bureau meeting regarding Interstate 95, Cramer supplied Sherouse with a copy of 
embarrassing State Committee hearings “which substantiate my initial charge that there 
was an intention of inserting a toll section into Interstate 75.  This, of course, has been 
denied by the Governor and apparently the plan has now become abandoned.”175    
While using public pressure to compel the governor to shed light on his 
intentions, Cramer publicly extended an offer of assistance to lend his expertise “in 
getting clearance, from the Bureau of Public Roads, for Florida’s free Interstate System 
between Fort Pierce and Daytona Beach.”  Cramer suggested Bryant “make a request . . . 
asking for an unequivocal commitment from the Bureau that Florida’s free highway 
system will not be jeopardized by the tollway.” The end of this seemingly conciliatory 
press release ended with a sharp reminder of “Bryant’s charge of ‘politics’ – which 
Cramer sweeps aside with his assertion that he only wants to help Bryant’s 
Administration avoid the previous mistakes of the Collin’s [sic] Administration when 
some $20 million was lost by integrating 44 miles of the Turnpike into the Interstate 
System.”176 
While Cramer battled Bryant at home, he also negotiated favorable policies in 
Washington. Sensitive to the desires of road users who expected uniform standards on 
federal highways, he initially forwarded their complaints to the authorities at the Bureau 
of Public Roads. However, many Bureau officials believed that the incorporation of toll 
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roads into the interstate system would speed its completion and was therefore justified.  
Commissioner Ellis L. Armstrong, for example, maintained that although the fusion of 
toll roads and free roads “may seem illogical to the individual road user,” “there is an 
overall benefit in that available funds are diverted to the development of the Interstate 
highway elsewhere,” making possible “a greater mileage of the Interstate System in a 
shorter period of time.”177  Though it may not have seemed in the best interests of most 
Americans, states maintained the right to build toll roads wherever they pleased, and it 
was beyond federal jurisdiction to prevent their construction even where they overlapped 
with the interstate.  Cramer therefore had to spend a great deal of time rectifying federal 
highway policies and the opinions of officials in order to keep the interstate system toll-
free. 
Cramer brought the issue to the national stage when, on August 21, 1961, he 
proposed legislation to the House Roads Subcommittee that he hoped would settle the I-
95 question.  Expressing in unflattering terms the state’s intentions to sidestep federal 
policy and thus jeopardize I-95, Cramer pointed out that in previous years the Bureau had 
revoked existing interstate routes due to the construction of nearby toll roads, resulting in 
losses of $92 million in Massachusetts, $65 million in Kansas, and $36 million in Texas.  
The Bureau also had a history of delaying construction “until it is clearly demonstrated 
that the toll road cannot carry the traffic and the construction will not jeopardize toll road 
bonds.”  Was it justifiable to build two parallel routes to southern Florida?  With 
Congress for the first time in a position to halt the construction of a toll road before 
allowing it to disrupt an interstate highway, Cramer saw this as a “unique opportunity” 
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for Congress to conduct a thorough inquiry before Florida “is inextricably committed to a 
toll road program.”178    
Cramer introduced two bills in that congressional session: one that would require 
Congress to approve the designation of toll roads as part of the interstate system, the 
other to preserve I-95 between Fort Pierce and Daytona Beach.  Although neither bill was 
enacted, Cramer later claimed that “the hearings served to pinpoint problems which exist, 
not only in Florida but in many other states as well, regarding the relationship between 
toll facilities and the Federal-aid highway systems.” 179  “Rather than the Governor and 
his road board acting in secrecy,” reasoned Cramer, “a public hearing before the 
committee would be required and the people interested and affected would know what’s 
happening with their tax dollar and their highway future.”180   
While behind the scenes Cramer endeavored to flush out an “unequivocal” 
statement from the Bureau or proceed with congressional action regarding the routing of 
I-95 alongside the turnpike, he reminded Bryant and the Florida public that he was as 
capable as anyone at brokering an agreement amenable to the interests of the turnpike.   
“I volunteer my assistance,” Cramer wired Bryant and Hammer on August 23, “in 
attempting to get a favorable unequivocal commitment from the Bureau preserving 
Florida’s free system and at the same time making it possible to build the Turnpike 
without adversely affecting the interstate system.”  With the welfare of the Florida public 
at stake, Cramer demonstrated that it was the governor’s duty to present the turnpike 
plans over to the Bureau for hearings.181  One of Cramer’s proposals to the Governor was 
to “float advance construction bonds guaranteed by future Federal allotments, thereby 
assuring a free system by 1972 rather than a network of tollways.”182 
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On September 15, the St. Petersburg Times outlined possible snags in the turnpike 
contract itself.  Even if the Bureau allowed for a competing road, the turnpike 
bondholders might not.  The contract stated that any highway proven “materially 
competitive with any part of the turnpike system” could result in a renegotiation of the 
contract based on lost earnings to the competitive highway. John Fowler, vice president 
of the New York bonding house Dillon, Read and Company, believed I-95 would 
compromise the turnpike’s earnings.  Based on projections of I-95 being completed in 
1972, turnpike revenues would decrease from $17 million $12 million, annually. 
Although with this $5 million loss there would still be enough revenue to pay off the 
debt, such a loss would not sit well with bondholders.183   
Cramer adapted the same set of facts into a strategic power play, asking, “how can 
[Turnpike Chairman John] Hammer in one breath say that Interstate 95 and the Turnpike 
are not competitive and in the next breath reveal that over 30 percent of the revenue on 
the Turnpike will be lost once I-95 is completed and opened to traffic.”   Fowler 
meanwhile insisted that I-95 be delayed at least until 1973.  Warning that it would be 
within the bondholders’ rights to prohibit the state from constructing I-95 until 2001, 
Cramer recommended that the state draft a new contract assuring that turnpike 
bondholders would not object to I-95, rather than accepting Hammer’s assurances.  
Again, Floridians could depend on nothing less than “Unequivocal clearance.”184  
 Where Cramer saw the Governor hedging on the option of deferring to federal 
road officials, he went straight to the source, himself.  If the Governor insisted on 
building the turnpike, then he should have obtained unequivocal approval for I-95 from 
the Bureau of Public Roads and from turnpike bondholders.  If the State “can force a 
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change of policy in the form of an unequivocal commitment as a result of my criticism, 
then my purpose . . . will be accomplished.”  However, Cramer had serious doubts that 
such a policy change would be made.  After conferring with Federal Highway 
Administrator Rex Whitton as well as Deputy Commissioner and Chief Engineer for the 
Bureau of Public Roads Frank Turner, Cramer was unable to obtain a “definite 
commitment.” Cramer concluded, “the state’s approach – at best – is risky business.  . . . 
[T]he bond peddlers will be deciding the highway future of Florida.”185 
 –––   
In the end, Interstate 75 was linked to Tampa without tolls, and the Sunshine 
Parkway was linked to I-75 at Wildwood.  This episode, however, did not end Cramer’s 
crusade to protect the interstate system from turnpikes.  At the end of the 89th Session of 
Congress in 1966, Cramer boasted of having been “successful in helping to prevent the 
construction of Interstate 95 in Georgia as a toll road connecting with Florida’s Interstate 
as had been considered by some officials in Georgia.”186   
 Besides the issues described above, the infusion of private tollways with the 
interstate system yielded further obstacles to a complete, smoothly operating system.  On 
February 23, 1966, Cramer noted in a speech to the American Road Builders’ 
Association that at the junction of the Sunshine State Parkway and Interstate 4, both the 
federal government and the Turnpike Authority yielded to laws, contractual agreements, 
and financial studies which precluded the construction of a connecting interchange from 
one expressway to the other. Whereas a “law concerning the use of Federal funds for 
facilities that will serve only toll traffic” restricted federal construction of the necessary 
ramps, the Turnpike Authority also demurred, since “the ramps do not meet economic 
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justification criteria which governs expenditure of its funds.” “As a result,” observed 
Cramer, “travelers who wish to go from one highway to the other must use widely 
separated interchanges and travel several miles over heavily congested city streets.” So 
much for convenience, safety, and national defense.  As fate would have it, “private 
developments,” including “a proposed new Disneyland,” said Cramer, “led the turnpike 
authority to decide recently than an interchange can be economically justified, and it is 
planning now to construct one with its own funds – someday.”187 
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Fruitcake 
 
Immediately following the enactment of the National System of Interstate and 
Defense Highway Act and the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, the programs proved 
vulnerable to theft and fraud.188  Responding to widespread scandals, in the summer of 
1957 the Bureau of Public Roads developed a Project Examination division “with the 
specific responsibility of making reviews and investigations, on a ‘spot-check’ basis.”  
Despite the Bureau’s efforts, the graft “substantially increased.”  In September 1959, the 
Subcommittee on the Federal-Aid Highway Program, dubbed the Blatnik Committee, 
was created as a subcommittee of the Public Works Committee “to investigate the 
highway program and act as a congressional ‘watchdog’ to protect the Federal 
interest.”189 While the Kelly Committee unveiled Florida’s highway contracting 
shenanigans for the world to see, the Blatnik Committee was doing the same on a 
national scale.  Cramer used his committee status to bring federal scrutiny to the time-
honored manner in which engineers and contractors conducted business in Florida and 
around the nation.  He summed up the problem this way: 
Any program which involves such tremendous sums of money and the 
participation of so many thousands of people, is bound to be a temptation 
to dishonest and unscrupulous persons who can find many opportunities to 
profit at the expense of the public.  . . . Before the creation of the special 
Subcommittee on the Federal-Aid Highway Program, I was convinced that 
the vast majority of the persons building our highways were honest, 
competent, and dedicated to serving the public interest.  However, the 
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disclosures of the special subcommittee have made it abundantly clear that 
fraud, graft, thievery, and incompetency are far more widespread, and 
involve far more persons, than most of us would have suspected or 
believed.190 
 
 The first state highway department to undergo public subcommittee hearings was 
Oklahoma.   Cramer noted an “amazing picture . . . of inadequate or no supervision, 
failure to make proper tests and inspections, falsifications;” in short, a “deplorable failure 
to meet specifications.” Disclosures in other states also proved “shocking.”  Florida was 
no exception: 
In our own State of Florida it was shown that over the years many of the 
big highway contractors have been making payments of cash, whisky, 
turkeys, and other merchandise of substantial value to officials and 
employees of the State road department who were, of course, paid by the 
State to see that these same contractors complied with specifications.  The 
Florida hearings have also shown that due to inadequate planning and 
worse, the State has disposed of valuable improvements on rights-of-way  
in total disregard of the public interest and has allowed the contractors and 
speculators to reap windfall profits that should have been realized by the 
State, a system that has permitted some contractors to use these valuable 
assets for what might be euphemistically called payola to grease the palms 
of two city commissioners and at least one highway official.191 
 
A comprehensive study of kickbacks and graft in Florida’s road development 
history might well trace it to the first paved paths.  To Cramer, as with many other 
proponents of the interstate program, the highway question was more than just a question 
of civic and economic development.  Taking seriously the concept of interstate highways 
as a national defense system, corrupt practices in America’s highway development were 
practically, if not literally, tantamount to breaches in national security.  In the early 
1960s, as Cramer rose through the ranks of Congress to become the ranking Republican 
on the Blatnik committee and the roads subcommittee, and later the public works 
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committee, he distinguished himself in his efforts to develop strong laws that would bring 
accountability to federal road projects and stiff penalties to transgressors.   
Developing these laws was not a simple task.  For years, it appears to have 
absorbed the legal talents of Cramer and his colleagues.  Just how successful Cramer and 
other watchdogs were remains to be assessed; but it seems that by the end of 1963, the 
congressman contented himself with his accomplishments in this arena and essentially 
gave up on what he could not push through that year.    
In 1961, Cramer truly came into his own as a public works legislator, making the 
first of a series of concerted efforts to tighten up federal highway construction laws by 
drafting a bill that would make a federal crime the “indirect financing of primaries and 
elections out of Federal funds appropriated for highways, to prohibit certain improper and 
undesirable practices relating to the Federal-aid highway program, and for other purposes 
designed to protect the public interest and investment therein.”  The proposal threatened 
fines up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment to any “officer, agent, or employee of the 
United States, or of any State or territory or political subdivision thereof, or whoever, 
whether a person, association, firm, or corporation” caught issuing false statements, 
offering or accepting kickbacks, or benefiting from a conflict of interest.192   Named the 
Federal-Aid Highway Reform Act, Cramer’s legislation “added several new provisions to 
the law and amended some portions of existing law and would . . . greatly strengthen the 
Federal law enforcement agencies in their efforts to prevent frauds and abuses and to 
punish such actions when they are detected.”193 
The above bill, like many of Cramer’s bills, brought with it a partisan intent.  It 
was the first of a series of such bills Cramer would propose, most if not all of which 
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would be voted down by the Democrat-controlled congress, although many of the 
measures in his bills would eventually be adopted.  Due to countless instances of 
incompetence, ignorance, selfishness, conspiracy, or just the unquestioned towing of the 
party line, the Democratic Party alone could not be entrusted to enact laws to ensure the 
successful execution of the national highway program.  With Democrats in control of the 
executive and legislative branches of government, Cramer cast himself into the role of the 
just minority seeking to introduce law and common sense into highway governance.   
One state indicted by Republicans to have some of the most notorious road 
scandals was none other than President Kennedy’s home state of Massachusetts.  Charges 
issued by the Republican members of the public works committee included “kickbacks,” 
“political contributions, conspiracy between some state highway officials, contractors and 
engineering consultants that have resulted in inflated highway costs, political favoritism, 
and conspiracy to cheat the government through the use of over-runs, inflated ‘winter 
work’ bonuses, payments for work not actually done, and other techniques of fraud which 
can easily be accomplished.”194    
Corruption in Massachusetts’s road development richly earned a national 
reputation.  In August 1960, the Bureau of Public Roads submitted the Beasley and 
Beasley report on corruption in Massachusetts.  In March 1961, Atlantic magazine 
published “Dirty Money in Boston,” which described the case of Thomas Worcester, 
caught evading hundreds of thousands in income taxes and bribing public officials, the 
latter offense Worcester considering an “‘ordinary and necessary’ cost of doing 
consulting business with the Massachusetts Department of Public Works.”  On June 19, 
20, and 21, the New York Times followed up with front-page stories.195   
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With Massachusetts making headlines, the case of Worcester seemed to the 
Republican public works members to provide “a logical starting point for a thorough 
investigation.” However, the Democrats who dominated the committee refused to 
conduct a proper investigation.   “Apparently everyone can find wrongdoing in 
Massachusetts,” chided the Republicans, “except [the Blatnik Committee] and its expert 
staff.”  Accusing the Democrats of “an obvious whitewash” and a “party line refusal to 
adequately staff the Massachusetts investigation,” Cramer and Minority Counsel Robert 
E. Manuel did some investigating of their own, finding in Massachusetts a mere 
“skeleton force” of investigators “operating under directions dictated by the Democrat 
majority, which limit them solely to real estate appraisals which have largely already 
been investigated by the Bureau of Public Roads.”  More “foot dragging” on the part of 
Democrats included the removal of a “U.S. Attorney who was seeking indictments by the 
Grand Jury in the federal court” and the delaying of a “simple executive order authorizing 
an inspection by the subcommittee of the income tax returns of persons suspected of 
fraud and bribe-taking.”196    
In lieu of the “deliberate refusal” of the subcommittee to “do its plain duty,” the 
“result of direct orders from the top Democratic party leadership,” Cramer and fellow 
republicans endeavored to enact the “duties and obligations that must be carried out as 
Members of Congress” by calling for a “full and exhaustive investigation.”  Even though 
a similar motion had already been voted down, the Republicans hoped to “establish for 
the record the manner in which the dictatorial majority is manipulating important 
committees of Congress to accommodate their own narrow political interest, at the 
expense of both truth and the public interest, and to register our determination not to be 
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accessories either before or after the fact to practices that threaten to subvert the very 
committee system of Congress and many cherished concepts of representative 
government.”197 
Eventually, the Democrats on the Blatnik Committee came around to the minority 
view, and when they did, Florida was on their investigative list.  Democrats concurred 
that since 1956, Florida manifested “a sustained disregard for the public interest and has 
eschewed the adoption of measures necessary for the proper protection and conservation 
of [federal and state] funds.”  The Democrats also condemned “a long-standing practice 
in Florida by which some road builders paid unauthorized money and other valuable 
merchandise to many State supervisory employees under circumstances which bordered 
on bribery and extortion.”198 
Republicans agreed with the democrats, but they wanted more forthright action to 
institute responsible government in Florida’s federal highways.  Each candidate for 
governor was promising “extravagant highway millenniums” but delivered only “crash” 
construction programs.  Governors were also appointing “partisans” to the state road 
board, such as Governor Farris Bryant’s selection of Warren Cason, a relative by 
marriage of the Cones, a prominent family in the construction business with over $30 
million in state contracts.  As a result, the Republicans argued, “highly technical 
engineering decisions are often made by politicians, not by competent, experienced 
personnel.”199 
The Republicans supplemented this criticism with the testimony of W. C. 
Peterson, a division engineer of the Federal Bureau of Public Roads who worked with the 
Florida government. According to Peterson, disorganization, along with cronyism, was at 
  
73 
the heart of the problem, largely because Florida “never entered into long-range 
planning.” Florida’s road governance had “no continuity of personnel and therefore no 
continuity of policy planning or programming.”  Three chairmen of the roads board 
served under Governor LeRoy Collins, each with “a different idea of how the highway 
department ought to be run,” each “pressuring” Peterson “pretty hard to ‘get the show on 
the road:’”200  Peterson claimed:  “Every letting I can remember that we have had in 
Florida is under pressure.  There is always a pressure to get the plans in and I have never 
known from one letting to the next what group of projects they are going to send over.  It 
is very difficult for me to operate that way.” 201 
Cramer asked Peterson how long Florida gave him to complete the “required 
engineering,” “right-of-way acquisition and so forth.”  “Sometimes 3 days,” Peterson 
responded, “sometimes.  Only on very, very seldom occasions have we gotten a set of 
plans as much as a week ahead of time or even 2 weeks ahead of time.  I have never had 
that experience in other states.”202  The minority report also pointed out how, during the 
transition from one administration to the next, the work of the previous administration 
could be laid to waste.  In one instance, $6 million paid to consulting engineers during the 
Collins administration was wasted due to an overhaul of plans under the Bryant 
administration.203 
 As a result of poor planning and graft, the cost of constructing interstate highways 
in Florida was among the highest in the South, with Florida paying $89,216 per mile; 
Georgia was paying $67,355, and Oklahoma only $17,447.204  Cramer’s group 
recommended “a number of local reforms and procedures suggested by the record and 
consideration of which we urge upon the appropriate state authorities.”  Republicans 
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wanted to impose laws on how the state conducted business with federal funds.  By this 
time, Florida had responded with some minor reforms, but in the Republican opinion, it 
was still not enough.  The state legislature needed to do more to punish “the givers as 
well as the receivers of largess.”205   
To free the state road board from “the dead hand of partisan politics,” it needed 
continuity of personnel, policy, and programming, rather than having all five members 
appointed by each administration.  Likewise, Republicans recommended the creation of a 
highway administrator, isolated from gubernatorial politics.  The road department, though 
subject to the authority of the road board, was staffed with “able and dedicated people 
who are overworked and underpaid,” and needed a respectable pay scale, job designation, 
and a merit system to insulate it from politics.206  The properties management sector of 
the roads department, characterized with “blunders and confusion,” brought attention to 
the need for “reorganization under a single, coordinated authority,” rather than the 
“hydra-headed monster which has long plagued the Interstate System.”207  Meanwhile, 
the state needed to address its right-of-way acquisition laws, which permitted the state to 
offer property owners five percent more than the market value and which taxed the state 
with attorneys’ fees, leading to “protracted and costly litigation.”208 
 Amidst the cultural and political upheavals that took place in Florida during the 
late 1950s and 1960s, the state initiated a series of investigations and reforms of its 
transportation governance, culminating in the creation of the Department of 
Transportation in 1969.  Cramer played a prominent role in bringing problems to light 
and offering solutions. 
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As for Washington, the first executive department to accommodate the 
Republican demand for stricter laws was the Department of Commerce, which had 
authority over the Bureau of Public Roads and was “responsible for the administration of 
the Federal-aid highway program.”  Here, we have evidence of Cramer pushing, with 
some success, to institute significant changes on national policy.  In response to Cramer’s 
1961 bill, the Department of Commerce began to acknowledge that the federal 
government needed to play a stronger, more direct role in the state management of 
federal funds.  On March 15, 1962, the Under Secretary of Commerce congratulated the 
“continuing investigation of the special subcommittee,” which had demonstrated that 
national reforms were “a vitally necessary adjunct to present highway program 
legislation.”  Neither the existing highway statutes nor the authority of the Federal 
Highway Administrator to withhold Federal-Aid funds had proven effective deterrents.209 
In March 1962, the Commerce Department also initiated House Resolution 9353, 
which was “somewhat similar” to what Cramer had proposed in 1961.  Although, in lieu 
of the Commerce Department’s bill, the Blatnik Committee conducted further 
investigations in Massachusetts and West Virginia, Congress failed to enact legislation 
based on the Committee’s findings.  Persistent as ever, on January 24, 1963, Cramer 
introduced a new bill “to revise and strengthen the Federal laws relating to offenses 
committed in connection with the Federal-aid highway program.”  Again, Cramer called 
for stricter enforcement against “conflicts of interests, . . . false statements and 
representations relating to the acquisition, administration and disposition of real property, 
as well as the work, material and equipment,” and “political contributions . . . by any 
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person or firm who is at the same time negotiating for or performing a contract in 
connection with a Federal-aid highway project.”210   
Cramer sensed that the “kickbacks” measure would be the most controversial part 
of the bill, so he provided some background to show that his proposal was not a major 
departure from past precedents.  Since 1940, federal law prohibited firms and individuals 
with contracts with the United States from making political contributions.  However, 
because U.S. highway contracts were issued by individual states, the law did not extend 
to federal highway programs, even if federal aid amounted to fifty to ninety percent of the 
cost.  “But if it’s bad to misuse Federal funds for political purposes at the Federal level,” 
said Cramer, “it is equally bad at the State level.”211  
The Boston Herald touted the “tough bill” drafted by the “minority leader of the 
Blatnik committee.”  Given the “mounting evidence” of “widespread cheating,” the 
Herald predicted that although his previous bills were “sidetracked,” “some sections” of 
this recent bill had “a better chance of passage during this session of Congress,” now that 
the states’ “shenanigans . . . had time to sink in at the Capitol.”  The measure prohibiting 
political contributions was considered the “most far reaching,” but also had the “least 
chance of passage.”  After all, “politicians the country over depend heavily on contractors 
for their campaign funds;” “most construction companies in the position to make 
generous donations to political committees, are involved directly or indirectly in the 
interstate road program.”  The Herald noted that Massachusetts Governor Peabody’s 
“very successful birthday dinner . . . was enriched considerably by contractors shelling 
out $1,000-a-table.”  “Campaign contributions,” the article concluded, “are a bread and 
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butter issue with politicians and until someone can suggest a suitable alternate, Congress 
is not likely to prohibit contractors from spreading their manna.”212  
Cramer’s bill made headway as higher officials in the Kennedy Administration 
began adopting some of his proposals.  On April 4, 1963, Attorney General Robert F. 
Kennedy of the Department of Justice proposed jointly with the Department of 
Commerce legislation “substantially similar” to Cramer’s, although weaker on conflicts 
of interest (requiring full disclosure, but not instituting penalties) and without a 
“provision prohibiting political contributions.”213  Later that month, Congressmen 
Emanuel Celler and Jim Wright both introduced the administration’s softer bill.214    
By the summer of 1963, Cramer had essentially thrown up his hands on 
legislating penalties for conflicts-of-interest and political contributions relating to 
federally funded highways.  Having become astute observers of federal highway ethics, 
he and his colleagues developed treatises on right-of-way acquisition and the thorny issue 
of conflicts-of-interest, to be delivered to professionals in the federal highways business.  
One of these talks was delivered to the New York Court of Claims School of Advanced 
Study in Real Property Acquisition by the minority counsel for the roads subcommittee, 
Clifton Enfield.   The address dealt with the “complexities” faced by the “modern day 
right-of-way agent,” who must be “25 percent appraiser, 25 percent salesman, 25 percent 
engineer, 25 percent lawyer, 25 percent governmental administrator, 25 percent 
economist, 25 percent public relations expert, and 25 percent psychologist . . . a double-
sized man.”  This detailed address suggests the level of compassion that Cramer and his 
colleagues had developed for professionals in the road development industry, as well as a 
detailed understanding of the challenges these professionals faced.  The last thing these 
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professionals could do was rest on their laurels.  “The time has come,” Enfield 
admonished his audience, “when members of the right-of-way profession, as well as all 
others associated with the highway program, must be brutally objective and honest in the 
evaluation of themselves and their associates.  Those who are competent, honest, and 
dedicated are a credit to the profession and an asset to the highway program.  I am sure 
that the great majority of persons engaged in right-of-way acquisition for the highway 
program fall into this category.  However, there are others who are neither a credit nor an 
asset to anything.”215 
 Bad right-of-way agents fell into two categories: the dishonest agent and the 
honest agent “who simply does not know how to do his job and hides the fact from his 
superiors.”  The former, prevalent in Massachusetts, could be restrained but not 
eliminated. The latter, prevalent in West Virginia, simply had to be educated.216       
Cramer’s last known address to Congress regarding his Federal-Aid Highway 
Reform Act was delivered on August 23, 1963.  His speech, “Conflict of Interest as a 
Legal and Administrative Problem,” was drafted by another of his trusted advisers, 
Robert L. May, minority counsel for the Blatnik Committee.  May originally delivered 
the address to a group of highway lawyers.  As an “administrative problem,” May began, 
conflicts of interest involve “questions of policy and practicality, as well as principles of 
ethics and integrity.”  As a “legal problem,” as Cramer and his colleagues well knew, “it 
involves questions of the legal authority to regulate, valid means of regulation and 
enforcement, and the rights of public officials as citizens, as well as technical problems of 
drafting a clear, unambiguous regulation or statute.”  The main difficulty in regulating 
conflicts of interest was that it encompassed such a wide range of behavior that any 
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general law “would probably be too vague to be enforceable.”   As a result, convictions 
were rare.  After years of Blatnik Committee investigations, the same problems were 
cropping up around the country, “a disturbing indication that administrative action . . . is 
lagging.” 217   
The President summed up the problem with existing laws.  “The fundamental 
defect of these statutes as presently written is that: On the one hand, they permit an 
astonishing range of private interests and activities by public officials which are wholly 
incompatible with the duties of public office; on the other hand, they create wholly 
unnecessary obstacles to recruiting qualified people for Government service.  This latter 
deficiency is particularly serious in the case of consultants and other temporary 
employees, and has been repeatedly recognized by Congress in its enactment of special 
exemption statutes.” 218 
Following a lengthy discussion on the efforts of the government to regulate 
conflicts of interest, May presented, in further detail, the pending legislation presented by 
Cramer, Wright, and Celler.  All three bills barred contractors from giving to state 
employees, prevented contractors from deviating from their contracts, and prohibited 
false statements.  Cramer’s bill stood alone in denying those engaged in federal highway 
projects from making political contributions, and only his bill provided actual penalties 
conflicts of interest cases.219  The address trailed off into general, philosophical questions 
directed to lawyers. If these two documents were Cramer’s final effort to get his 
legislation passed, then it was an uncharacteristically feeble effort.  By the end of 1963, 
Cramer’s attention had shifted to other issues.   
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The deplorable condition of Florida’s interstate highways made the November 30, 
1963 issue of the Saturday Evening Post.  Page 19 shows a close-up of a Florida road 
surface, textured everywhere with little grooves maybe an inch deep, with golf ball-sized 
chunks of rubble strewn amidst the remnants of blown tires along the median. The state 
had to build a dividing wall to prevent out-of-control cars from careening into oncoming 
traffic.220 This was the surface of the W. Howard Frankland Bridge over Tampa Bay, at 
the southwest terminus of Interstate Highway 4 – a bridge funded 90 percent by the 
federal government and designed to link Pinellas County with the greatest road program 
in American history, perhaps the history of the world. This boon to economic 
development, this pillar of national defense, this was Florida’s monument to American 
mobility.  The original cost was $6.2 million.  The 30-inch dividing wall cost another 
$250,000.  One of the span supports met minimum federal standards, but 39 others did 
not.  It was, said Congressman James Wright, “about as poorly constructed as any bridge 
in the United States.”221 Congressional investigators discovered that project engineer Joe 
R. Maseda, Jr., whose job was “enforcing specifications,” received “payola” from the 
road surfacing contractor, Hardaway Contracting of Tampa.  Though unethical, this was 
not unusual.  Similar activities were going on throughout Florida and in many other 
states.  
Florida’s shenanigans had their own signature.  They were not the most sinister 
(that would be Massachusetts), nor did they stem from the most ignorance (that 
distinction went to West Virginia).  The nature of Florida’s deviance was captured under 
the heading:  “PAYOLA INCLUDED CIGARETTES, WHISKEY, TURKEYS, HAMS, AND, 
FRUITCAKES.”  Namely, state engineer William H. McLeod Jr. was caught collecting at 
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least $10,000 in spirits, smokes, and vittles.222 On national television, McLeod proudly 
stood his ground and proclaimed, “I can still live with myself.  I can look back over and I 
can look you or anybody else in the eye and tell you that I haven’t done anything wrong.  
Only thing wrong I have done is possibly work too many hours and tried to do the right 
thing about everything.”223 There was a well-established precedent for McLeod’s lack of 
remorse.  As President Julian L. Cone, Jr. of Cone Brothers Contracting Company put it, 
payoffs to state engineers had been the norm for “as long as I have been in the 
contracting business.”224 
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Posies 
 
Through the 1960s, the scope of Cramer’s political power expanded.  Rising in 
status to become the senior Republican on the House Public Works Committee, he used 
the Interstate system to wedge himself into national policy debates.  Despite differences 
with public works Democrats, during the course of his highway reform years Cramer 
developed a strong rapport and a good working relationship with them.  He would also 
recall in later years the bipartisan manner with which the Kennedy administration 
approached transportation issues, a compliment he was not to extend to the Johnson 
administration. In the mid-1960s, a new foe to the system would emerge, keeping Cramer 
occupied for years. President Lyndon Johnson brought to the executive mansion 
unbridled energy, an artistry of deal-making, and a solid party majority willing to spend 
on the Great Society.  When it came to highway matters, however, Cramer found 
Johnson’s administration inconsistent and misguided. The only thing more 
unconscionable to Cramer than cash, whisky, and turkeys was guns and butter.  The 
President, according to Cramer, made several steps to compromise the interstate system, 
sometimes in an effort to boost his social programs, sometimes for no logical reason at 
all.  Cramer’s efforts garnered the attention of powerful Republicans such as Richard 
Nixon, who during his presidency frequently met with Cramer and personally endorsed 
the Floridian’s 1970 U.S. Senate campaign. 
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Of all of Johnson’s policies, that of beautifying highways using construction 
funds provided the most convenient political target.  “The Highway Beautification Act of 
1965,” explained Cramer in 1966, “provides financing from the general funds of the 
Treasury for the first 2 years for the control of advertising and junkyards adjacent to 
Interstate and Federal-aid primary highways, and for landscaping and scenic 
enhancement along all federal highways.”  However, Johnson wanted to shift course, 
proposing that the Highway Beautification Act “be financed from the highway trust fund, 
at an average rate of more than $200 million a year for the Interstate System alone.”  As a 
result, Cramer warned, “all money spent for beautification would be taken away from 
construction, and less miles of Federal-aid primary and secondary highways, and their 
urban extensions, will be improved.”  Johnson, Cramer concluded, “thinks it is more 
important to beautify these roads than to construct them or to make them safe and 
adequate for travel.”225  
In 1967, Cramer was not finished with the beautification question. During a 
February 6 speech, Cramer accused Johnson of a “turnabout on highway safety,” arguing,  
“At the very same time that the administration is stopping badly needed highway 
construction, it is calling for . . . $380 million of new obligational contract authority for 
landscaping, billboard control, and screening of junkyards,” and “recommending that 
from $1.8 to $2.9 billion be spent over the next 10 years to make the Federal-aid highway 
system more beautiful.”  “Should it not be made more safe first?” Cramer implored.   “In 
my opinion,” he continued, “the administration is placing a higher value on posies and 
bushes along the highways than it is placing on American lives or on our use of highways 
for national defense.  It will be of no benefit to the man, woman, or child who dies in an 
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automobile accident on an obsolete road to have enjoyed looking at posies before the 
crash occurred.”226 
Later that year, Cramer requested “1 long minute” from the House to discuss 
Johnson’s inconsistent, almost amusing, stance on the beautification issue.  Apparently, 
while the Administration was calling for the elimination of 1,014,000 out of 1.1 million 
roadside signs, it was also distributing information from the Small Business 
Administration touting billboards as “a motel’s introduction to the greatest number of 
potential guests.”  “Thousands of owner-managers say their very existence depends 
directly on the signs,” said the brochure.  “Many motel operators find it to their 
advantage to start their sign ‘campaign’ about 250 miles from the motel --- the average 
day’s drive for most travelers.  Average highway speed is about 50 miles an hour, so a 
sign every 50 miles will remind travelers of your business once an hour.  Your biggest 
sign should be the last one, the one closest to your motel (even in sight of it).”227 
In August 1967, when Cramer proposed legislation “to provide for eliminating or 
minimizing roadside hazards,” he included as leading hazards “unnecessary signs […] 
which can kill the motorists who run into them; and, certain highway beautification 
‘improvements,’ such as the planting of trees.”228  
 Construction-versus-beautification was just one of many highway issues on which 
Cramer distinguished himself from Johnson.  Foremost on Cramer’s agenda was 
preserving interstate funding and ensuring that enough funds would be available to keep 
the project on schedule.  A 1967 report to Congress drafted by Cramer and Clifton 
Enfield summarized the progress of interstate funding up to that time.  In 1956, to 
provide for the “prompt and early completion of the National System of Interstate and 
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Defense Highways,” Congress drafted the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956.  Initially, 
the Interstate was to be completed in fourteen years, or by 1970, but that deadline was 
extended to 1972, or sixteen years.  Thus, the Federal-Aid Highway Act called for sixteen 
appropriations “for the purpose of expediting its construction.” 229   
Hence, the federal government appeared braced for the project, but what about the 
road construction industry?  As a precaution, in 1956, the Public Works Committee 
checked with the roadbuilding industry to ensure its ability to keep up with the 
construction program.  In response, the contracting industry expanded in order to meet its 
obligations.230 Trusting that the federal government would be ready with needed funding, 
“many construction firms substantially enlarged their professional and supervisory staffs, 
expanded their office and other facilities, increased their work forces, and purchased 
additional roadbuilding equipment.”  Road contractors thus placed their trust in the 
federal government to back them, even buying on credit or borrowing in faith that the 
government would reimburse them.231  Cramer, for one, was determined not to let down a 
road construction industry that had shown so much faith in the government.   
At the beginning of Johnson’s presidency, the President seemed to share Cramer’s 
understanding of the importance of highway funding.  Claiming some credit for the 
enactment of the 1956 Interstate and Defense Act, signed into law when he was Senate 
Majority Leader, Johnson emphasized the benefits of the highway to the oft-neglected 
highway driver as he signed into law the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1964. “For much 
too long,” Johnson remarked, 
the man who owns and drives an automobile has been treated like a 
stepchild.  We require him to pay for the highways he uses and we require 
him to pay in advance.  We divert his taxes to other uses but we delay the 
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building of the roads that he deserves.  We denounce him for getting 
snarled in traffic jams not of his own making.  We complain about what he 
costs us but we never thank him for what he adds to the worth and wealth 
of our economy.  We could not get along without him, but we often talk as 
through [sic] we can’t live with him.  . . . Eight years ago, in 1956, we set 
out on a 16-year program to catch up with ourselves, catch up through the 
Interstate Highway System.  This has been described as the most 
ambitious highway program since the days of ancient Rome.  It was my 
privilege then to guide that program to passage as Senate Majority Leader.  
In every respect, it has met our hopes.  It has put more than one million 
Americans to work.  It is already saving 3,000 lives a year and, by 1972, it 
will be saving 8,000 lives a year.  . . . It is saving dollars---$6 billion in 
user benefits last year; $11 billion a year 8 years from now; and the 
program is not costing the General Fund of the United States Treasury a 
single cent.  . . .  I say that this morning because I want the American 
motorist to know that things aren’t so bad that we must sell off our public 
roads to the highest bidder for Uncle Sam to stay liquid.232 
 
 Besides omitting the relevance of the interstate system to the nation’s defense, the 
above sentiments essentially mirrored those of Cramer throughout his congressional 
career.  Had Johnson held to this position, Cramer might have become an ally.  Although 
Cramer valued his party and sought victories for it wherever he could, highway 
development was one issue where he was willing to put aside partisan politics if he 
thought it would advance interstate highway financing and construction.  In March 1965, 
for example, Congressman John Kluczynski, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Roads of 
the House Committee on Public Works, introduced a bill “to approve the estimate of cost 
of completing, and to revise the authorization of appropriation for, the Interstate System.”  
In return, Cramer reintroduced the same bill as a demonstration of “bipartisan support for 
the interstate highway program.”233  Likewise, during the 1968 Florida Senate election, 
Cramer and former Governor LeRoy Collins, a Democrat, found common ground on the 
enduring Interstate versus Turnpike question.  Edward Gurney, the Republican candidate, 
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ran an Orlando law firm that represented the Turnpike Authority under Governor Claude 
Kirk and, not surprisingly, came out in favor of the Turnpike.  
 In the years following 1964, Johnson strayed from his previous interstate 
advocacy, slighting the highway user in the same manner that he previously denounced in 
1964.  Frequently, trusting Cramer’s testimony, Johnson quietly diverted highway funds, 
although during at least one speech, given on November 29, 1966, Johnson openly 
denigrated the interstate highway program to make way for his Great Society:  “We 
would rather postpone the construction of an office building or stretch out the completion 
of a six-lane super-highway than to stop the momentum of our great programs for the 
people that hold out a promise of hope and opportunity to so many.”234 
Cramer was critical, to say the least, of Johnson’s method of scraping together 
finances for Great Society programs by taking money from the interstate system.  As 
early as 1966, Cramer described Johnson as “devoid of leadership in providing funds to 
complete the system by 1972.”235  In an address to the Road Builder’s Association on 
February 28, 1966, Cramer claimed, “If necessary funds had been provided” in 1965, the 
system could have been completed in 1972, “except for a few isolated projects in some 
large metropolitan centers.”  To complete the system on schedule would require “rapid 
acceleration of construction, probably followed by a sudden deceleration,” rather than in 
an “orderly and economic fashion.”  At best, the system could be completed by 1973, and 
without prompt action, not until 1975.236     
The climax of Cramer’s anti-Johnson crusade came on February 6, 1967, when 
the House yielded sixty minutes to Cramer to address how the Johnson Administration 
was jeopardizing America’s highway program.  According to Johnson, Cramer inferred, 
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harking back to Johnson’s 1964 speech, America’s financial situation must actually have 
gotten so bad that Johnson could justify “treating the American motorist like a stepchild,” 
“diverting highway users’ taxes to other uses,” “perpetrating the plight of the motorist 
who is ‘snarled in traffic jams not of his own making,” showing “utter disregard for the 
fact that the Interstate System will be saving 8,000 lives a year upon completion,” and, 
last but not least, using “every possible budget gimmick for ‘Uncle Sam to stay 
liquid.’”237   
Cramer relished quoting that last remark made by Johnson – “things aren’t so bad 
that we must sell off our public roads to the highest bidder for Uncle Sam to stay liquid” 
– citing it three times in a single speech.  (Cramer cited the phrase again on October 11, 
1967.)  As for cutting highway funds to promote social programs, Cramer pointed out 
that the interstate system itself served as an important social program:  “What opportunity 
or promise of hope have you given by the cutback to the thousands of people in the 
construction industry who will become unemployed and to the contractors who will 
become bankrupted?  What better program is there to help the people than to construct 
their highways as early as possible and save 8,000 lives a year?”238  Again, what poverty 
program would “employ more people and keep the economy stronger than highway 
construction, which requires thousands of taxpaying workers and millions of dollars in 
heavy construction equipment and links areas contributing to our prosperity?”239   
 The theme arose again as Cramer discussed the potential for disaster to road 
departments and building contractors in disrupting slated highway funding.  “State 
highway departments,” Cramer explained, “are large, complex organizations.  Scheduling 
of operations, which require advanced lead times, is essential for their efficiency and 
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economy.  Sudden changes, without notice, in the States [sic] construction programs by 
the Federal Government disrupt work schedules and financing plans.  They render useless 
or lessen the usefulness of work previously accomplished.  They result in additional costs 
and work hardships upon the State highway departments.  . . . Many highway 
departments will have to either discharge personnel or reassign them to other 
departments.  Already States are reporting to the Representatives in Congress that 
hundreds of field personnel are being laid off or reassigned.”240   
 As for contractors: 
The sudden slowdown in the award of highway construction contracts is 
most serious . . .  Many contractors cannot long survive the Federal 
Government’s turning the Federal-aid highway program off and on like a 
faucet to suit its own purposes.  The cutback has suddenly decreased 
contractors’ workloads from the levels they had anticipated and geared up 
for.  Because of the cutback, contractors may have little or no new work to 
commence as old jobs are completed.  In such cases, some contractors 
may be able to bear the costs of carrying surplus personnel and equipment 
inventories, in the hope that the faucet soon will be turned on again.  
Others must discharge employees and dispose of construction equipment.  
If they are forced to discharge their supervisory and skilled personnel and 
to dispose of their equipment, they will be unable to respond quickly when 
the faucet is again turned on by the administration.  Thus, urgently needed 
highway improvement will be even further delayed. 241 
 
Cramer thus emphasized that to compromise the interstate system to promote the 
Great Society was completely irrational.  By “asking for a 25-percent increase in 
programs to relieve poverty,” the Johnson administration “instituted a highway cutback, 
which will produce poverty.  Hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of highway construction 
workers will be laid off.  The economy will lose hundreds of millions of dollars in 
construction work.  This does not make sense.”  At the end of the hearing, Congressman 
Cleveland went so far as to speculate that by destroying the highway industry, the 
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Administration intended to “create new classes of poverty . . . so that they can have 
objectives lined up for new poverty programs.”  Cramer dismissed this conspiratorial 
accusation, concluding instead that Johnson valued “poverty squandering” over “our 
transportation lifelines” along with “defense, the national economy,” and “the fiber of our 
society.”  In contrast, Cramer believed highway construction to be an effective social 
program in itself, better than any program Johnson brought to the table.242  
Where Johnson lacked the authority to impose cuts in the interstate system, on at 
least one occasion Cramer accused him of manipulating Congress to do so. The 
accusation came on the heels of an announcement to the governors from Secretary of 
Transportation Alan Boyd on October 8, 1967, informing them that due to “recent 
Congressional discussion on substantial reductions in Federal expenditures, it may 
become necessary to impose ceilings on the Federal-aid highway program.”  On October 
11, Cramer pounced, describing Boyd’s letter as “an obvious sledgehammer tactic to 
bludgeon the Congress into passing the tax surcharges the President has recommended, 
instead of reducing unnecessary Federal expenditures.”  Cramer reminded Congress that 
since the interstate system was funded “out of the Highway Trust Fund, not the general 
fund,” its money raised from “highway user taxes,” the cut-back would have “no effect 
whatsoever on the estimated expenditures in the administrative budget nor the deficit of 
about $29 billion which the President has forecast.”  Not only was the attempted raid on 
highway funds “unwarranted,” it was thus also “unthinking.”  Cramer then went on the 
offensive, calling for a reduction in federal spending to the tune of  $5 billion, pointing 
out that Arkansas Democrat Wilbur Mills, the leader of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, called for a “$7 to $10 billion reduction in Federal expenditures” before issuing a 
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surtax.  Among the programs Cramer wished to ax: “antipoverty, demonstration cities, 
rent supplements, the Teacher Corps,” and, lastly, a highway beautification program 
meant to acquire “land outside the highway right-of-way.”  “It is a most peculiar set of 
priorities,” puzzled Cramer, “which would dictate the expenditure of huge sums of 
money for beautification and other cosmetic and luxury programs while we are facing a 
$29 billion deficit, and while citizens of the United States are bleeding and dying in 
Vietnam and on our inadequate highway system.”  Cramer cited 53,000 traffic deaths in 
1966, just short of the number of Americans killed in the entire Vietnam conflict.243   
 Cramer went on to describe how, under Johnson’s leadership, the financing of 
federal highway projects had become “a yo-yo program of ups and downs.”  In October 
1966, the states thought they had $4.4 billion for 1968.  In November, this figure 
suddenly dropped by $1.1 billion, though in July of 1967 the figure returned to $4.4 
billion.  In August, 1967, the states were told they had $4.74 billion for 1969, but on 
October 8, Secretary Boyd announced this could be cut in half.  The program, Cramer 
said, could not operate smoothly with such fluctuations:  “An effective Federal-aid 
highway program simply will not exist if it continues to go up and down like a yo-yo 
with every fluctuation in the economic situation.  Whether the proposed cutback is put 
into effect or not, Secretary Boyd’s announcement that up to a 50-percent reduction is 
being considered has already seriously damaged the highway program.  . . . Uncertainty 
as to what will happen in the highway program next week, next month, or next year has a 
severely damaging impact.” 
  
92 
With such uncertainty, the states would be more likely to lose faith in the program 
and instead rely on dreaded toll facilities.  That included Florida, which was facing a 
possible 61 percent cutback for 1968.244    
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Umbrella 
 
 Up to this point, I have emphasized Cramer’s gladiatorial spirit.  However, it 
would be misleading to say that he always picked his battles along partisan lines, or that 
reelection was his prime motivation, or that the adversaries in his crosshairs were merely 
expedient targets.  Further testimony in the congressional record reveals that Cramer 
mastered an encyclopedic working knowledge of the relationships between various 
Congressional committees and of federal bureaucracies.  After a brief scan of just a few 
segments of his career, it is hard not to be impressed by his knowledge and forward-
thinking approach to problems, nor to acknowledge the respect and deference that 
Cramer garnered from his colleagues on both sides of the aisle. Like a skilled chess 
player, when drafting, amending, or criticizing legislation, he understood cause and 
effect, foreseeing the far-reaching consequences of congressional action. Connected, 
intuitive, and persuasive, his influence ranged far beyond the committees on which he 
officially served. 
 Cramer’s ability is apparent during the fine-tuning of certain legislative acts 
during 1966 and 1967.  In 1966, House Resolution 13200 was circulating through 
Congress, to establish a Department of Transportation, an umbrella organization 
encompassing, among other agencies, the Federal Aviation Agency, the Bureau of Public 
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Roads, and the Maritime Commission.  On April 26, Cramer appeared before the 
Committee on Government Operations to share his views and recommend amendments 
drafted by the leader of the public works committee, George Hyde Fallon.  While Cramer 
agreed with the spirit of the legislation, that it was essential that “all Federal 
transportation programs must be fully coordinated,” he questioned whether “the existing 
transportation agencies and officials” would not be able to achieve the same goal.   He 
was also concerned that once subordinated, the lower agencies would “lose their 
independence or semi-independence” and “be denied a major voice at the policy levels of 
the Government.”  The position of Federal Highway Administrator overseeing the Bureau 
of Public Roads, for example, was to be erased or downgraded.  With the “importance of 
the Federal-aid Highway program . . . not diminished but . . . increased” since 1956, 
Cramer contended, “this is certainly no time to downgrade the position of Federal 
Highway Administrator.”  Therefore, Cramer recommended that the administrator 
position, along with the existing “four Assistant Secretaries and the General Counsel,” be 
maintained at their present salary and status.245   
The following year, Congressman James Colgate Cleveland of New Hampshire, 
an ally of Cramer’s, confirmed that with the creation of the Department of 
Transportation, “the Bureau of Public Roads has been almost completely eviscerated.  . . . 
The field offices and personnel of the Bureau of Public Roads are no longer responsible 
to the Director of Public Roads.  . . . [T]he Director of Public Roads is no longer in the 
chain of command; . . . has no supervision or control over the officials exercising 
authority delegated by him.”  The range of the Bureau’s actual “Supervision and control” 
was limited to a region “in the eastern part of the United States” and the Inter-American 
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Highway in Central America.  The Bureau’s remaining roles, such as “technical program 
guidance and assistance,” lacked real authority.246  
Cramer fretted that a new Department might “infringe upon the responsibilities of 
Congress.”  What congressman would not be alarmed by the prospect of a Secretary of 
Transportation who could “approve or disprove” the construction of highways “without 
reference to any of the policy declarations presently contained in . . . United States Code” 
as drafted by Congress?  Other members of Congress such as Congressman Frank T. 
Bow of Ohio, for example, were defensive of the fact that “the Interstate System was one 
part of the highway program where members of Congress were able to take part in 
determining where the money would be spent.  . . . I note, for example, that over $200 
million has been spent on Interstate 77, which will connect Cleveland and Canton with 
southeastern Ohio, West Virginia, and North Carolina, largely if not solely on the 
insistence of the Members of the House directly concerned including, as I recall, our 
former colleague John Henderson, members of the Virginia and West Virginia 
delegations, and myself.”247 
What standards would a new Department of Transportation employ in the 
planning of roads?  Cramer suspected the Department might resort to “averages or 
statistical data or some theoretical planning concept” that could “result in a mediocre 
transportation system,” versus more practical approaches developed by state 
representatives.  Cramer also warned that the legislation might “permit the Secretary to 
divert funds from one program to another,” with only the House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees to conduct reviews.  The wording of the bill justified his 
alarm, permitting “comparative evaluation of transportation projects . . . with a view to 
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identifying those warranting support and establishing priorities.”  As proposed by 
Congressman Fallon, Cramer recommended limiting the role of the Secretary to making 
recommendations to Congress “for consideration in the formulation and economic 
evaluation of all proposals for the investment of Federal funds in transportation facilities 
or equipment.”248  
Cramer addressed a broad range of issues during discussion of the Federal Aid 
Highway Act of 1966. As usual, Cramer’s main theme remained the shaky financial 
situation of the system’s trust fund, which was “$6 billion short of doing a 41,000-mile 
job even by 1973.” He and some sympathetic colleagues, Congressman H.R. Gross from 
Iowa and Congressman Hall from Iowa, railed against the lack of leadership in the 
Johnson Administration and its attempted program of beautifying highways with trust 
fund money.   While construction costs were increasing from 2.5 to 2.7 percent annually, 
the “slipping” of Federal matching funds to State highway departments was creating an 
“embarrassing” predicament.  Evolving conditions and highway standards would add 
even more to the cost of the project.  “[F]rom one estimate to another,” admonished 
Cramer, “conditions change, forecast traffic volumes increase, and technology and design 
concepts advance, all of which result in constant upgrading of standards” such as “full 
widths of shoulders across long bridges, . . . more traffic lanes, additional interchanges, 
and depressed sections in urban areas.” “As communities grow and urban limits expand,” 
Cramer explained, “more interchanges are needed.” Between 1961 and 1965, 754 
interchanges were added to the system.  A new safety measure of four-laning the entire 
system yielded a $265 million increase.  All told, these changes would add $630 million 
to the total cost.249  
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The public works committee lacked the authority to provide for the $6 billion 
shortage.  Therefore, Cramer recommended that the Committee on Ways and Means raise 
highway user taxes, transfer funds generated by “the 7 percent automobile excise taxes” 
from the general fund to the highway trust fund, “[extend] the . . . termination date of the 
highway trust fund,” or “[repeal] or [suspend] provisions of section 209 (g) of the 
Highway Revenue Act of 1956 --- the Byrd amendment --- to permit appropriations to the 
trust fund of advances from the general fund to be repaid with interest from later 
revenues to the trust fund.” 250 
Reimbursement for state-constructed highways along Interstate routes emerged as 
a common refrain.  From New York, Congressman Howard W. Robison noted that a 
“rather substantial part” of the interstate completed to date had been accomplished “by 
virtue of the fact that some of the more progressive States,” such as New York, Illinois, 
and Florida, “constructed mileage prior to the beginning of the Interstate System which 
was later incorporated into the system.”  New York, for example, contributed $799.1 
million worth of mileage.  Robison wanted to know whether New York and other states 
would be reimbursed.  Cramer responded that the completion of the entire system should 
precede any reimbursements, and that the issue would be dealt with in the January 1968 
report to the Congress.251    
Congressman Edward J. Derwinski of Illinois then asked if “there is nothing in 
this bill for the acquisition of bankrupt toll roads or skyways.” Cramer replied there was 
not, adding, “I hope there never is any such provision in a Federal-aid highway bill.  […] 
Congress is constantly under appeals to bail out those projects. […] They did bail one out 
  
98 
in the State of West Virginia by making it a part of the interstate highway mileage 
allowance to that State.  But I personally am hoping that will never happen again.”252   
Congressman Raymond F. Clevenger of Michigan also proposed reimbursement, and was 
then cross-examined by Congressman Don H. Clausen, who informed Clevenger that he 
should have made his proposal during previous hearings before the Federal-Aid 
Subcommittee or Roads Subcommittee.  Cramer then asked where Congress would 
acquire the $5 billion that would be needed for “paying off existing toll roads and 
bridges.”   
 Clevenger: I am prepared to support legislation to get the funds. 
Cramer: Has the President made any such proposal? I am sure that he has 
not. 
Clevenger: I cannot speak for him.  . . . 
Cramer: This administration and the previous administrations have all 
recommended against toll road reimbursement at this time.  So I think that 
the gentleman from Michigan is doing nothing more than wishful 
thinking.  . . .  I think some people who are pressing the question of toll 
road reimbursement ought to take equal leadership in pressing people to 
do something about this $6 billion deficit with regard to the present system 
of 41,000 miles that has not been completed.253 
 
Congressman Jonathon B. Bingham rose in defense of Clevenger, declaring that 
“the present program . . . works so as to penalize those States and communities which in 
the past have shown initiative enough to have roads and bridges built; now they are 
suffering for their energy and their investment.” Congressman Max McCarthy concurred, 
once again citing New York’s loss of nearly $800 million and calling the reimbursement 
issue “one of the most vexing public works problems which exists in the United States.” 
McCarthy nevertheless conceded that reimbursements would have to wait until “after 
1973.”254  
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 Though Cramer despised Johnson’s Great Society proposals, he approved of 
several spending measures that would, in the long run, reduce construction costs and also 
assist people disrupted by construction.  He asked that the Federal Aid Highway Act of 
1966 require the Secretary of Commerce to conduct a “study of advance acquisition of 
rights-of-way for future construction” of the system.  The purpose of this study was to 
determine the most cost-effective methods for the states to obtain right-of-way, and what 
the federal government could do to help finance the acquisition.  Noting that the “rural 
countryside adjacent to urban areas is rapidly being developed for residential 
subdivisions, shopping centers, and industrial parks,” Cramer pointed out that “State 
highway officials have been compelled to watch helplessly” as development proceeds 
and land values rise “without being able to acquire those portions they know will be 
needed for highway construction within a few years.”  State highway departments needed 
“legal and financial tools . . . to acquire such properties at a time when this could be done 
at minimum expense to the taxpayers.”  The “Cramer amendment,” he mentioned 
elsewhere, which had been “on the books” for years, “provides for 7-year advance 
acquisition of rights of way.  The States do not use it, and we want to know why.”  
Cramer hoped that the study by the Secretary of Commerce might “chart the course” for 
future acquisitions.255   
 Cramer also desired the Secretary of Commerce, the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, State highway departments, and other agencies, to perform a 
thorough study of “persons and businesses . . . displaced by highway projects.”  Cramer 
requested long-awaited assistance for property owners along the acquisition routes, who 
“sit around for 20 years, knowing their property is going to be taken, with no relief.”   He 
  
100 
believed these people deserved “full relocation costs, rather than the maximum of $200 
for an individual or family and $3,000 for a business.”  He also recommended “the 
coordination of highway construction with other types of construction” and other 
measures to integrate highways into the urban landscape while softening the blows on 
local communities.256 
 Finished with his agenda for the day, Cramer stuck around for comment on other 
proposals.  The temperature rose a little when Congressman Cleveland proposed an 
amendment that would “protect parklands, national forests and historic sites that are in 
some instances being threatened by the building of interstate highways.”  Objection came 
from Congressman Kenneth J. Gray of Illinois, who charged that the individual states 
would have ample motivation to preserve such sites.  Unsure of the amendment’s 
“implications,” Gray believed the committee needed time to “study” the issue. 
Cleveland: [W]hat earthly objection could there be to my amendment.  
You do not have to study four printed lines to know what they say.  . . . It 
is a statement of policy on an important issue that has bothered many 
conservationists . . .  It reaffirms what is probably the law.  . . . 
Gray:  I am a little surprised that my distinguished friend, who is a strong 
States righter, would once again want us to write into a Federal law what a 
State must or must not do . . .  Until we know what the implications are . . 
. the question should be studied.  . . . 
Cleveland:  There is no dictation here.  I think you have either not read my 
amendment carefully or I have not made it clear as to what the intent is.  I 
quote: “The Secretary shall cooperate with the States.”257 
 
 Discussion continued to heat up as several Republican Congressmen, led by 
Cleveland, attempted to strike out a beautification appropriation of $493 million from the 
Federal Aid Highway Act.  Noting that the United States Government was borrowing to 
pay its bills and facing interest rates fast approaching 6 percent, “unheard of in modern 
times,” Republican Congressman Charles Raper Jonas recalled that President Johnson 
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had recently urged “that the line be held and that his budget not be increased.”  “I am 
going to support the President . . . in his efforts to curtail spending,” sniped Jonas.  “I 
suggest his friends on the other side of the aisle should support him in this instance.”  
Aspiring to raise the issue above partisan politics, Republican Congressman Thomas B. 
Curtis pointed out that there were “many Democrats” who agreed that less essential 
programs such as beautification could be shelved until later.258   
Rising in defiance, Democratic Congressman Robert E. Sweeney declared the 
Republicans to be inconsistent in touting the interstate system to be “imperative and in 
the national interest,” while, “for purposes of perhaps political tact, in the consideration 
of the particular amendment, the tune changes to, ‘Let us support the President and slow 
down spending.’” “Let us set the record straight,” Sweeney bristled, “the administration’s 
[original] proposal was that the highway trust fund for beautification be incorporated 
without limitation.  . . . I would ask the Committee to reject unanimously the suggestion, 
which is a belated 11th-hour suggestion – that we scuttle the national effort to clean up 
our highways.259   
Cramer reiterated that his intent was not to “scuttle the program,” but that he also 
did not want the trust fund to be raided for beautification purposes.   
Cramer: [W]e have no testimony whatsoever . . . as to how much money it 
would take . . . for general beautification purposes.  . . . I challenge anyone 
to show – yes, the gentleman who just rose, Mr. Sweeney – where in the 
record it shows how much money is going to be needed.   
Sweeney:  I should like to address myself to that point, but I wish to say 
one thing in correction of a statement the gentleman made . . . that the 
Cleveland amendment would not do enormous destruction to the 
beautification effort. 
Cramer: It would not.  We can do that next year. 
Sweeney:  I respectfully suggest, it would gut the bill. 
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Cramer: I refuse to yield further. The gentleman is not answering the 
question.260 
 
House Minority Leader Gerald Ford intervened, concluding, “If you are for 
economy, we should try to strike from the bill the additional authorization of $493 
million.”   Congressman William Howard Harsha agreed that the government “has no 
money of its own with which to pay for this largesse,” and thus was “driv[ing] the cost of 
borrowing money to an alltime high,” thereby hurting “the small businessmen, and the 
homebuilders” who were “trying to find adequate funds with which to meet their current 
needs.”  Despite Republican efforts, the amendment to strike out the beautification 
appropriation failed, 48 to 65.  Cramer left the meeting shortly thereafter, forfeiting an 
opportunity to comment on an amendment that would permit governors to divert highway 
funds into mass transportation systems, an amendment that was nevertheless handily 
defeated.261   
On August 31, 1966, Congress passed the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1966. 
Fuzzy sentiments set the tone for the final hearing.  Democratic Congressman Kluczynski 
described Cramer as “one of the great men on the minority side, . . . a very good friend of 
mine, who . . . knows as much about highways as anyone in the country.”  Cramer 
responded in kind: “There is no finer and more cooperative man in the Congress than the 
gentleman from Illinois.”  One cause for Cramer’s warmth was clear.  Ford had presented 
a “motion to recommit the bill” that struck out the $493 million beautification 
appropriation, a motion that had prevailed.262   
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The Missing Link 
 
In 1965, Dick Pope, creator of Cypress Gardens, urged citizens of Bradenton to 
“holler” for an Interstate 75 extension from St. Petersburg.263  Conspicuously missing 
from the Florida interstate outlays was a connection from Tampa Bay to Miami. 
Construction costs continued to inflate year after year, creating a sense of urgency among 
road officials, politicians, and constituents. As costs increased, a succession of legislators, 
governors, and road officials from all around the state engaged in a heated debate on the 
question of how to build the “Missing Link.”  
Without question, highway officials agreed that a controlled-access route should 
be built from Tampa to Miami, but most assumed that the Florida Turnpike Authority 
would construct the route.  On its face, the question was simple.  Two options remained: 
Florida could try to secure Interstate status so that the federal government would pay for 
ninety percent of the highway.  Or Florida could build the highway as part of the 
turnpike.  At first, it may have seemed the question was already settled.  The federal 
government had already allotted Florida 1,100 miles of highway; Florida had already 
decided where to place that mileage; the Missing Link didn’t make the cut.  That might 
have been the end of the debate, were it not for the remarks of a United States 
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Congressman whose prescient knowledge of interstate highway matters was impossible 
to ignore. 
 Since 1957, if not earlier, and through the rest of his Congressional career, the 
goal of bringing an expressway through St. Petersburg and connecting Tampa Bay to 
Miami was at the top of Cramer’s agenda.  Newspaper reports provide glimpses into his 
efforts.  In a speech to the St. Petersburg shoe merchants, Cramer foresaw problems with 
the termination of I-4, which, the St. Petersburg Times summarized, would “put too great 
responsibility on state, county and city governments to provide connecting links to handle 
traffic.”  St. Petersburg needed as much expressway as possible to “channel traffic on to 
the Sunshine Skyway without clogging existing east-west and north-south arteries.”  As 
of 1957, 1,000 miles of interstate mileage still had not been designated, so Cramer put in 
a request for the Tampa Bay to Miami link, which had to compete with requests from 
other states “amounting to some 12,000 miles.”  In lieu of the states’ mileage demands, 
the Senate Public Works Committee considered a bill adding 7,000 miles to the system, 
but failed.264   
On February 2, 1962, the mileage issue made Tampa Tribune headlines when W. 
T. (Billy) Mayo, the State Road Department’s Interstate Highway Administrator, claimed 
that Florida “stood little chance” of obtaining extra mileage for southwest Florida.  His 
assumption was based upon a recent application for “a relatively few more miles” for a 
causeway at Cape Canaveral, an obvious shoe-in, Mayo figured, given the site’s 
relevance to national defense.  “If they wouldn’t give us any for that,” concluded Mayo, 
“I feel certain we couldn’t get any” for southwest Florida.  While Governor Farris Bryant 
offered no comment, press aide John Evans was pessimistic, noting the “reluctance” of 
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the Bureau of Public Roads to offer extra miles.  Former Governor Collins nevertheless 
believed that the state should make “a last-ditch effort . . . before a final decision is made 
on building a toll turnpike in that area.”  That same week, the state authorized a $60,000 
feasibility study for a Tampa to Miami turnpike.265   
The following day, Cramer’s cherubic face appeared in the Tribune with a look as 
bold as the accompanying headline, “Cramer Sees Tampa-Miami Route Being 
Designated ‘Before 1968.’” Cramer predicted that “‘there isn’t any question that toward 
the end of the program (in 1967-68) or before,’ the federal government will re-evaluate 
its interstate program [and] consider additional mileage allocations.”  Until then, Cramer 
recommended that the state initiate a free road program “on a 50-50 basis” with the 
federal government, but the state did not take action.266    
It is unclear what assurances Cramer had in 1962 that the Interstate program 
would be reevaluated by 1968.  As ranking Republican on the public works committee, 
he knew a lot of things no one back in Florida knew.  What is certain is that he did 
everything in his power to make sure that the reevaluation took place according to his 
designs.  As it turned out, his 1968 prediction was prophetic.   
The task of bringing mileage to southwest Florida was no straightforward matter.  
It demanded the full use of Cramer’s authority and ability. It is not hard to detect in 
Cramer’s maneuvers some subtle and devastatingly effective measures to discreetly make 
way for the construction of expressways through his own district and region, yet without 
leaving the faucet on for too many other members of Congress to tap the same resources 
for their own districts. In his endeavors to preserve the authority of the Bureau of Public 
Roads, block appropriations for beautification, and deny until a later date reimbursements 
  
106 
to existing highways along the interstate route, Cramer endeavored to ensure the timely 
completion of the Interstate system and prevent it from being manipulated by overly-
narrow, local interests, the worst-case scenario being the proverbial politician trying to 
route the highway through his backyard, charge a toll, and collect federal funds at the 
same time, with federal mileage elsewhere denied where it was actually needed.  
In 1965, Cramer inserted a crucial piece of legislation into that year’s Federal-Aid 
Highway Act that in following years would work in favor of southwest Florida.  The 
measure called for the Bureau of Public Roads to issue a report, in January 1968 and 
“every second year thereafter,” containing “estimates of the future highway needs of the 
Nation,” thus providing for “an orderly development of the Federal-aid highway 
programs after 1972.”267  (Responsibility for the report would eventually transfer to the 
Department of Transportation.)   
Once signed into law, Cramer put a great deal of effort into steering the report, 
exploiting to the fullest his position in the public works committee.  Much effort went 
into ensuring that the new Department of Transportation cooperated with the states, 
rather than devolve into a maverick technocracy, as previously discussed.  On April 28, 
1966, Cramer voiced his concern:  “There have been disturbing rumors during the past 
few months that the States might not be permitted to fully participate in the formulation 
of plans for a program for improving the Nation’s highway systems after 1972.”  It would 
probably have been fairly easy for one or more State Road Departments to slip through 
the cracks of the proposed study.  Cramer was not about to allow Florida to be one of 
those states.  Although the study was signed into law on August 28, 1965, Cramer learned 
on February 25, 1966 that Floyd B. Boyen, chairman of the Florida Road Department, 
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had still not received a federal request to “formulate any recommended future 
improvement program” for Florida.268   
On March 15, 1966, Cramer wrote to Federal Highway Administrator Rex 
Whitton, saying, “I am quite disturbed to find that apparently the Bureau of Public Roads 
has not requested the State road department to formulate a recommended improvement 
program.” On April 19, Whitton testified before the House Public Works Subcommittee 
on Roads.  “During interrogation by me,” Cramer recalled, “Mr. Whitton stated that the 
Bureau of Public Roads was in the process of formulating guidelines to be followed by 
the States in submitting their recommendations,” and that “the guidelines would be 
submitted to the States early enough to permit them to make proper studies.”  Somewhat 
reassured, but not easily cajoled, Cramer reminded Congress of the crucial role of the 
states in shaping federal highway programs:  “Improvement of Federal-aid highways, 
ever since the commencement of the Federal-aid highway program in 1916, has been 
carried out cooperatively by the Federal Government and the States.  This partner 
relationship has worked exceptionally well and has been the model emulated by other 
programs.  The present highway program, including construction of the Interstate and 
Defense Highway System, enacted into law in 1956, was a result of joint studies, 
planning, and recommendations of the Bureau of Public Roads and the State highway 
departments.  It is essential to the public interest that future highway programs continue 
this partnership concept.”269   
 In a corresponding letter to Cramer, Whitton provided an update on the state of 
the Bureau’s review.  It is worth noting that Whitton’s description of the review process 
closely matched Cramer’s worst fears of how a new Department of Transportation might 
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conduct studies, such as resorting to “averages or statistical data or some theoretical 
planning concept” that could “result in a mediocre transportation system.”  The situation 
was precarious enough under the current system.  Understandably, Whitton requested that 
the states “classify” all their roads based on the “functions they perform . . . on a 
consistent basis throughout the country.”  But before the states could do that, they had to 
wait for federal officials to develop assessment standards.  Using congressional 
guidelines, the federal government would then designate where new roads would be built. 
Hence, Congress still had a part in planning new routes, but it was becoming more 
indirect.  Assisting the evaluation, said Whitton, the government would “have the 
advantage of an analytical tool […] that will permit a mathematical simulation of travel 
based on estimates of future population and economic growth and distribution.”270  Such 
an analytical tool probably did not inspire confidence in members of Congress such as 
Cramer, confident that the individual states had a pretty good idea where new highways 
were needed.  Cramer would have to find creative ways to work the system to his 
advantage.   
In 1966, Cramer pointed up the need for a “Tampa-St. Petersburg-Miami” 
expressway during the Federal Highway Act of 1966 hearings.  In the process, he 
skillfully insisted that existing state toll roads along interstate routes should not be 
reimbursed.  The measure was effective at reserving funds for un-built routes such as 
those he desired, considering that toll roads undoubtedly comprised the bulk of state 
constructed expressways.  The measure was also, at least on the surface, ethically benign, 
that is, not overtly self-serving, no matter to what degree he was actually shaping federal 
policy to serve his own district.271   
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With the January 1968 deadline approaching, 1967 was a crucial year for any 
state hoping to gain extra mileage.  On January 16, 1967, Cramer reminded Congress that 
the Department of Transportation’s report was to “include specific route designations for 
any proposed increases in mileage on the Interstate System.”  With that in mind, he 
introduced three bills.   The first called for “the construction of an interstate highway 
from the Interstate 75 terminus at Tampa, Fla., and from the Interstate 4 terminus at St. 
Petersburg, Fla., through Bradenton, Sarasota, Venice, Punta Gorda, Fort Lauderdale, and 
Homestead.” “In my opinion,” he reasoned, this “missing link is one of the most 
obvious inadequacies in the Interstate System. . . . There is no interstate route whatsoever 
linking the west coast of Florida with the lower east coast area, despite the fact that the 
west coast would be the shortest route from many Midwestern and Eastern cities to the 
Fort Lauderdale-Miami area.  In addition, the west coast of Florida is one of the fastest 
growing areas in the entire nation.  Interstate 75, which links such populated areas as 
Atlanta, Birmingham, Chattanooga, St. Louis, New Orleans, Dallas, and Chicago, with 
the west coast of Florida presently deadends in Tampa.  Interstate 4, which links many 
populous areas of the eastern United States to the Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater area, 
presently deadends in St. Petersburg.  I therefore feel it essential that a new interstate 
highway be constructed so that the interstate traffic presently terminating in the Tampa-
St. Petersburg area can be funneled down the lower west coast to the Fort Lauderdale-
Miami area.”272 
Cramer’s second bill, which never made it off the ground, “provided for the 
construction of Interstate 65 from Montgomery, Alabama to Ocala, via Tallahassee.273  A 
third bill was intended to prevent toll interests from building on designated interstate 
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routes, a measure that would prove of crucial importance in Florida.  Any tolls installed 
on the interstate would have to be in the interests of the public and would also require 
permission from the Secretary of Transportation.274 
On November 9, 1967, he introduced a crucial measure, requiring the Secretary of 
Transportation to “give due regard to the extension of routes which now terminate within 
municipalities that are served by a single Interstate route so as to provide traffic service 
entirely through such municipalities to connect with an arterial highway beyond the 
boundaries thereof.  This . . . provision is to remedy the situation now existing in some 
municipalities where the Interstate System terminates within a municipality and will 
dump large volumes of traffic on a city street system that is inadequate to accommodate 
movement of such traffic in and through the municipality.”275  This condition made St. 
Petersburg and Tampa prime candidates for additional mileage, given the termination of 
Interstate 75 in Tampa and Interstate 4 in St. Petersburg.  Cramer thus put Southwest 
Florida on the front burner without even mentioning the region by name.  On January 2, 
1968, this measure was signed into law in the Howard-Cramer Act, which also added 200 
miles to the Interstate system to be shared between Florida and New Jersey.276  
 Although the Howard-Cramer Act favored cities like St. Petersburg and Tampa 
where federal expressways dead-ended, it did not specify that the additional mileage 
would go specifically to these cities.  According to Congressman John L. Mica, Cramer 
“crafted” the 1968 Federal Aid Highway Act to southwest Florida’s advantage.  Not only 
did Congress demand that the Secretary of Transportation privilege the Tampa Bay area 
in allotting the extra 200 miles, Congress also added another 1,500 miles to the interstate 
system, for which Congress insisted the Tampa to Miami route should receive prime 
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consideration.  Mica described Cramer’s management of the 1968 Federal Highway Act 
as “the capstone of his service on the Public Works Committee.”277   
Once again, Cramer earned the warm esteem of his colleagues, including Clausen: 
“I believe, in all sincerity, that the gentleman from Florida is respected by members of 
the subcommittee as much or possibly more than any other Member on either side of the 
aisle.  Certainly, no one has been a better student, become more knowledgeable, or 
demonstrated the ability to articulate our road and highway message to the Congress or 
the Nation, than the ranking Republican on the Public Works Committee --- Bill Cramer.  
I am sure that future generations of Americans will come to appreciate the work he has 
done and the contributions he has made to our nation’s road and highway system.” 
In addition, Speaker of the House John McCormack “came down from his rostrum to 
personally congratulate Cramer and . . . was quoted as saying: ‘Bill, this has been one of 
the most statesmanlike presentations that I have observed since coming to the 
Congress.’”278    
 Back in Florida, Cramer pressed the issue with Boyd.279 However, when Cramer 
boasted of increasing the state’s mileage, critics responded with doubts and concerns that 
the congressman might actually be placing Florida’s road programs in jeopardy in the 
name of politics.  Cramer assumed that the signing of the 1968 Federal Aid Highway Act 
would “slide into reality” the construction of the missing link, especially given the fact 
that Boyd was a Floridian.  However, the Tampa Tribune reported that “unnamed ‘high 
officials’” had warned “state officials that assignment of the additional mileage will be on 
a substitute basis; therefore, the 1,500 additional miles created by Congress was only 
“theoretical;” “to get a Tampa-Miami Interstate 75 Florida will have to give up an equal 
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dollar volume on other interstate roads,” such as I-10 and I-95.  The American 
Association of State Highway Officials shared this interpretation of the 1968 Act. 280 
Given the Interstate system’s tight budget, such fears were not irrational.  The 
Tribune reported that funding would decrease from $4 billion every year “through 1973” 
to only $2.25 billion for 1974.  Without an increased appropriation for 1974, warned state 
officials, “someone will have to decide where the available money can best be spent.” 
Hank Drane, political editor for the Jacksonville Times Union, was also worried: “It 
would be unfortunate ... for I-95 or I-10 to become the missing link.” The Tribune also 
voiced concern that designation of I-75 from Tampa to Miami could be just as harmful to 
southwest Florida’s highway development, given the delays, budget limits, and complex 
protocol of the interstate program.  The Turnpike Authority, it was argued, could get the 
job done much faster, because, unlike the Interstate program, it was not required to 
purchase all the right-of-way and relocate individuals in the path of the highway in 
advance of construction.  While the state could construct the road “in about five years,” it 
was estimated, the federal government would not complete the job until 1985.281  Later 
that year, Cramer denied the charge that the federal government would take a lot longer 
to construct the highway, claiming that right-of-way could be quickly bought and 
contracts begun in 1970, with the help of $300 million in federal funds.282 
As a new toll versus free debate emerged, the ‘will of the people’ became a 
contested topic.  “To most of the communities south of Tampa Bay,” claimed the 
Tribune, “the debate over tolls or no-tolls is academic.  Community leaders say they want 
the road built—built by whatever means possible, and finished not later than 
yesterday.”283  According to a St. Petersburg Times report, however, that was not 
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completely true.  While Richard A. A. Martin, chairman of the Highway Committee for 
the Sarasota Chamber of Commerce, assisted the Turnpike Authority with its feasibility 
studies, he openly hoped for delays in the Turnpike’s progress.  “The longer the study 
time,” Martin reasoned, “the more time Mr. Cramer . . . has to get us an interstate.”284  
   In the weeks following the 1968 general election, prospects for a federally 
funded I-75 in southwest Florida finally came to fruition.  On November 24, 1968, the 
Times reported that Federal Highway Administrator Lowell K. Bridwell would announce 
the fate of Florida’s missing link, which was competing with 20 other routes totaling 
10,000 miles, for a share of the added 1,500 miles.  Practically quoting Cramer, Bridwell 
hinted that the Tampa Bay-Miami route was one of the “obvious and serious gaps” in the 
Interstate system.  Even if Cramer did not have his way during the remaining months of 
the Johnson Administration, he was predicted to have “a pipeline into the White House,” 
given his “early and ardent” support of the Nixon campaign.  Nixon, it might be added, 
was “a frequent visitor to Miami and has a substantial investment in real estate there.”  
“I’m fully confident we’ll get the mileage,” said Cramer, “either under the present 
administration or under the new one.”285  Days before Boyd was expected to announce 
the recipients of the additional mileage, Cramer viewed the event as a test of 
congressional authority.  “I understand the recommendations are on Boyd’s desk,” he 
said on December 10.  “If the congressional mandate is followed, I-75 has to be 
included.”286  
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Mickey Mouse Road 
 
  On December 13, 1968, Boyd approved a “252-mile extension” for southwest 
Florida’s missing link, although Florida was denied a 52 mile extension of I-95 through 
Homestead to connect it with I-75.  Florida fared nearly twice as well as any other state, 
with 138.5 miles allotted to Texas, 130 miles to New York, 109 miles to California, 105.8 
to Wisconsin, 38.8 to Georgia, and 19.2 to Alabama.  The Times celebrated Cramer’s 
“legislative coup,” noting how he “tailored a piece of legislation to fit Florida’s need for a 
Tampa-Bay-Miami interstate link.”287  “This is one of the happiest days we’ve had in this 
office,” proclaimed Cramer’s administrative assistant, Richard Haber, who reportedly 
“beamed with pride.” 288 The Tribune also acknowledged Cramer’s allies, including 
Representatives Sam Gibbons of Tampa, James Haley of Sarasota, and William Rogers 
of Palm Beach, all Democrats.289   
An editorial in the Tribune proclaimed, “All Florida will profit from this 
expansion of the high-speed highway network but Tampa and the West Coast will be 
especial beneficiaries.  Present routes southward from Tampa to the thriving cities of 
Bradenton, Sarasota, Fort Myers and Naples are congested and often hazardous.  Poor 
roads retard the development of all.  Tampa, sitting at the crossroads of two Interstate 
highways, I-75 and I-4, will have an advantage few cities enjoy.  This fast and cheap 
accessibility to other parts of Florida and the nation will be an economic asset of 
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tremendous value.”290  
The Tribune editorial also touted Boyd’s designation as “an encouraging example 
of bi-partisan effort,” the kind that “Floridians expect:”  “For the motorist caught on one 
of the crowded two-lane roads leading to Miami is neither Democrat nor Republican; 
he’s just a disgusted driver.”291   
Following the immediate rush of excitement, Floridians began scrutinizing 
Boyd’s approved route, finding many aspects of it unusual and unsavory. The criticisms 
were numerous and widespread; and the reaction was immediate and fierce.  Of particular 
concern was the omission of a proposed beltway along the eastern side of Tampa Bay.  
The beltway was designed to avoid the Tampa business district, through which it was 
deemed “impractical and too expensive” to build, according to Jay W. Brown of the 
Florida Road Department.  Rather, a longer, circuitous I-75 beltway would begin north of 
Tampa, extending eastward around the city before progressing to Miami.292  Upon 
discovering the omission of this eastern loop, the Times described how southbound traffic 
on I-75 would face two unsavory alternatives: continue driving on U.S. 41 to Palmetto, or 
“face the Skyway toll” on the western beltway through St. Petersburg.  (The Interstate 
route just past the southern end of the Skyway also included three to five miles of non-
limited access highway, a definite hazard.  State Road Board Member Donald R. Crane, 
Jr. noted, “That’s being four-laned now, . . . but maybe we better buy limited access 
property there.”)293   
The Times speculated that Boyd’s omission must have been a political oversight.  
A report, entitled “Interstate 75: ‘Missing Link’ in Political Thought?” noted that Boyd’s 
decision made the western route through Pinellas County the principal path to Miami.  
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Quoted in the report was an anonymous, “politically astute [Republican] Floridian on 
Capitol Hill,” who puzzled over why Boyd, a Democrat, would reward a Republican 
Congressman’s district when he could have just as easily reward Democrat Sam Gibbons 
of Tampa, who desired the expressway on the eastern side of Tampa Bay.  “Well,” 
responded Boyd, “it wasn’t a politically motivated decision. […] Most of that mileage 
went to states with Republican governors and a lot of Republican congressmen and 
senators.  We didn’t do it on a political basis.  We did it on a basis of need as we saw it, 
based on the criteria which were in the act.  Politics didn’t enter into it.”294    
A second set of dilemmas surrounding the southern part of the I-75 extension 
erupted in consternation throughout southern Florida.  First, at its terminus, I-75 would 
link to “the overloaded Palmetto Expressway in northwest Dade,” described as “a death 
row for motorists” and “among the major traffic engineering disasters of a county with 
the first or second largest automotive vehicle registration per capita in the nation.”295    
Said an editorial in the Miami Herald: “It would be difficult to find a professional 
highway engineer in South Florida who would recommend dumping more traffic into the 
Palmetto Bypass as the Boyd plan would do with the southeast terminus of I-75.  We 
suggest that the Secretary of Transportation find out how many people have been killed 
on the bypass before he ties it into the Interstate system.”296 
The Palmetto Expressway predicament was symptomatic of a much larger 
problem.  The State Road Department had asked for I-75 to run alongside the Tamiami 
Trail.  Boyd’s Department ignored that request and switched the route to Alligator Alley.  
Initially, Boyd’s announcement appeared, to some, to have marked the end of Florida’s 
Tampa-to-Miami toll route endeavors.  “Now such a toll road cannot be built without 
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specific permission of the U.S. Department of Transportation,” reported the Tribune after 
Boyd’s announcement, citing a “sleeper clause” in the 1968 Federal Highway Act barring 
the construction of “any toll road in the same traffic corridor as an interstate” without 
federal approval.297  However, the Times and a vitriolic editorial from the Miami Herald 
offered a different interpretation.  “The plan,” warned the Times, is to four-lane ‘Alligator 
Alley,’ a toll road from Naples to Fort Lauderdale, and make it part of the interstate 
extension --- possibly with the toll still intact.” 298   
In addition, Boyd’s rejection of the US 41 route desired by Cramer, an “outraged” 
State Road Board Chairman Michael O’Neill, and many others, dealt southern Florida an 
I-75 that would stray far north of “the huge jetport under construction west of Miami.”299   
Exclaimed the Herald:  “One of the reasons for locating the new South Florida jetport 
just north of the Tamiami trail was the expectation that I-75 was coming through to serve 
as a high-speed, limited access highway for both private cars and public transportation 
serving air travelers. […] [W]e would not be surprised if it turns out that the [Turnpike] 
authority is right now thinking about building a toll road between the jetport and Miami.  
That would be a money grabber to rival Miami’s airport expressway that took in 
$188,530 last month in dimes.”300 
 Extending criticisms beyond Boyd’s decision, newspapers from around the state 
launched attacks against Boyd himself, along with the Turnpike Authority and its 
beneficiaries.  Florida’s prominent new Disney establishment meanwhile armed critics 
with a novel form of epithet.  While the St. Petersburg Times likened the Turnpike 
Authority to “the Beagle Boys watching Scrooge McDuck’s money, the Miami Herald 
complained of the “Mickey Mousing of I-75, all at the expense of the taxpaying 
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motorist:301  “This hapless chap pays once in state and federal gasoline taxes, next in 
surcharges to fund the Interstate program, and thirdly, though perhaps not finally (they 
get you coming and going) in toll charges.”302   
AAA Motor Clubs of Florida complained that the I-75 extension “critically 
ignores the worst needs of population centers while protecting the ever-eager bond 
schemers with two built-in toll traps.  . . . The Boyd plan, is brazen, bizarre and is an 
affront to every citizen and community on the west coast of Florida. . . .  Mr. Boyd’s 
proposal ignores the will of Congress and the desire of the people of Florida during the 
dying days of the Johnson administration.”303   
 In addition to the above criticisms, “enough to hurt a few eardrums in 
Washington,” the St. Petersburg Times circulated a more serious allegation.304  Citing a 
source close to Boyd, the Times claimed that Boyd had actually intended “to veto any 
mileage for Florida.”  When apprised of Boyd’s demand, Federal Highway Administrator 
Lowell K. Bridwell and Director of Public Roads Frank Turner purportedly “protested to 
Boyd” on the grounds that Congress insisted on providing for Florida’s missing link.  In 
reply, Boyd told the officials to “approve only the minimum necessary.”  Unsure of 
Boyd’s “motive,” the Times pointed out that the Interstate expansion “engineered by 
Republican Cramer was opposed by the Democratic Administration.”305 Boyd described 
the whole scenario as “ridiculous,” insisting “that he had no feelings whatsoever about 
the Florida project.”306   
Reacting to Boyd’s omission of the eastern loop, the Hillsborough County 
Commission quickly turned to the Turnpike Authority to construct the eastern bypass as 
part of a comprehensive road development plan including six other expressways. 
  
119 
However, most, including State Road Department officials who withheld their appeals to 
the Department of Transportation, agreed that the prudent course of action was to wait 
until the accession of former Massachusetts governor John Volpe, “an old friend of 
Cramer,” the new Transportation Secretary under President Nixon.  Then, Cramer would 
have a good opportunity to appeal for the eastern loop and reroute I-75 along the 
Tamiami Trail. “I cannot understand nor do I approve of the DOT’s deletion of the 
Tampa bypass connecting Interstate 75,” said Cramer.  “I have already put into motion 
the necessary expressions of interest in revising this decision.  . . . With a total of 
approximately 58 miles presently still unallocated, I believe it may be possible to get the 
needed mileage (approximately 32 miles) added to include the Tampa bypass.   
The Times added, “If it isn’t possible to get it approved . . . [Cramer] will get it 
incorporated in the 1970 Federal-Aid Highway Act.”307  The state of Florida had perhaps 
another ‘ace in the hole,’ having elected Nixon in 1960 and 1968, “the 210,000 vote 
margin the state gave him [in 1968] comprised about half his national popular vote lead 
over Hubert Humphrey.”308   
On the opposing side, Turnpike Chairman Charles W. Rex also planned to appeal 
to Volpe to “scuttle the interstate for a toll road.”  Volpe, said Rex, “is governor of 
Massachusetts and they’re very toll road conscious.”  The Times emphasized Rex’s 
sardonic sense of humor.  Looking forward to a December 17 Hillsborough County 
meeting, Rex planned to ask the pro-Interstate, State Road Board Chairman Michael 
O’Neill to explain Boyd’s decision and “watch his face turn red.”309   
The most glaring problem with Boyd’s designation of I-75 along Alligator Alley 
was that, thanks to Cramer’s legislative endeavors, its routing along a toll route was 
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unlawful.  According to Cliff Enfield, who now served as minority counsel for the House 
Committee on Public Works, the Department of Transportation had three options: 
“Change the law, get the toll removed (this would be up to the state) or move the 
route.”310  Boyd believed the routing was legal, though his reasoning is unclear.  
According to the Times, Boyd believed that Florida might “be required to pay off the toll 
road bonds before it could obtain the interstate construction money,” an action that would 
likely benefit toll-way bondholders, assuming the Turnpike interests could be compelled 
to relinquish the route.311  Earlier in the debacle, a Tribune editorialist posited the notion 
that Boyd’s “cheerful blueprint” for Alligator Alley could be put into action:  “It can be 
aided in . . . studies already done by the Turnpike Authority.  Governor Kirk, we trust, 
will instruct his Turnpike board to turn over to his [largely pro-Interstate] Road Board 
whatever data will be helpful.”312 
Amidst the fray, the 1969 event pointed up the need for a reorganization of 
Florida’s transportation governance.  John Pennekamp of the Miami Herald emphasized 
problems stemming from the conflicting agendas and “lack of coordination” between the 
Turnpike and the Road Board.  “[I]n spite of the fact that Dade County is by far the 
biggest gasoline tax contributor to the Road Department, and most of the tollway traffic 
is generated here,” the region’s contributions were not reflected in the local road quality, 
with “residents riding jam-packed on two-laned highways, some the busiest in the 
South.” Pennekamp concluded: “Certainly one coordinated department would serve 
better than viewpoints as widely separated as . . . the two chairmen.”313  Months later, in 
July, 1969, Florida created a Department of Transportation, with some measure of 
authority over the Turnpike Authority, and abolished the Road Board. 
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 Despite Florida’s optimistic outlook with Nixon in office, nearly a year passed 
with the state still in uncertainty over the fate of its expressways.  The only good news for 
the Interstate was that the Turnpike Authority could not legally build along the Interstate 
route without Volpe’s approval.  Cramer said he would be “amazed and shocked” if 
Volpe approved.  Cramer also persuaded Volpe to “set aside” Boyd’s Alligator Alley 
designation while the Florida Road Department submitted new recommendations to the 
Federal Highway Administration.  “Then,” said Cramer, “it is just a matter of getting 
approval of the secretary and the federal highway administration,” a process that would 
take three or four months.  Cramer was also “hopeful” about the eastern loop, especially 
since it looked as though the District of Columbia might forfeit some mileage.314  
Governor Kirk was apparently of two minds, “talk[ing] off and on of building a toll road” 
along the bypass, but “back[ing] off after Cramer . . . insisted the bypass would be 
restored.”  Kirk also ordered a “moratorium . . . on new interstate highway construction 
contracts,” described by his administration as a measure to “fight inflation.”315   
 With regards to highway legislation, including the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 
1969, nothing of great import stands out in Cramer’s remarks in the 91st Congress.  
Numerous other members of the Public Works Committee shared his desire for ample 
appropriations to provide for the additional Interstate mileage, so he merely backed such 
proposals with his support.316  Likewise, with a Republican Secretary of Transportation, 
there was no need at the moment, and perhaps it would have been pretentious at the time, 
to direct the actions of the Department of Transportation.  On October 7, 1969, the Times 
reported that Volpe and Cramer would jointly announce federal authorization for a $60 
million, 47-mile Tampa bypass.  For the time being, the Turnpike Authority would be 
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barred from building along the route, which would eventually be constructed, toll-free.317  
Contrary to the jetport interests, Interstate 75 from Tampa to Miami would be constructed 
along the Alligator Alley route, but without tolls.   
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Southern Strategy 
 
As an accomplished public works legislator, Cramer was hopeful that Florida 
would welcome his bid for the United States Senate.  He was in line to accept the 
Republican nomination for the ailing George Smathers’s seat in 1968, which would 
indeed have been an opportune time for Cramer to campaign.  Along with his public 
works endeavors, Cramer’s recent accomplishments on the Judiciary Committee had won 
widespread approval from conservatives, who were quite happy with the recent passage 
of his anti-riot legislation in 1967.  Instead, he yielded the opportunity to Edward J. 
Gurney.318  As early as March 1965, Gurney had been considered as a candidate for 
governor for the 1966 election, receiving “strong sentiment” throughout Florida, 
according to GOP National Committeewoman Helene Morris.319  While Claude Kirk 
became the Republican nominee, Gurney entertained thoughts of running in the 1968 
Senate race as early as December 1965.320  It was not long after Gurney won the 1968 
Senate race that Republicans looked forward to taking the remaining Senate seat in 1970.  
Cramer was “seriously considering” running for Senate, and Gurney was supportive.  In 
January 1969, Gurney predicted that Florida Republicans, led by the state GOP Chairman 
William Murfin, Kirk, Gurney, and three Congressmen including Cramer, were “going to 
go into the 1970 election in Florida completely united and unified.”321    
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 “Frankly,” remarked Cramer, “I was a little surprised at the amount of 
enthusiasm, which seemed universal, that I encountered at . . . Ed’s victory reception. . . . 
[B]ut I don’t have to have the job on the other hand.  I have a good berth in the House 
and I am certainly not going to give it up unless I am pretty certain I can win.”322      
At an April 9 meeting, Cramer aide Jack Insco remarked that it was “amazing 
how the Gurney people are coming across to us.”  Asked whether he would rather run 
against Farris Bryant, Sam Gibbons of Tampa, or Paul Rogers of West Palm Beach, 
Cramer replied, “if you wish to talk philosophically, then I would hope to be in a position 
– as the senator (Gurney) was – to run against a liberal.”  
Gurney offered supportive remarks.  Cramer “looks like a pretty live prospect,” 
said Gurney. “All the people who worked for me, I am sure, will pretty much support 
Congressman Cramer.” Louis Frey, freshman Congressman from Orlando, was 
considering the seat, but was waiting to see what Cramer would do.323  Later that year, 
Ray Osborne campaigned for the seat.324  With or without Gurney’s support, Cramer was 
by far the strongest Republican contender.  Asked whether he would support Cramer in a 
primary, Gurney assumed Cramer would run unopposed and there would be no 
primary.325  
 In May 1969, rumors spread that the Republicans might “Dump Cramer.” Gurney 
replied, “I’m a party leader, . . . and I will have no part in dumping anyone.  I don’t know 
where these rumors are coming from.” 326 A letter from Gurney to Cramer indicates that 
as late as March 24, 1970, the two politicians shared warm relations.327  Then, on April 
20, Gurney unceremoniously dumped Cramer in a press release that neglected to even 
mention the Congressman’s name. 328  By the following month, Gurney was promoting a 
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“nation-wide drive to raise 1-million dollars” for a new Republican contestant, Harrold 
Carswell, a move that disturbed many Republicans.  “What is good for […] a faction of 
the Republican Party in Florida,” responded Dorothy Swanson of Winter Park, “is not 
necessarily good for the Republican Party nation-wide. . . . [T]his investment . . . couldn’t 
be a more effective scheme to promote internal friction than if the Democrats had thought 
it up.  . . . [D]uring my primary campaign for State Committeewoman in 1966 . . . Rep. 
Gurney told me he never had and never would, take part in primary campaigns and 
added, ‘You know me better than that.’  I believed him.  But now it appears that the 
sterling qualities of statesmanship were only a plating over the cheap brass of power 
politics.  It is disillusioning.”329 
 Carswell was a quintessential post-office Republican of the South, defined by 
legal scholar Bruce H. Kalk as office seekers “[d]edicated to seeking postmasterships and 
federal marshallships whenever the GOP was in power” who bore little chance of being 
“selected on merit alone.”  Kalk offers a devastating account of Carswell.  During the 
Eisenhower administration, Carswell was appointed federal attorney and, with Cramer’s 
recommendation, federal judge for the Northern District of Florida.330  Carswell, 
“reluctant to exert himself,” managed to have the lowest caseload in the Fifth Circuit, yet 
his backlog grew to the extent that Congress had to create another judgeship for his 
district.331  Nevertheless, in 1969, President Nixon appointed Carswell to the U.S. Court 
of Appeals.332  An “ill-closeted segregationist,” Carswell seemed a good fit for Nixon’s 
southern strategy and was nominated for the Supreme Court in January, 1970.  However, 
even the President was shocked when he discovered that earlier in his career, Carswell 
had sold property with a whites only covenant and chartered a whites-only booster club 
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for the Florida State University football team.333  Carswell’s nomination was scuttled, but 
his career in politics was not quite over.  Regardless of his previous endorsements of 
Cramer, Gurney suddenly endorsed Carswell in the 1970 Florida senate primary:   
Sometimes dramatic events can verge to an inevitable happening and such 
is true of Judge Carswell’s candidacy to the U.S. Senate.  President Nixon 
pledged to the people to change the balance and direction of the Supreme 
Court.  Twice his will has been slaughtered by the Senate, pressured by 
the very liberal forces of this country.  The Carswell and Haynsworth 
nominations were much more than Supreme Court nominations, they were 
massive confrontation struggles between the very liberal activists against 
the majority of the nation – the silent majority, if you will.  The time has 
come to take this contest to the people in the elections of 1970.  Judge 
Carswell has offered himself to go to the Senate and help the President 
fight this battle for progressive conservative government.  Judge Carswell 
is committed to a cause; it’s right, it’s just, it must be fought for, and it 
will be won.  I congratulate Judge Carswell, I offer him my support and I 
urge all people of Florida, Republicans and Democrats, to join this cause 
for progressive conservative government and send Harrold Carswell to the 
United States Senate.334      
  
 The St. Petersburg Times played its part in the race.  Despite sharing with Cramer 
an almost identical highway construction agenda, Democrat Nelson Poynter did not 
support Cramer, and his paper played up the contest between Cramer and Carswell.  A 
lengthy Times profile described Cramer as “Little Boy Conservative with his thumb in 
the hole in the dike, trying to prevent the erosion of change.”  At first, the profile put 
forth the appearance of dealing evenhandedly with Cramer:  “Friends will find mirrored 
in the record the image of a man who is flexible, conservative, staunchly Republican, and 
jealous of the rights of the states.  Foes will see instead a man who is illogical, negative, 
abrasively partisan, and racist.”335 
At last, the Times landed on a central point:  “This much is clear: Cramer’s 
greatest consistency is his inconsistency.  He will oppose a new departure today, but if 
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time brings popularity to the program, he will not just support it but embrace it. […] He 
will fight a proposal if it comes from a Democrat in the White House, but back the same 
idea without a blush if a Republican asks his support.”336 
From there, it got personal:  “His public ethics are those of a private businessman.  
Cramer makes no effort at hounds-tooth cleanliness, nor to avoid the appearance of evil.  
Since coming to Congress in 1955, he has stated unequivocally that his income from his 
St. Petersburg law firm is nobody’s business, headed a laundry that did business with the 
government, managed to avoid prosecution on a minor hit-and-run charge that followed a 
cocktail party, and driven a luxury car provided under a very favorable leasing 
arrangement by the Ford Motor Company.”337   
While the article provided details on the more controversial aspects of his career, 
the Times only had a few points to make about Cramer’s accomplishments on the Roads 
Subcommittee: that back in 1959, he voted against a highway safety measure before 
becoming a highway safety advocate; and that since 1956, Cramer had “supported 
highway construction legislation,” to say nothing of the many proposals he initiated and 
the remarkable interstate mileage he helped appropriate for Florida and the rest of the 
nation.338  
Cramer won 62.5 percent of the primary vote, but lost the general election to 
Democrat Lawton Chiles by a 7.7 percent margin.339   
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Breaking New Ground 
 
Gurney’s endorsement of Carswell coincided with the April 21 commencement of 
the 1970 Federal-Aid Highway Act hearings.  Cramer later said, towards the end of his 
last year in Congress, that he had been “determined,” with the bipartisan cooperation of 
his colleagues in the Public Works Committee, “to break new ground.”  “Incidentally,” 
the retiring Congressman said, “I had to break with my administration, the present 
administration, in order to do so.”340   
 It is interesting to observe the evolution of Cramer’s highway agenda through the 
course of his career.   During his early years, an unsympathetic critic might presume that 
to Cramer, the Interstate System was an end in itself, that the Congressman was merely a 
talented monomaniac who would continue legislating barebones expressways ad 
infinitum.  According to the Times, it took him a while to come around on highway 
safety, and he made every effort to shelve beautification efforts.  But throughout the 
course of his career, and especially from 1968 onward, the legislator can be seen 
acknowledging and, with his characteristic sharpness, strategy, and prioritization, 
thoughtfully addressing an increasingly complex array of challenges.  It is not as though 
Cramer suddenly became aware of these challenges and then abruptly reacted.  Rather, he 
had been schooling himself on various transportation issues for years.  He was simply 
unwavering in his priorities.  Until Eisenhower’s first priority was accomplished, to 
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expend energy on other projects would have been profligacy.  Later, as the primary 
agenda neared completion, Cramer began ushering his characteristic energy and spirit 
into new projects.  
 Although there is little if anything in the congressional record in the way of overt 
dissent from the Nixon administration, Cramer’s fighting spirit had obviously returned.  
He openly regretted giving up his cherished role on the roads subcommittee, and he was 
determined to make the most of his final year.  As for the administration, the White 
House apparently did not approve of Cramer’s scope of the challenges ahead.  On May 
14, while Gurney was launching his million-dollar fund-raising campaign, Cramer and 
fourteen legislators introduced a bill to ensure that the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 
would meet the nation’s changing demands.  First on the agenda, as usual, was ensuring 
that the interstate, which so far was 70 percent complete, received necessary funding.  
Already, the remaining construction was expected to cost the government $13.7 billion 
more than estimated in 1968.  To accommodate inflation, Cramer called for $17.12 
billion for 1972 to 1976.341  
Cramer still considered the interstate system “the backbone of the entire highway 
network of this country,” and he wanted to see the nation complete the system before 
shifting “major attention to other highways.”  However, with roughly 900,000 miles in 
total Federal-Aid Highway Systems, the Interstate made up “only a small part” of 
America’s highways.  As soon as the Interstate System was completed, America had its 
work cut out in bringing all other highways up to government standards.342   
 Cramer urged Congress to look far ahead and implement an “after 1975” highway 
program, “so that necessary planning could be undertaken timely, and costly stops and 
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starts avoided in the transition from the current highway program to the one that will 
follow.”  However, since Congress was not yet furnished with adequate, up-to-date 
information to develop such a plan, Cramer called for the Transportation Department “to 
develop, in cooperation with State highway departments and local governments, and to 
report to Congress in January of 1972, . . . detailed recommendations for a continuing 
Federal-aid highway program for the 15 year period from 1976 through 1990.”  Until 
then, Cramer proposed immediately channeling funds into primary and secondary 
highways “for a spot improvement program to eliminate, on a priority basis, safety 
hazards.”  His bill also called for the federal funding of “training programs to provide 
equal employment opportunities” during lulls in highway construction.343 
The Congressman who had accomplished so much for federal expressways was 
also now calling attention to the need to “promote the improvement and use of urban 
highway public transportation systems.”  He understood that mass transit would be a 
difficult sell for most motorists, but figured that if “comfortable, convenient, attractive, 
and safe buses operate over well-planned routes and on schedules that meet the needs of 
the people, many persons in metropolitan areas who drive,” people might be convinced to 
take the bus.  In contrast to the period of interstate construction wherein the states had to 
strain to conform to federal standards, Cramer believed that Federal-aid highway 
programs should be “more flexible and adaptable to meet the needs of individual 
communities,” recommending a combination of highways and mass transit systems. 
However, not wanting to see money poorly spent, Cramer’s bill would allow for 
alternative uses of highway funds only if the alternative system was at least as effective 
as, and no more expensive than, a highway – a tall, perhaps even prohibitive, order.344 
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On November 25, 1970, Cramer made his final Congressional speech on behalf of 
highways.  Here, Cramer mentioned that the long-range future highway programs he 
introduced in April were the crux of his “break” with the Nixon Administration.  In order 
to “break new ground,” senior members of the Roads Subcommittee had learned that it 
did not matter whether a Republican or a Democratic controlled the White House; this 
special group would always have to push hard to make sure that America’s transportation 
demands were met.345  Cramer ran the gamut of issues that the 1970 Federal-Aid 
Highway Act needed to address.  The alleviation of “urban congested areas” demanded a 
“highway oriented mass transit program.”  He also called for “an indepth study of the 
problems relating to alcoholism” and safety measures on highway construction sites.346 
 Several members of the Roads Subcommittee were very close to Cramer and were 
sad to see him leave.   Their remarks suggest they held him in very high esteem.  Don H. 
Clausen, who played a prominent role in the shaping of the bill, credited Cramer as a 
“champion of building a better America.”  Congressman Kluczynski of Illinois, 
Chairman of the Roads Subcommittee, described Cramer as “a brilliant, able lawyer, and 
a very effective legislator.”  Congressman Ed Edmondson of Oklahoma described 
Cramer as “one of the hardest-working” and “one of the ablest debaters,” demonstrating 
“mastery of detail,” “scholarship and workmanship in the preparation and finalizing of 
the legislation that comes to the floor of the House.”  Recalling past debates, 
Congressman John A. Blatnik of Minnesota admired Cramer as “an antagonist as well as 
a protagonist.”  Out of their “combined conflict,” they “came out with good propositions . 
. . that have been repeatedly sustained . . . by record-breaking majorities.” Cramer 
reciprocated his appreciation for his fellow members on the Public Works Committee.347  
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Yes We Can 
 
 On 9 March 1965, Governor Haydon Burns commemorated the completion of 
Interstate 4.  No interchange had been built where the highway intersected the Sunshine 
Parkway, rest areas had yet to be built, and St. Petersburg cried out for an extension to the 
Sunshine Skyway, but Interstate 4 was nevertheless ready for traffic.348  Though gaps still 
existed as late as 1969, much of Interstate 75 from Michigan to Tampa was open to 
traffic as early as 1965.  After completing a 3.3-mile gap in Tampa, Florida would be the 
first state to complete its share of the highway.  Of course, construction of the Tampa to 
Miami route pushed back I-75’s overall completion date.349   
By May 1971, Interstate 75 from the Howard Frankland Bridge to St. Petersburg’s 
9th Street had been completed while work commenced on an overpass over Gandy 
Boulevard.350  However, the environmental movement was beginning to complicate 
matters for the rest of I-75.  In 1968, officials thought that construction could begin as 
early as 1970, but by 1971, the Florida Department of Transportation was compelled to 
develop environmental plans for 32 federal agencies.  Millions of dollars worth of plans 
had to be reassessed for environmental impact. Handing existing plans to the Turnpike 
Authority to avoid federal regulations was still a possibility, but at last in 1973 the 
missing link received environmental approval.  Meanwhile, successive presidential 
administrations threatened to cut highway budgets, and the mid-1970s fuel crisis undercut 
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gasoline tax revenues. According to state officials, I-75 would not be completed until, at 
best, 1980.351  By 1975, surprisingly little progress had been made.  Due to funding 
problems, one pessimistic prediction placed the completion date as late as 2009.352  In 
1978, bridges across the Manatee River and the Peace River were under construction, 
along with other segments of Interstate 75 from Tampa Bay to Naples.353  Piece by piece, 
the missing link reached completion in the 1980s. 
The impact of Florida’s expressways was immediate and widespread. In I-4’s first 
year, 40,000 cars passed by downtown Orlando each day, and eventually Central Florida 
became “among the most sprawling places in America.”354   Interstate 75, said the St. 
Petersburg Times, created a “revolution in Florida’s economy.”  At the intersection of I-
75 and I-10, a 100-unit hotel went up in Lake City, a city self-described as the “New 
Gateway to Florida.”  Likewise, Wildwood dubbed itself the “Gateway to South Florida.”  
New businesses established themselves along Gainesville’s three I-75 exits, and the 
highway became the “spine” of the city’s development.  Meanwhile, businesses along old 
highways such as US 41, US 27, and US 301 struggled to adapt to the circumstances, 
with service stations switching to local car maintenance and motels enticing tourists to 
stay for longer periods of time.  Many businesses simply folded.355  Along US 1, old 
shopping centers devolved into “oversized neighborhood centers with identity crises,” 
whose owners found it difficult to retain tenants.356  
 The environmental impact of the superhighways was incredible.  Opponents 
fought the routing of every highway, often to no avail.  In Manatee County, the Izaak 
Walton League fought unsuccessfully to save a cypress stand in the path of I-75.357  A 
Governor’s Task Force under Reubin Askew listened to appeals to save the western edge 
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of the Loxahatachee Slough along I-95.358  Near Tequesta, residents registered a 281-acre 
bird sanctuary with the Florida Audubon Society to save the land from I-95.359  
Oftentimes, engineers had to choose between building through undeveloped 
environments or through residential areas.  Many homes were lost, and countless others, 
many of them built in formerly pleasant neighborhoods, had to deal with the noise and 
unsightliness of superhighways.  With every routing and rerouting, there were winners, 
losers, and uncertainty.   
 Like other baby boomers, in the 2000s, the superhighways conceived and brought 
into being during the 1950s have been reaching their fiftieth anniversary.  Retrospective 
articles described how interstates have “remade the country’s social and economic 
landscape,” some believe for the worse.  In contrast to traditional two-lane highways, the 
superhighways have been deemed “soulless” and “tedious.”  In exchange for roadside 
regional character, the nation acquired fast food chains.360  Interstates have become 
synonymous with divided cities, oil dependence, rampant sprawl, pollution, and 
environmental degradation.  Meanwhile, the demand for new highways has outpaced the 
nation’s road building capacity, and the average driver spends about 38 hours per year 
stuck in traffic.361  In Florida, as in many other parts of the country, chronic traffic jams 
characterize many stretches of highway.   Central Florida’s I-4 boasted the nation’s ninth 
worst traffic congestion in 2006, where the smell of orange blossoms has been supplanted 
by “the smell of idling engines,” and the perpetual existence of detours and closed lanes 
due to road improvements have “tried the patience of even the most forgiving 
commuters.”362  Many other expressway segments have become notorious. The site of 
numerous fatal accidents with mysterious causes, I-75 from Alachua to Ocala became 
  
135 
known as “a sort of Bermuda Triangle.”363   
While federal expressways have been maintained, widened, and improved, their 
dependence on unpopular revenues such as gasoline taxes did not allow them to grow 
quite like the toll highway system now known as Florida’s Turnpike.  In the 1980s, after 
paying off the bonds to the original turnpike, the legislature voted in 1990 to widen the 
original parkway and build new highways with the surplus toll revenue.  Since then, the 
Turnpike took over of the failing Sawgrass Expressway in Broward County, then 
financed construction of another 150 miles of urban expressways in the Tampa Bay, 
Orlando, and Lakeland areas.  With a total of 460 miles of highway, 2.1 million vehicles 
drove on Florida’s tollways in 2006, generating $643 million.364  Metropolitan areas 
continue to rely primarily on tolls to finance new expressway projects. 
In 2006, the Turnpike received what may be the most controversial highway 
proposal in the state’s history, a $7 billion, 152-mile expressway pushing through an 
undeveloped interior strip of Florida.  The Heartland Parkway began as a project of the 
Heartland Economic, Agricultural and Rural Task Force, or HEART.  Created in 2005, 
HEART’s membership included Lykes Brothers, Collier Enterprises, and State Senator 
J.D. Alexander of Lake Wales, in short, of “a pedigree of Florida’s landed elite,” with 
each member owning significant tracts of land in the Parkway’s path. Editorialist Howard 
Troxler drew a satirical map of the proposed highway, which included exits to the Tampa 
Bay Sprawlway, Sprawladelphia, and Sustainablemixeduseburg, while zigzagging and 
swirling through the properties of its backers.  Before leaving office, Governor Bush’s 
Secretary of Transportation Denver Stutler submitted an “action plan” which included the 
Heartland Parkway, but Governor Charlie Crist’s administration has opposed the 
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Parkway along with the entire “Future Corridors” program, composed of nine new 
expressways covering more than one thousand miles throughout the state. Crist later 
described the Parkway as a “road to nowhere,” and said that when appointing 
Transportation Secretary Stephanie Kopelousos, he sought someone who would improve 
existing expressways in South Florida, particularly I-95, I-75, and I-4, rather than blaze 
new trails through undeveloped areas. HEART attorney Rick Dantzler has argued that the 
Parkway could be used to “organize” Florida’s inevitable growth, but Department of 
Community Affairs Secretary Thomas Pelham disagreed with Parkway proponents, 
arguing that their highway proposal “should not be driving land-use planning,” but that a 
comprehensive land planning should “determine the appropriate transportation.”365        
The Urban Land Institute has named west-central Florida one of the United 
States’ eight emerging “super cities.”  Ignoring the laments of those who believe Florida 
already has enough people, metropolitan planners continue to look for ways to 
accommodate yet more growth. In 2007, the Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council gave 
experts a pile of Lego blocks and a map with the goal of finding ways to accommodate 
3.2 million additional residents by 2050. The Planning Council ignored county lines, 
seeking regionwide transportation plans and possibly a rail system.366  
While comprehensive planning in the Tampa Bay area poses challenges, 
coordinating municipal and county governments can be next to impossible.  For example, 
Senator Alexander has resisted efforts to bring Polk County into Tampa Bay’s planning 
process, claiming, “The interests of Tampa Bay are different … than the interests of Polk 
County,” whose destiny he saw tied to inland counties where the Heartland Parkway 
would run.367  Polk was not the only county to resist incorporating certain Tampa Bay 
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transportation developments. In 2007, Hillsborough County completed a $2.2 million 
highway to the Pasco County line to ease traffic on Bruce B. Downs Boulevard, but 
Pasco balked on a promise to connect to the road, and so it dead-ended just before 
reaching Kinnan Street.  Assistant County Administrator Bipin Parikh explained he did 
not want other streets to become overburdened, like Pasco’s Cross Creek Boulevard.368  
In the future, how will regional transportation planners gather official consensus?  And 
what will they do if they cannot? 
–– 
At the end of his last term in Congress, Cramer remarked, “If we do not ship the 
goods in America, if we do not accommodate the moving people in America, America 
will be stymied and will be stultified, and it will die.”369  What shape will future 
transportation systems take?  In past decades, with an abundance of fossil fuels, highways 
have provided an essential source of freedom.  With rising fuel costs and an uncertain 
economy, will cars and highways continue to offer freedom, or will they prove an 
unsustainable form of transportation?  
As I write, an election cycle has come to an end.  Barack Obama will be the next 
President, and the Democratic Party has increased its majorities in the House and Senate.  
Great challenges lie ahead as the nation faces “two wars, a planet in peril, the worst 
financial crisis in a century,” but in his first speech as President-elect, Obama has infused 
the nation with a simple mantra. “Yes, we can.”370  It may be that there has never been a 
better opportunity for Americans of all stripes to let go of past prejudices, to come 
together and dream, to let everyone’s voice be heard, to nurture democracy, to create a 
more exceptional nation, and to extend and sustain peace and prosperity around the 
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world.  Yes, I daresay, we are. 
 In this world of possibility, it is difficult to know what we should hope for? In 
Florida, a series of ambitious transit proposals have repeatedly been sidetracked.  The 
prevalence of low-density sprawl has made the establishment of profitable, effective 
transit routes virtually impossible, and rail systems linking Tampa Bay, Orlando, and 
Miami have been derailed. Despite worsening traffic conditions, it is still more convenient 
for most people to drive cars than ride buses.  Compared to riding a bike or a bus, cars 
enable people to go more places faster and to bring more stuff with them.  For several 
years, I have managed to get by with a bicycle as my primary means of transportation.  
Living in downtown St. Petersburg, this has been made possible by the fact that home, 
school, work, friends, and other necessities such as food are all in close proximity. 
However, it is hard to imagine trying to survive anywhere else in the Tampa Bay area 
without a car.  Despite St. Petersburg’s cycling possibilities, cars still rule the streets. 
 Despite decades of setbacks, now is the time to think big.  In Florida, virtually 
everyone agrees that the transportation systems need revamped, but there is a great divide 
on what path to take.  Metropolitan areas are likely to welcome regional planning, mass 
transit, and federal funding.  Meanwhile, against the will of many of their constituents, 
representatives of outlying areas such as Polk County may unfortunately cling to 
traditional, non-constructive highway planning concepts.  The temptation is still strong 
for powerful landholders to coordinate highways through their properties, collect tolls, 
and increase their fortunes.  In the 1950s, this may have seemed a reasonable approach, 
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but since then, Floridians have learned the importance of reigning in development and 
preserving wilderness areas.  Low-density sprawl is the direct consequence of 
unrestrained highway initiatives.  To prevent this outcome, conscientious Floridians 
should be prepared for an arduous battle, especially if Governor Crist’s successor 
embraces an ambitious highway program. 
 Unless we wish to court disaster, future transportation systems must be very 
different from the expressway networks of yesteryear. Setting into motion a plan for 
responsibly addressing the nation’s transportation needs, Obama has acknowledged that 
highways alone will not serve the needs of today.  New highways encourage urban sprawl 
and heighten dependence on personal automobiles, increasing fuel consumption and 
making it difficult for people who cannot afford vehicles to get to work.  As states 
develop transportation systems, mass transit will be an absolute necessity as fuel 
conservation will be a required element for federal funding.  Tax incentives must be 
created for those who walk, bike, or ride a bus rather than drive a car. Already, the Obama 
campaign has stated the intent of creating “a robust federal infrastructure investment 
program” for future transportation systems. As a financial supplement, a new National 
Infrastructure Reinvestment Bank is slated to provide $60 billion over ten years for 
transportation projects.371    
 A surprising, unanticipated outcome of this study of expressway development is 
that it has yielded a model for understanding problems that may be encountered in future 
developments, and for assessing whether their execution will run smoothly. In fact, the 
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situation today is not all that different from that of the 1950s.  In common with mid-20th 
century expressway construction, Obama has stated that his initiatives will create more 
than a million jobs, thus offsetting the current slump in construction work and refueling 
the economy.372  As in the 1960s, measures should be put in place to ensure that funding 
remains ample and consistent from year to year, leveling the peaks and valleys frequently 
encountered in the construction industry. 
 Just as there will be federal initiatives, city, county, and state governments will also 
have proposals, along with private organizations.  As in the past, there will undoubtedly 
be conflicts. With the help of elected officials, appointees, government workers, and the 
media, the public will play a crucial role in deciding what proposals work best. As I have 
tried to demonstrate, William C. Cramer exemplifies how representatives can use their 
authority to bring integrity to transportation programs in Florida and throughout the 
nation. He took his job very seriously.  He had a brilliant understanding of how to make 
transportation bills work according to design, in the best interests of the public, often 
against the wishes of state leaders with less egalitarian aims.  His party never won a 
majority in the House during his tenure, but through keen, diligent service, Cramer was 
able to accomplish a great deal.  He demonstrates how minority Republicans today can 
play a lead role while healing the partisan divide, and his example may serve as a beacon 
for all transportation planners. 
  
141 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
 
                                                
1 Michael Paterniti. “America in Extremis,” New York Times Magazine, 12 Apr 2002, 35, 
74. 
2 Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Parrington, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1979), 3. 
3 Ibid., 158. 
4 Howard Lawrence Preston, Dirt Roads to Dixie: Accessibility and Modernization in the 
South, 1885-1935, (Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1991) 127. 
5  “West Florida Expects Boom,” New York Times, 13 Jun 1954. 
6 Preston, Dirt Roads to Dixie, 116.  Quoting Elbert Henderson, “Winter Tours in 
Summer Climes,” Harper’s Weekly, 6 Jan 1912, 12-13. 
7 “Hillsborough County Now Has 35 Mile Stretch of A-1 Brick Road,” Tampa Daily 
Times, 4 September 1915. 
8 Ibid. 
9 “New Indian Rocks Bridge Is Opened,” Tampa Morning Times, 24 Nov 1915. 
10 “Get Busy; Repair Roads,” Morning News, Oct 1921. 
11 “County Gains From Ill Wind; Gets $200,000 For Bridges,” St. Petersburg Times, 1 
Jan 1922. 
12 “Get Busy; Repair Roads,” Morning News, Oct 1921. 
  
142 
                                                                                                                                            
13 “Gandy Bridge City’s Greatest Gift of Promise For New Year,” St. Petersburg Times, 
1 Jan 1922. 
14 “Longest Toll Bridge,” New York Times, 15 June 1924. 
15 Leland Hawes, “Gandy’s ‘silver ribbon’ links shores,” Tampa Tribune, 7 March 1987.  
16 “Gandy Bridge City’s Greatest Gift of Promise For New Year,” St. Petersburg Times, 
1 Jan 1922. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 “Major Highway to be Finished Within a Year,” St. Petersburg Times, 8 July 1927. 
22 Leland Hawes, “Gandy’s ‘silver ribbon’ links shores,” Tampa Tribune, 7 March 1987.  
23 “Two-Mile Strip To Be Finished in Eight Months,” Tampa Morning Times, 8 Nov 
1936. 
24 “10,000 Persons Ride On Street Cars Each Day,” Unknown newspaper, 26 Jan 1917. 
25 “Trolleys’ End Will Cure Traffic Headache,” Miami Herald, 15 Oct 1939. 
26 Gary Mormino, Land of Sunshine, State of Dreams: A Social History of Modern 
Florida, (Gainesville: University of Florida, 2005), 241. 
27 Wilfred Owen, The Metropolitan Transportation Problem, Revised Edition, 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966), 39.   
28 “Parking Problem Hits Downtown,” St. Petersburg Times, 2 Nov 1950. 
29 “Ask The Man Who Needs One,” St. Petersburg Times, 21 Oct 1946. 
  
143 
                                                                                                                                            
30 “Here’s How Others View City’s Lack of Proper Parking Spaces,” St. Petersburg 
Times, 4 Nov 1950. 
31 “Parking Problem Hits Downtown,” St. Petersburg Times, 2 Nov 1950. 
32 “Our Traffic Problem,” St. Petersburg Times, 3 Nov 1950. 
33 “15,000 Homes Gave Developer Idea For Plaza,” St. Petersburg Times, 18 Nov 1952. 
34 “11 Stores Open Today,” St. Petersburg Times, 18 Nov 1952. 
35 “City Has Brief Fling As Retailing Capital,” St. Petersburg Times, 19 Nov 1952. 
36 “Immediate Goal: A County Manager,” St. Petersburg Times, 18 Jun 1956. 
37 “Gandy Boulevard to Get 4 Lanes,” St. Petersburg Times, 17 July 1956. 
38 “Long-Awaited Truck Route,” St. Petersburg Times, 1 Apr 1957. 
39 “Super Industrial Area Envisioned in Pinellas,” St. Petersburg Times, 9 Aug 1957.  
“Indian Rocks Bridge Traffic Survey Planned,” St. Petersburg Times, 23 Jun 1955. 
40 “City’s Largest Shopping Center Plans Revealed,” St. Petersburg Times, 20 Jun 1956. 
41 “Board Told Avenue Job Behind Time,” St. Petersburg Times, 3 Apr 1963. 
42 “20 Fight Removal Of Trees,” St. Petersburg Times, 3 Apr 1963, 
43 “Clapp Says Civic Spirit Will Rebuild Downtown,” St. Petersburg Times, 2 Apr 1963. 
44 “Manager Says Remove All Parking Meters,” St. Petersburg Times, 4 Apr 1963.   
45 “219 Cars Use Tampa Bay Ferry,” Evening Independent,” 28 Dec 1945. 
46 “Public Opinion,” Evening Independent, 20 Feb 1947. 
47 “Bay Bridge Toll Estimate Put At Million Annually,” Evening Independent, 27 Nov 
1945. Even after construction of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge, the prospect of building 
tunnels across Tampa Bay cropped up again in 1957, when the St. Petersburg Times 
  
144 
                                                                                                                                            
pointed out that tunnels could double as bomb shelters. “Under-Bay Tunnel Bomb 
Shelters?” St. Petersburg Times,16 Dec 1957. 
48 “West Florida Expects Boom,” New York Times, 13 Jun 1954.  “U.S. 41 Four-Laning 
Project Begins Sept. 19,” St. Petersburg Times, 8 Sept 1957. 
49 “Frenchman Creek Set As Bayway Bridgehead,” St. Petersburg Times, 20 Jun 1956. 
50 “Center Policy,” St. Petersburg Times, 4 Apr 1963. 
51 “Work Starts on Killer Intersection,” St. Petersburg Times, 3 Apr 1963. 
52 “Free Parking for 110 Cars,” Advertisement, St. Petersburg Times, 3 April 1963, 3-B. 
53  Advertisement, St. Petersburg Times, 23 March 1965, 10-A. 
54 Douglas Doubleday, “Suncoast Has Over 100% Hike In Motor Vehicles,” St. 
Petersburg Times, 1 March 1960, B1. 
55 Owen, The Metropolitan Transportation Problem, 36-7, 235. 
56 “VRR-Oomh!” St. Petersburg Times, 9 Jan 1961. 
57 “Suncoast Has Over 100% Hike In Motor Vehicles” St. Petersburg Times, 1 March 
1960, B1. 
58 Ibid. 
59 George Bartlett, “Summer Visitor Travels By Auto,” St. Petersburg Times, 19 June 
1956. 
60 “Dayton Likes to Commute Via Choo Choo,” St. Petersburg Times, 23 June 1955. 
61 “Florida Pressed To Handle Growing Volume Of Traffic,” St. Petersburg Times, 11 
March 1962, 6A, Mormino Collection.  (Highway-using vehicle ranking based on Florida 
  
145 
                                                                                                                                            
Highway Patrol Statistics). “One Solid City From Cape To St. Pete Seen,” Orlando 
Sentinel, 6 October 1961, Mormino Collection. 
62 “Duval Got Most 1953 Road Funds,” Tampa Tribune, date unknown, LeRoy Collins 
Papers, Box 57, State Road Dept Part 2.  
63 Ibid.  
64 “Hernando 6th in State Road Work,” Tampa Morning Tribune, 1 Dec 1951. 
65 “State Builds Highway And Bridge To McKethan Land And Park He Gave County,” 
Tampa Morning Tribune, 18 Oct 1952. 
66 Ibid. 
67  The Range Line Association appealed to successive administrations to change the 
route, apparently to no avail, although LeRoy Collins promised to “look to sound 
engineering advice.”  John J. Pelot to Charley Johns, 9 Feb 1954, Library of University of 
South Florida, Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Roads Correspondence. John J. 
Pelot to LeRoy Collins, 2 Oct 1954, Library of University of South Florida, Tampa, 
LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Roads Correspondence. LeRoy Collins to John J. Pelot, 
15 Oct 1954, Library of University of South Florida, Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 
149, Roads Correspondence.  
68 “Notes For Collins’ Use On Frozen Road Funds,” Newspaper article, Library of 
University of South Florida, Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Road Research Part 
1. 
69 “Simpson Cites the Record,” Tampa Morning Tribune, 20 Apr 1954. 
70 Ibid. 
  
146 
                                                                                                                                            
71 Florida Road Department member Thomas B. Manuel to Department Chairman 
Richard H. Simpson, 10 Dec 1953, Library of University of South Florida, Tampa, 
LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Road Research Part 1. 
72 “Lloyd Out, Whitehair In,” Daytona Beach Sunday News Journal, 3 Jan 1954. 
73 Ibid. 
74 “Politics, Bridges Don’t Mix,” Unknown newspaper, 19 Apr 1954, Library of 
University of South Florida, Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Road Research Part 
3. 
75 “Bid Openings By SRD Stir New Dispute,” Unknown newspaper, Associated Press?, 8 
May 1954, Library of University of South Florida, Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 
149, Road Research Part 3, USF Library. 
76 “Thanks For Telling Us,” Tampa Morning Tribune, date unknown, Library of 
University of South Florida, Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Road Research Part 
3. 
77 “Simpson Cites the Record,” Tampa Morning Tribune, 20 Apr 1954. 
78 Statement by Richard Simpson, Library of University of South Florida, Tampa, LeRoy 
Collins Papers, Box 149, Road Research Part 1. 
79 “Florida Road Building,” Statement of Richard Simpson, Library of University of 
South Florida, Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Road Research Part 1. 
80 “Revolutionary State Road Policy Seen,” Palm Beach Times, 8 Feb 1954.  “State Road 
Overhaul,” Fort Myers News-Press, 9 Feb 1954. 
  
147 
                                                                                                                                            
81 “Revolutionary State Road Policy Seen,” Palm Beach Times, 8 Feb 1954.  “State Road 
Overhaul,” Fort Myers News-Press, 9 Feb 1954. 
82 Edgar Chambers to LeRoy Collins, 27 Dec 1954, Library of University of South 
Florida, Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Roads Correspondence. LeRoy Collins 
to Edgar Chambers, 3 Jan 1955, Library of University of South Florida, Tampa, LeRoy 
Collins Papers, Box 149, Roads Correspondence. 
83 “Port St. Joe,” Library of University of South Florida, Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, 
Box 149, Road Research Part 1. 
84 Tom Gaskins to LeRoy Collins, 15 Sept 1954, Library of University of South Florida, 
Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Roads Correspondence. 
85 “Statement by LeRoy Collins on Roads,” Library of University of South Florida, 
Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Roads Correspondence. LeRoy Collins press 
release, Library of University of South Florida, Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, 
Road Research Part 1. 
86  Dorothy Weik Smiljanich, Then Sings My Soul: The Scott Kelly Story, (Florida 
Historical Society Press, 2007), 110-11. 
87 Raymond Arsenault, St. Petersburg and the Florida Dream, (Gainesville: University of 
Florida, 1996), 312. 
88 Charles Stafford, “Republicans Vying,” St. Petersburg Times, 30 August 1970. 
89 Ibid. 
90 “Majority of Southerners Wish Section Were Less Solidly Democratic,” St. Petersburg 
Times, 26 Jun 1946. 
  
148 
                                                                                                                                            
91 Stephen F. Lawson and Charles Payne, Debating the Civil Rights Movement, 1945-
1968, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 8. 
92 Ibid., 7, 46, 47. 
93 Darryl Paulson, William C. Cramer and the Second Republican Revolution, 
Unpublished manuscript, 9. 
94 Ibid., 10. 
95 Ibid., 12-17. 
96 Charles Stafford, “Republicans Vying,” St. Petersburg Times, 30 August 1970. 
97 Earl Black and Merle Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans, (Belknap: Cambridge, 
2002), 64-5.   
98 Charles Stafford, “Republicans Vying,” St. Petersburg Times, 30 August 1970. “No 
More ‘Sixth Commissioners,” St. Petersburg Times, 21 Nov 1958. Earl Black, The Rise 
of Southern Republicans, 64-5. 
99 “Majority of Southerners Wish Section Were Less Solidly Democratic,” St. Petersburg 
Times, 26 Jun 1946. 
100 Martin A. Dyckman, Floridian of His Century: The Courage of Governor LeRoy 
Collins, (Gainesville: University of Florida, 2006), 77. 
101 Earl Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans, 65. Charles Stafford, “Republicans 
Vying,” St. Petersburg Times, 30 August 1970. Darryl Paulson, William C. Cramer and 
the Second Republican Revolution, 16-17. 
  
149 
                                                                                                                                            
102 Earl Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans, 65. Charles Stafford, “Republicans 
Vying,” St. Petersburg Times, 30 August 1970. Darryl Paulson, William C. Cramer and 
the Second Republican Revolution, 16-17. 
103 Charles Stafford, “Republicans Vying,” St. Petersburg Times, 30 August 1970. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Wilfred Owen, The Metropolitan Transportation Problem, 39, 41. 
106 Mark H. Rose, Interstate: Express Highway Politics: 1939-1989, Revised Edition, 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1990), 97. 
107 Whitney Goit to LeRoy Collins, 21 Sept 1954, Library of University of South Florida, 
Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Roads Correspondence. 
108 LeRoy Collins to Whitney Goit, 27 Sept 1954, Library of University of South Florida, 
Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Roads Correspondence. 
109 “Florida Turnpike Report,” 15 Apr 1953, 1-12, University of Florida Library, 
Gainesville, Farris Bryant Collection, Public Roads and Highways Committee, Box 14, 
File 13. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Statement by Richard Simpson, Library of University of South Florida, Tampa, 
LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Road Research Part 1. 
113 “Bay Bridge Toll Estimate Put At Million Annually,” Evening Independent, 27 Nov 
1945. Even after construction of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge, the prospect of building 
tunnels across Tampa Bay cropped up again in 1957, when the St. Petersburg Times 
  
150 
                                                                                                                                            
pointed out that tunnels could double as bomb shelters. “Under-Bay Tunnel Bomb 
Shelters?” St. Petersburg Times, 16 Dec 1957. 
114 “West Florida Expects Boom,” New York Times, 13 Jun 1954. 
115 Arsenault, St. Petersburg, 312. 
116 Ibid. 
117 “Bay Bridge Toll Estimate Put At Million Annually,” Evening Independent, 27 Nov 
1945. 
118 “Statement by LeRoy Collins on Roads,” Library of University of South Florida, 
Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Roads Correspondence. 
119 LeRoy Collins to H.E. Sisson, 30 Sept 1954, Library of University of South Florida, 
Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Roads, USF Library. 
120 “Florida Turnpike Report,” 15 Apr 1953, 1-12, Farris Bryant Collection, Public Roads 
and Highways Committee, Box 14, File 13, UF Library. 
121 John K. Hichborn to LeRoy Collins, 10 Nov 1954, Library of University of South 
Florida, Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Turnpike Part 2. 
122 “Florida Turnpike Report.” 
123 Sam P. Turnbull to Thomas B. Manuel, 1 Nov 1954, Library of University of South 
Florida, Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Turnpike Part 2. 
124 “Turnpike Conference,” 26 Nov 1954, Library of University of South Florida, Tampa, 
LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Turnpike Part 2. Coverdale and Colpitts Consulting 
Engineers to LeRoy Collins, 30 Dec 1954, Library of University of South Florida, 
Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Turnpike Part 1.) 
  
151 
                                                                                                                                            
125 Sam P. Brown to LeRoy Collins, 17 Dec 1954, Library of University of South Florida, 
Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Turnpike Part 1. 
126 Joe Grotegut to LeRoy Collins, 16 Dec 1954, Library of University of South Florida, 
Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Turnpike Part 1. 
127 Mrs. Porter Baldwin to LeRoy Collins, 2 Dec 1954, Library of University of South 
Florida, Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Turnpike Part 2. 
128 B.L. Danese to LeRoy Collins, 26 Nov 1954, Library of University of South Florida, 
Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Turnpike Part 2. 
129 Wallace G. Rouse of Wallace G. Rouse Company to LeRoy Collins, 10 Dec 1954, 
Library of University of South Florida, Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Turnpike 
Part 2. 
130 C.R. Thebaut Jr. to Marvin D. Adams, Chairman of Turnpike Authority, 22 Nov 1954, 
Library of University of South Florida, Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Turnpike 
Part 2. Joseph Grotegut to William A. McRae, attorney, Bartow, Florida, Library of 
University of South Florida, Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Turnpike Part 2. 
131 Wallace G. Rouse of Wallace G. Rouse Company to LeRoy Collins, 10 Dec 1954, 
Library of University of South Florida, Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Turnpike 
Part 2. Wallace G. Rouse to Charles S. Ausley, 19 Aug 1954, Library of University of 
South Florida, Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Turnpike Part 2. Wallace G. 
Rouse to Charles S. Ausley, 14 Sept 1954, Library of University of South Florida, 
Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Turnpike Part 2. 
  
152 
                                                                                                                                            
132 Paul D. Speer, “The Municipal Finance Consultant,” Brochure, Library of University 
of South Florida, Tampa, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, Turnpike Part 2. Paul D. Speer 
to Joseph Grotegut, 29 Oct 1954, Library of University of South Florida, Tampa, LeRoy 
Collins Papers, Box 149, Turnpike Part 2 
133 N.C. Hamilton to Joseph Grotegut, 6 Dec 1954, LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, 
Turnpike Part 1.Brochure, Smith Barney & Co., LeRoy Collins Papers, Box 149, 
Turnpike Part 1. 
134 “Turnpike Tale,” Wall Street Journal, 26 Oct 1954. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Thomas Manuel to John Hammer, 29 Jun 1961, Series 468, Carton 1, State of Florida 
Archives, Turnpike Apr-Jun 1961. 
138 “Florida Pressed To Handle Growing Volume Of Traffic,” St. Petersburg Times, 11 
March 1962, 6A. 
139 Miami Chamber of Commerce Resolution, 12 Jan 1953, Library of University of 
Florida, Gainesville, Farris Bryant Collection, Public Roads and Highways Committee, 
Box 14, File 13. 
140 “Florida Turnpike Report,” 15 Apr 1953, 1-12, Library of University of Florida, 
Gainesville, Farris Bryant Collection, Public Roads and Highways Committee, Box 14, 
File 13. 
141 Ibid. 
  
153 
                                                                                                                                            
142 “Statement by Governor Collins,” 21 Dec 1956, Library of University of Florida, 
Gainesville, Farris Bryant Collection, Box 13, Folder 6, Florida Turnpike, 1956-1960. 
143 Alexander Holmes, “Collins Dedicates Pike With Pledge of More Highways,” Tampa 
Morning Tribune, 26 January 1957. 
144 Joe Knetsch, Florida’s Turnpike: The Setting and It’s Beginnings, Bureau of Survey 
and Mapping, Division of State Lands, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 
26 January 2007. 
145 Alexander Holmes, “Collins Dedicates Pike With Pledge of More Highways,” Tampa 
Morning Tribune, 26 January 1957. 
146 “Statement By Governor Collins,” 15 Apr 1957, Library of University of Florida, 
Gainesville, Farris Bryant Collection, Box 13, Folder 6, Florida Turnpike, 1956-1960.  
147 Thomas Manuel to John Hammer, 29 Jun 1961, State of Florida Archives, Series 468, 
Carton 1, Turnpike Apr-Jun 1961. Donald A. Lockheed of Coverdale & Colpitts to 
Thomas B. Manuel, 12 Aug 1960, Library of University of Florida, Gainesville, Farris 
Bryant Collection, Box 13, Folder 6, Florida Turnpike, 1956-1960. 
148 Chairman of the Turnpike Authority Thomas B. Manuel to Chairman of the State 
Road Department Wilbur E. Jones, 3 July 1957, Library of University of Florida, 
Gainesville, Farris Bryant Collection, Box 13, Folder 6, Florida Turnpike, 1956-1960.  
Chairman of the State Road Department Wilbur E. Jones to Chairman of the Turnpike 
Authority Thomas B. Manuel, 22 July 1957, Library of University of Florida, 
Gainesville, Farris Bryant Collection, Box 13, Folder 6, Florida Turnpike, 1956-1960. 
  
154 
                                                                                                                                            
149 Thomas Manuel to John Hammer, 29 Jun 1961, State of Florida Archives, Series 468, 
Carton 1, Turnpike Apr-Jun 1961. 
150 W. Howard Frankland, Vice Chairman of the Turnpike Authority to LeRoy Collins, 
10 Jun 1960, Library of University of Florida, Gainesville, Farris Bryant Collection, Box 
13, Folder 6, Florida Turnpike, 1956-1960. 
151 Thomas Manuel to W.M. Palmer, Jr., Dixie Lime Products Company, 1 Aug 1960, 
Library of University of Florida, Gainesville,  Farris Bryant Collection, Box 13, Folder 6, 
Florida Turnpike, 1956-1960. 
152 LeRoy Collins to Farris Bryant, 19 Aug 1960, Library of University of Florida, 
Gainesville, Farris Bryant Collection, Box 13, Folder 6, Florida Turnpike, 1956-1960. 
153 LeRoy Collins to Farris Bryant, 16 Sept 1960, Library of University of Florida, 
Gainesville, Farris Bryant Collection, Box 13, Folder 6, Florida Turnpike, 1956-1960. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid. 
156 John Hammer to Farris Bryant, 16 Sept 1960, Library of University of Florida, 
Gainesville, Farris Bryant Collection, Box 2, Folder 14. 
157 Jerome C.L. Tripp, President of Tripp & Co. to Farris Bryant, 15 Jun 1961, State of 
Florida Archives, Series 468, Carton 1, Turnpike Apr-Jun 1961. 
158 Thomas Manuel to John Hammer, 29 Jun 1961, State of Florida Archives, Series 468, 
Carton 1, Turnpike Apr-Jun 1961. 
159 W.R. Kidd to Farris Bryant, 16 Dec 1960, Library of University of Florida, 
Gainesville, Farris Bryant Collection, Box 13, Folder 6, Florida Turnpike, 1956-1960. 
  
155 
                                                                                                                                            
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
162 James R. Mathis and Bruce Chappel, “A Guide to the C. Farris Bryant Papers,” 2000, 
http://www.uflib.ufl.edu/spec/pkyonge/Bryant.htm.  
163 Marvin Harper, Our War Stories, (Haverford: Infinity, 2003), 12-15. 
164 Telegram to Farris Bryant, 11 Apr 1955, Library of University of Florida, Gainesville, 
Farris Bryant Collection, Florida Turnpike, 1956-1960, Box 13, Folder 6.  
165 Quoted in letter from Florida Motor Court Association to Farris Bryant, 28 Mar 1955, 
Library of University of Florida, Gainesville, Farris Bryant Collection, Florida Turnpike, 
1956-1960, Box 13, Folder 6. 
166 Letter from Wilbur Jones to Farris Bryant, 3 Feb 1955, Library of University of 
Florida, Gainesville, Farris Bryant Collection, Public Roads and Highways Committee, 
Box 14, File 13. 
167 “Freeway Route Hit,” Florida Explorer, Jan 1969.  Cramer:  “I-75 is a vital link in the 
national system of defense and interstate highways. Let’s not forget that during the Cuban 
missile crisis, when south Florida was jammed with military convoys, the greedy toll 
takers even charged our own soldiers riding in Government vehicles, who were using 
Florida Toll Pike facilities to come to our own defense.”  
168 Letter from Clifton Enfield to William C. Cramer, 25 July 1961, University of Tampa 
Library, Cramer Collection, Highways, 1959-1961.  Clifton Enfield describes the broader 
acceptance of the policy:  “This policy has prevailed continuously since its enunciation 
and as far as I know is still the policy of the Department of Commerce.  This policy has 
  
156 
                                                                                                                                            
also been made known to the Congress, and it apparently has received Congressional 
approval by acquiescence.  It was fully brought to the attention of Congress by a report to 
the Subcommittee on Public Roads of the Committee on Public Works of the United 
States Senate by the Comptroller General of the United States, in connection with his 
review of cost estimates for completion of the National System of Interstate and Defense 
Highways, which report was submitted on May 16, 1958. 
169 Letter from Clifton Enfield to Cramer, 25 July 1961, University of Tampa Library, 
Cramer Collection, Highways, 1959-1961. 
170 Letter from N.G. Sherouse to A.S. Herlong, 3 July 1961, University of Tampa 
Library, Cramer Collection, Highways, 1959-1961. 
171 Cramer Press Release, “The Plan for the Sunshine State Toll Parkway Extension and 
its Effect on Florida’s Free Interstate System,” undated, University of Tampa Library, 
Cramer Collection, Highways, 1959-1961. 
172 Letter from N.G. Sherouse to Cramer, 27 July 1961, University of Tampa Library, 
Cramer Collection, Highways, 1959-1961. 
173 Letter from Cramer to N.G. Sherouse, 1 August 1961, University of Tampa Library, 
Cramer Collection, Highways, 1959-1961. 
174 Cramer Press Release, “The Plan for the Sunshine State Toll Parkway Extension and 
its Effect on Florida’s Free Interstate System,” undated, University of Tampa Library, 
Cramer Collection, Highways, 1959-1961. 
175 Letter from Cramer to N.G. Sherouse, 27 July 1961, University of Tampa Library, 
Cramer Collection, Highways, 1959-1961. 
  
157 
                                                                                                                                            
176 Cramer Press Release, 6 August 1961, University of Tampa Library, Cramer 
Collection, Highways, 1959-1961. 
177 Letter from Ellis L. Armstrong to Cramer, 15 Nov 1960, University of Tampa Library, 
Cramer Collection, Highways, 1959-1961.   
178 Testimony of Cramer, 21 August 1961, University of Tampa Library, Cramer 
Collection, Highways, 1959-1961. Cramer cites the Comptroller General in his Review of 
Cost Estimates for Completion of the Interstate and Defense Systems in January of 1958 
179 Bills described in: “Toll Facilities on the Interstate Highway System,” Congressional 
Record, 16 January 1967, University of Tampa Library, Cramer Collection, Highways, 
1966-67.   
180 Cramer Press Release, “The Plan for the Sunshine State Toll Parkway Extension and 
its Effect on Florida’s Free Interstate System,” undated, University of Tampa Library, 
Cramer Collection, Highways, 1959-1961. 
181 Telegram from Cramer to Bryant, 23 August 1961, University of Tampa Library, 
Cramer Collection, Highways, 1959-1961. 
182 Cramer Press Release, “The Plan for the Sunshine State Toll Parkway Extension and 
its Effect on Florida’s Free Interstate System,” undated, University of Tampa Library, 
Cramer Collection, Highways, 1959-1961. 
183 “The Agreement Says No Competing Roads,” St. Petersburg Times, 15 Sept 1961. 
184 Cramer Press Release, 19 September 1961, University of Tampa Library, Cramer 
Collection, Highways, 1959-1961. 
  
158 
                                                                                                                                            
185 Cramer Press Release, “Effect of Florida State Toll Turnpike on Interstate 95,” 23 July 
1961, University of Tampa Library, Cramer Collection, Highways, 1959-1961. 
186 “Report to the People of the 8th District of Florida,” 21 October 1966, House 
Congressional Record, 27458. 
187 “Storm Clouds, Address by Hon. William C. Cramer […] at the annual convention of 
the American Road Builders’ Association, Denver, Colo., 23 Feb 1966. Quoted in 
“Representative Cramer Makes Highly Important Speech on Nation’s Highway 
Problems,” House Congressional Record, 28 Feb 1966, A1006. 
188 “Federal-Aid Highway Reform Act,” House Congressional Record, 24 Jan 1963, 907-
10. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid. 
192 H.R. 9395, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 21 Sept 1961, University of Tampa Library, 
Cramer Collection, Highways, 1959-1961. 
193 “Federal-Aid Highway Reform Act,” House Congressional Record, 24 Jan 1963, 907-
10. 
194 “Minority Position Paper,” University of Tampa Library, Cramer Collection, 
Highways, 1959-1961. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Ibid. 
  
159 
                                                                                                                                            
198 “Supplemental Views,” 16 Jan 1962, 1-3, University of Tampa Library, Cramer 
Collection, Federal Highways.  Cites House Report 1246 and Hearing, Dec 5-13, 337-
338, 343. 
199 “Supplemental Views,” Cites House Report 1246 and Hearing, Dec 5-13, 337-338, 
343. 
200 Ibid. 
201 “Supplemental Views,” 16 Jan 1962, 11.  
202 Ibid., 4-5. 
203 Ibid., 11.  
204 Ibid., 10.  
205 Ibid., 17.  
206 Ibid., 18.  
207 Ibid., 18-19. 
208 Ibid., 19. 
209 “Federal-Aid Highway Reform Act,” House Congressional Record, 24 Jan 1963, 907-
10. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid. 
212 “Tough Bill Aimed At Highway Fraud,” Boston Herald, 24 Feb 1963. 
213 “Address of [Cramer] delivered by [Clifton Enfield] at the School of Advanced 
Studies in Real Property Acquisition,” House Congressional Record, 24 Apr 1963, 
A2447.  “Highway Legislation,” St. Petersburg Times, 5 Apr 1963. 
  
160 
                                                                                                                                            
214 “The Need for Highway Reform Legislation,” House Congressional Record, 23 Aug 
1963, A5423. 
215 “Address of [Cramer] delivered by [Clifton Enfield] at the School of Advanced 
Studies in Real Property Acquisition,” House Congressional Record, 24 Apr 1963, 
A2446. 
216 Ibid., A2446-7. 
217 “The Need for Highway Reform Legislation,” House Congressional Record, 23 Aug 
1963, A5423-6. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Ibid. 
220 James Wright, “Highway Robbery: Fraud In Road Building Is Wasting Millions,” 
Saturday Evening Post, 30 Nov 1963, 19-21. 
221 Ibid., 22. 
222 Ibid., 22. 
223 Ibid., 22. 
224 Ibid., 22. 
225 “Storm Clouds, Address by Hon. William C. Cramer […] at the annual convention of 
the American Road Builders’ Association, Denver, Colo., 23 Feb 1966. Quoted in 
“Representative Cramer Makes Highly Important Speech on Nation’s Highway 
Problems,” House Congressional Record, 28 Feb 1966, A1006. 
226 “Highway Program Jeopardized by Johnson Administration,” House Congressional 
Record, 6 Feb 1967, H 1015. 
  
161 
                                                                                                                                            
227 “On Highway Beautification – Small Business Proposes Billboards for Motels,” 
House Congressional Record, 20 Apr 1967, H 4426. 
228 “Legislation to Remove Traffic Hazards from our Highways,” House Congressional 
Record, 28 Aug 1967, H 11357.  Other hazards included “guardrails that constitute 
hazards themselves because of improper location or installation; guardrails that proptect 
highway structures from damage rather than motorists from death; culverts and bridge 
piers so located as to kill people who, perhaps momentarily, lose control of their car and 
leave the paved traveled way; ditches and cut and fill banks so steep and so close to the 
highway as to make it virtually impossible for a driver to avoid overturning if he leaves 
the traveled lanes; […] ‘no hitchhiking’ signs […] and the erection of ‘motorist service 
signs’ inside the highway right of way.” 
229  “Highway Program Jeopardized by Johnson Administration,” House Congressional 
Record, 6 Feb 1967, H 1021. 
230  Ibid. 
231  Ibid. 
232 Lyndon Johnson speech, given on 13 Aug 1964.  Quoted in “Highway Program 
Jeopardized by Johnson Administration,” House Congressional Record, 6 Feb 1967, H 
1015-6. 
233 “Interstate Highway Authorizations Bill to Complete the System on Schedule – H.R. 
6391,” House Congressional Record, 17 March 1965, 5142. 
  
162 
                                                                                                                                            
234 Lyndon Johnson speech given on 29 Nov 1966.  Quoted in “Highway Program 
Jeopardized by Johnson Administration,” House Congressional Record, 6 Feb 1967, H 
1016.   
235 “Report to the People of the 8th District, Florida, on the 89th Congress,” House 
Congressional Record, 21 Oct 1966, 27458. 
236 “Storm Clouds, Address by Hon. William C. Cramer […] at the annual convention of 
the American Road Builders’ Association, Denver, Colo., 23 Feb 1966. Quoted in 
“Representative Cramer Makes Highly Important Speech on Nation’s Highway 
Problems,” House Congressional Record, 28 Feb 1966, A1008. 
237 “Highway Program Jeopardized by Johnson Administration,” House Congressional 
Record, 6 Feb 1967, H 1016. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Ibid.  Detailed analyses of Lyndon Johnson’s cutbacks are also available in the 
Congressional Record.  
240 “Highway Program Jeopardized by Johnson Administration,” House Congressional 
Record, 6 Feb 1967, H 1018. 
241 Ibid. 
242 Ibid. 
243 “Highway Cutbacks Again --- A Cynical, Political and Largely Ineffective Response 
Intended to Bludgeon Congress into Passing a Surtax,” House Congressional Record, 11 
Oct 1967, H 13292-3. 
244 Ibid. 
  
163 
                                                                                                                                            
245 “A New Transportation Department,” House Congressional Record, 28 Apr 1966, 
8828-9. 
246 “Address by the Honorable James C. Cleveland,” House Congressional Record, 6 
Nov 1967, A 5443. 
247 “A New Transportation Department,” House Congressional Record, 28 Apr 1966, 
8828-9.  Congressman Bow’s comments in “Federal Aid Highway Act,” House 
Congressional Record, 11 Aug 1966, 18257. 
248 Ibid. 
249 “Federal Aid Highway Act,” House Congressional Record, 11 Aug 1966, 18252-3. 
250 Ibid. 
251 Ibid., 18251-2. 
252 Ibid. 
253 Ibid., 18263. 
254 Ibid., 18264. 
255 Ibid., 18254, 3. 
256  Ibid. 
257  Ibid., 18264.  
258  Ibid., 18268. 
259 Ibid., 18268-9. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Ibid. 
  
164 
                                                                                                                                            
262 “Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966,” House Congressional Record, 31 Aug 1966, 
20454. 
263 “Bradenton Chided,” St. Petersburg Times, 11 Feb 1965. 
264 “Cramer Asks New Highway Extension Here,” St. Petersburg Times, 16 Oct 1957.  
265 “No Federal Tampa-Dade Pike Aid Seen,” Tampa Tribune, 2 Feb 1962. 
266 “Cramer Sees Tampa-Miami Route,” Tampa Tribune, 3 Feb 1962, 7A. 
267 Summary provided in:  “Additional Highway Segments Need to be Added to the 
Interstate System This Congress,” House Congressional Record, 16 Jan 1967.   
268 “States are Finally Going to be Consulted,” House Congressional Record, 28 April 
1966, 8832-3.  The record includes correspondence between Cramer, Rex Whitton, and 
Floyd Bowen. 
269 Ibid. 
270 “States are Finally Going to be Consulted,” House Congressional Record, 28 April 
1966, 8833-4.  “A New Transportation Department,” House Congressional Record, 28 
Apr 1966, 8828-9. 
271 “Federal Aid Highway Act,” House Congressional Record, 11 Aug 1966, 18251. 
272 “Additional Highway Segments,” House Congressional Record, 16 January 1967, 
H223. 
273 Ibid. 
274 “Toll Facilities on the Interstate Highway System,” House Congressional Record, 16 
Jan 1967.   
  
165 
                                                                                                                                            
275  “Authorizing Modifications in the Interstate System,” House Congressional Record, 
20 Nov 1967, H 15577.  The Bureau of Public Roads was initially charged with making 
the report.  In or by 1967 the bulk of federal highway authority had been transferred from 
the Bureau of Public Roads to the Department of Transportation. 
276 House Resolution 13933, 90th Congress, 2 Jan 1968. 
277 “Dedication of the William C. Cramer Memorial Highway,” House Congressional 
Record, 1 Mar 2006. 
278 Ibid. 
279 Ibid. 
280 “Cramer Playing Politics On I-75 Link?” Tampa Tribune, 25 August 1968, B-1. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Tampa Tribune, 11 Dec 1968. 
283 “Cramer Playing Politics On I-75 Link?” Tampa Tribune, 25 August 1968, B-1. 
284 “Eastward Shift Of Toll Route Is Proposed,” St. Petersburg Times, 26 Mar 1968. 
285 “I-75 Extension To Include Belt Around Tampa, St. Pete,” Tampa Tribune, 24 Nov 
1968.  “For I-75, Bi-Partisan Victory,” Tampa Tribune, Date Unknown, within weeks 
after 14 Dec 1968, Editorial. 
286 Tampa Tribune, 11 Dec 1968. 
287 “Boyd Approves I-75 Extension to Miami,” St. Petersburg Times, 14 Dec 1968. 
288 “Tampa-Miami I-75 Leg Given Federal Approval,” Tampa Tribune, 14 Dec 1968. 
289 Ibid. 
  
166 
                                                                                                                                            
290  “For I-75, Bi-Partisan Victory,” Tampa Tribune, Date Unknown, within weeks after 
14 Dec 1968, Editorial. 
291  Ibid. 
292 “I-75 Extension To Include Belt Around Tampa, St. Pete,” Tampa Tribune, November 
24, 1968. 
293 “Toll Barriers Might Mar I-75 Extension To Miami,” St. Petersburg Times, 17 Dec 
1968. 
294 “Interstate 75: ‘Missing Link’ In Political Thought?” St. Petersburg Times, December 
29, 1968, Charles Stafford. 
295 “Mickey Mouse Road Not Answer on Tampa Link,” originally printed in Miami 
Herald editorial reprinted in Florida Explorer, Jan 1969, 7. 
296 “Only the Bond Hustlers Like Mr. Boyd’s Tollway Sandwich,” Tampa Tribune, 28 
Dec 1968, originally in Miami Herald. 
297  “Tampa-Miami I-75 Leg Given Federal Approval,” Tampa Tribune, 14 Dec 1968. 
298 “Toll Barriers Might Mar I-75 Extension To Miami,” St. Petersburg Times, 17 Dec 
1968. 
299 Ibid. 
300 “Only the Bond Hustlers Like Mr. Boyd’s Tollway Sandwich,” Tampa Tribune, 28 
Dec 1968, originally in Miami Herald. 
301 “Public Interest in Roads,” originally printed in St. Petersburg Times editorial; 
reprinted in Florida Explorer, Jan 1969, 7. “Hard Way to Miami,” originally printed in 
Miami Herald editorial; reprinted in Florida Explorer, Jan 1969, 7.  
  
167 
                                                                                                                                            
302 “Mickey Mouse Road Not Answer on Tampa Link,” originally printed in Miami 
Herald editorial; reprinted in Florida Explorer, Jan 1969, 7. 
303 “Freeway Route Hit,” Florida Explorer, Jan 1969.  Amidst the biting criticisms of the 
Florida Turnpike printed in the Florida Explorer, the Turnpike ran the following 
advertisement:  “Talk about golf!  There’s a total of 60 regulation courses within a ten-
minute drive of Turnpike exits.  Reach them faster, smoother, safer on Florida’s ‘Main 
Street’ . . . FLORIDA’S TURNPIKE.  Along the way, convenient service plazas feature 
good food, car service, citrus and gift shops . . . and playgrounds where kids can unwind.  
We’ll even wash your car FREE at our Okahumpka Service Plaza.  It’s all part of the 
delightful difference when you drive down our Main Street . . . FLORIDA’S 
TURNPIKE.”   
304 “Faint Heart Never Won,” originally in Tampa Tribune, reprinted in Florida Explorer, 
Jan 1969. 
305 “Boyd Blamed For Route Linking ‘Alley,’ Freeway,” originally in St. Petersburg 
Times, reprinted in Florida Explorer, Jan 1969. 
306 “Interstate 75: ‘Missing Link’ In Political Thought?” St. Petersburg Times, December 
29, 1968. 
307 “Volpe Asked To Change Route,” St. Petersburg Times, 8 Jan 1969. 
308 “Faint Heart Never Won,” originally printed in Tampa Tribune editorial, reprinted in 
Florida Explorer, Jan 1969.  “I-75 Spur Among 7 Tampa Expressways in SRD Plans,” 
Tampa Tribune, 8 Jan 1969.  “Boyd Blamed For Route Linking ‘Alley,’ Freeway,” 
originally in SPT, reprinted in Florida Explorer, Jan 1969. 
  
168 
                                                                                                                                            
309 “Toll Barriers Might Mar I-75 Extension To Miami,” St. Petersburg Times, 17 Dec 
1968. 
310 Ibid. 
311 “Interstate 75: ‘Missing Link’ In Political Thought?” St. Petersburg Times, December 
29, 1968. 
312 “For I-75, Bi-Partisan Victory,” Tampa Tribune, Date Unknown, within weeks after 
14 Dec 1968, Editorial. 
313 “Two-Lane Thinking On Roads,” originally printed in Miami Herald, reprinted in 
Florida Explorer, Jan 1969. 
314 “Cramer Calls Toll I-75 Virtually Impossible,” St. Petersburg Times, 10 Apr 1969. 
315 “Bypass Okay Expected,” St. Petersburg Times, 7 Oct 1969. 
316 “Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1969,” House Congressional Record, 25 Nov 1969, 
H11360-9. 
317 “Bypass Okay Expected,” St. Petersburg Times, 7 Oct 1969.  
At the time, Cramer was already in the midst of a Republican primary contest against 
Lieutenant Governor Ray Osborne.  “Political watchers” puzzled over why Cramer did 
not delay the bypass announcement until a more opportune moment in his campaign.  
The Times followed this campaign news with the tantalizing lead of an anonymous 
“insider:” “There’s more to come.” 
318 Interview with Sara Cramer, 3 March 2008. 
319 St. Petersburg Times, 30 March 1965. 
320 “Gurney Eying Florida Seat in U.S. Senate,” St. Petersburg Times, 29 Dec 1965. 
  
169 
                                                                                                                                            
321 “Gurney Sees Cramer In ’70 Senate Race,” St. Petersburg Times, 8 Jan 1969. 
322 Ibid. 
323 “Republicans Deprecate ‘Dump Cramer’ Talk,” Tampa Tribune, 25 May 1969. 
324 “Bypass Okay Expected,” St. Petersburg Times, 7 Oct 1969. 
325 “Gurney Predicts Cramer Senate Victory in 1970,” St. Petersburg Times, 10 Apr 
1969. 
326 “Republicans Deprecate ‘Dump Cramer’ Talk,” Tampa Tribune, 25 May 1969. 
327 Letter from Edward Gurney to William and Alice Cramer, 24 March 1970, University 
of Tampa Library, Cramer Collection, Senate Bid. 
328 Edward Gurney News Release, 20 April 1970, University of Tampa Library, Cramer 
Collection, Senate Bid. 
329 Letter from Dorothy Swanson to Editor, Orland Sentinel Star, 28 May 1970, 
University of Tampa Library, Cramer Collection, Senate Bid. 
330 Bruce H. Kalk, “The Carswell Affair: The Politics of a Supreme Court Nomination in 
the Nixon Administration,” American Journal of Legal History, Vol 42, No 3, Jul 1998, 
271-2.   
331 Ibid., 276. 
332 Ibid., 277. 
333 Ibid., 278, 279, 282. 
334 Edward Gurney News Release, 20 April 1970, University of Tampa Library, Cramer 
Collection, Senate Bid. 
 
  
170 
                                                                                                                                            
335 “Republicans Vying,” St. Petersburg Times, 30 Aug 1970, D1. 
336 Ibid. 
337 Ibid. 
338 Ibid. 
339 Website: “Our Campaigns,” 
http://www.ourcampaigns.com/RaceDetail.html?RaceID=6538. 
340 “Federal Aid Highway Act of 1970,” House Congressional Record, 25 Nov 1970, 
10767-8. 
341 “Cramer Proposes Long-Range Program in Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970,” 
House Congressional Record, 14 May 1970, H4419. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Ibid. 
344 Ibid. 
345 “Federal Aid Highway Act of 1970,” House Congressional Record, 25 Nov 1970, 
10767. 
346 Ibid. 
347 Ibid., 10767-76. 
348 “Interstate 4 Last Stretch Is Dedicated,” St. Petersburg Times, 9 Mar 1965.  “4 
Separate Problems,” St. Petersburg Times, 17 Dec 1965. 
349 “Interstate 75: Changes To Be Many For Florida’s Economy,” 21 Feb 1965.  “Florida 
Leads On I-75 Project,” St. Petersburg Times, 29 Sept 1968. 
350 “Interstate 75 Begins To Push Into Pinellas,” St. Petersburg Times, 6 May 1971. 
  
171 
                                                                                                                                            
351 “I-75 Goal Seen 10 Years Away,” St. Petersburg Times, 25 March 1972.  “Public 
pressure called a key to quicker I-75 completion,” St. Petersburg Times, 25 Aug 1975. 
352 “I-75 To Miami – In 34 Years,” Tampa Tribune, date unknown. 
353 “I-75 slowly makes its way southward,” St. Petersburg Times, 1 Oct 1978. 
354 “I-4 marking 50-year milestone,” Orlando Sentinel, 29 Jun 2006. 
355 “Interstate 75: Changes,” St. Petersburg Times, 21 Feb 1965.  “A Century’s Top 10,” 
Gainesville Sun, 1 Jan 2000. 
356 “2 older shopping centers in need of newer tenants,” Palm Beach Post, 8 Jun 1986. 
357 “I-75 slowly makes its way southward,” St. Petersburg Times, 1 Oct 1978. 
358 “Officials Hike Through Wilds of Loxahatchee,” Miami Herald, 17 May 1974. 
359 “Bird Sanctuary Might Delay I-95,” Palm Beach Daily News, 22 July 1973. 
360 “Roads to Somewhere,” Economist, 24 Jun 2006, 36.  “The Roads Most Traveled,” 
Washington Post, 29 Jun 2006. 
361 David B. Keever, et al., Moving Ahead: The American Public Speaks on Roadways 
and Transportation in Communities, 1 Feb 2001, 3.  “Americans spending more time 
stuck in traffic,” Associated Press, 18 Sept 2007. 
362 “I-4 marking 50-year milestone,” Orlando Sentinel, 29 Jun 2006.  “You already hated 
I-4,” Orlando Sentinel, 25 Apr 2007. 
363 “Deadly I-75,” Gainesville Sun, 14 Oct 2007. 
364 “Turnpike at 50,” Miami Herald, 26 Jan 2007.  “50 years of travelers and tolls,” Palm 
Beach Post, 23 Jan 2007. 
  
172 
                                                                                                                                            
365 “Who’s driving this road project,” St. Petersburg Times, 4 Mar 2007.  “It’s not too late 
to get your own exit ramp,” St. Petersburg Times, 6 Mar 2007.  “Can Crist be sold on 
huge toll road plan,” St. Petersburg Times, 11 Feb 2007.  Charlie Crist, speaking at 
University of South Florida, St. Petersburg, 2007.  “Crist signals break with past on 
roads,” St. Petersburg Times, 6 Mar 2007. 
366 “Exercise in utility,” St. Petersburg Times, 14 Feb 2007. 
367 “Transportation panel won’t include Polk,” St. Petersburg Times, 8 Mar 2007. 
368 “They’ve built a disconnector,” St. Petersburg Times, 18 Jan 2007. 
369 “Federal Aid Highway Act of 1970,” House Congressional Record, 25 Nov 1970, 
10768. 
370 Barack Obama, Presidential Election Victory Speech, 4 Nov 2008. 
371 Barack Obama and Joe Biden, Strengthening America’s Transportation 
Infrastructure, www.barackobama.com. 
372 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
173 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
Archives and Collections 
 
George Smathers Library, University of Florida, Gainesville.  Farris Bryant Papers.   
MacDonald-Kelce Library, University of Tampa.  William Cramer Papers.  
Nelson Poynter Memorial Library, University of South Florida, St. Petersburg. 
State of Florida Archives, Tallahassee. 
University of South Florida Library, Tampa. LeRoy Collins Papers.  
 
Government Records 
 
Congressional Record. Washington, D.C., 1956-71. 
Knetsch, Joe. Florida’s Turnpike: The Setting and It’s Beginnings. Bureau of Survey and 
Mapping, Division of State Lands, Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection. 26 January 2007. 
 
 
 
 
  
174 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
Newspapers 
 
Boston Herald 
Florida Explorer 
Gainesville Sun 
Miami Herald 
New York Times 
Orlando Sentinel 
Palm Beach Daily News 
Palm Beach Post 
St. Petersburg Evening Independent 
St. Petersburg Times 
Tampa Daily Times 
Tampa Morning Times 
Tampa Morning Tribune 
Tampa Tribune 
Wall Street Journal 
Washington Post 
 
 
 
 
  
175 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
Books and Articles 
 
 
 
Arsenault, Raymond. St. Petersburg and the Florida Dream. Gainesville: University 
Press of Florida, 1996. 
Black, Earl, and Merle Black. The Rise of Southern Republicans. Belknap: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. 
Colburn, David R. From Yellow Dog Democrats to Red State Republicans: Florida and 
Its Politics since 1940. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007. 
Dyckman, Martin A. Floridian of His Century: The Courage of Governor LeRoy Collins. 
Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006. 
Hathorn, Billy B. “Cramer v. Kirk: The Florida Republican Schism of 1970.” Florida 
Historical Quarterly. April 1990. 
Hofstadter, Richard. The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Parrington. Chicago: 
University Press of Chicago, 1979. 
Kalk, Bruce H. “The Carswell Affair: The Politics of a Supreme Court Nomination in the 
Nixon Administration.” American Journal of Legal History, Vol 42, No 3, Jul 
1998. 
Lawson, Stephen F., and Charles Payne. Debating the Civil Rights Movement, 1945-
1968. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998. 
  
176 
                                                                                                                                            
Mormino, Gary R. Land of Sunshine, State of Dreams: A Social History of Modern 
Florida.  Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005. 
Obama, Barack, and Joe Biden. Strengthening America’s Transportation Infrastructure. 
www.barackobama.com. 
Owen, Wilfred.  The Metropolitan Transportation Problem. Revised Edition. 
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966. 
Paterniti, Michael. “America in Extremis: How Florida Became the New California.” 
New York Times Magazine, 21 Apr 2002. 
Paulson, Darryl. William C. Cramer and the Second Republican Revolution. Unpublished 
manuscript. 
Preston, Howard Lawrence. Dirt Roads to Dixie: Accessibility and Modernization in the 
South, 1885-1935. Knoxville: University Press of Tennessee, 1991. 
Rose, Mark H. Interstate: Express Highway Politics: 1939-1989.  Revised Edition, 
Knoxville: University Press of Tennessee, 1990. 
Smiljanich, Dorothy Weik. Then Sings My Soul: The Scott Kelly Story. Florida Historical 
Society Press, 2007. 
Wright, James. “Highway Robbery: Fraud In Road Building Is Wasting Millions.” 
Saturday Evening Post, 30 Nov 1963. 
 
 
 
 
